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IF MOSES WAS AN EGYPTIAN . . .[1]

BY

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In an earlier publication [2] I have tried to strengthen by a new argument the suggestion that the man Moses, the liberator and law-giver of the Jewish people, was not a Jew, but an Egyptian. That his name derived from the Egyptian vocabulary had long been observed, though not duly appreciated. I added to this consideration the further one that the interpretation of the exposure myth attaching to Moses necessitated the conclusion that he was an Egyptian whom a people needed to make into a Jew. At the end of my essay I said that important and far-reaching conclusions could be drawn from the suggestion that Moses was an Egyptian ; but I was not prepared to uphold them publicly, since they were based only on psychological probabilities and lacked objective proof. The more significant the possibilities thus discerned the more cautious is one about exposing them to the critical attack of the outside world without any secure foundation—like an iron monument with feet of clay. No probability, however seductive, can protect us from error ; even if all parts of a problem seem to fit together like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, one has to remember that the probable need not necessarily be the truth and the truth not always probable. And, lastly, it is not attractive to be classed with the scholastics and talmudists who are satisfied to exercise their ingenuity—unconcerned how far removed their conclusions may be from the truth.

[1] This is the second section of a book entitled *Moses and Monotheism* which will be published in the spring by the Hogarth Press, London, and Knopf, Inc., New York.

[2] 'Moses an Egyptian,' JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, p. 291.

Notwithstanding these misgivings, which weigh as heavily to-day as they did then, out of the conflict of my motives the decision has emerged to follow up my first essay by this contribution. But once again it is only a part of the whole, and not the most important part.

I

If, then, Moses was an Egyptian, the first gain from this suggestion is a new riddle, one difficult to answer. When a people or a tribe [3] prepares for a great undertaking it is to be expected that one of them should make himself their leader or be chosen for this rôle. But what could have induced a distinguished Egyptian—perhaps a prince, priest or high official—to place himself at the head of a throng of culturally inferior immigrants, and to leave the country with them, is not easy to conjecture. The well-known contempt of the Egyptians for foreigners makes such a proceeding especially unlikely. Indeed, I am inclined to think this is why even those historians who recognized the name as Egyptian, and ascribed all the wisdom of Egypt to him, were not willing to entertain the obvious possibility that Moses was an Egyptian.

This first difficulty is followed by a second. We must not forget that Moses was not only the political leader of the Jews settled in Egypt, he was also their law-giver and educator and the man who forced them to adopt a new religion, which is still to-day called Mosaic after him. But can a single person create a new religion so easily? And when someone wishes to influence the religion of another would not the most natural thing be to convert him to his own? The Jewish people in Egypt were certainly not without some kind of religion, and if Moses, who gave them a new religion, was an Egyptian, then the surmise cannot be rejected that this other new religion was the Egyptian one.

This possibility encounters an obstacle: the sharp contrast between the Jewish religion attributed to Moses and the Egyptian one. The former is a grandiosely rigid monotheism. There is only one God, unique, omnipotent, unapproachable. The sight of his countenance cannot be borne; one must not make an image of him, not even breathe his name. In the Egyptian religion, on the other hand, there is a bewildering mass of deities of differing importance and provenance. Some of them are personifications of great natural powers like heaven

[3] We have no inkling what numbers were concerned in the Exodus.

and earth, sun and moon. Then we find an abstraction such as Maat (Justice, Truth) or a grotesque creature like the dwarfish Bes. Most of them, however, are local gods from the time when the land was divided into numerous provinces. They have the shapes of animals as if they had not yet overcome their origin from the old totem animals. They are not clearly differentiated, barely distinguished by special functions attributed to some of them. The hymns in praise of these gods tell the same thing about each of them, identify them with one another without any misgivings in a way that would confuse us hopelessly. Names of deities are combined with one another, so that one becomes degraded almost to an epithet of the other. Thus in the best period of the 'New Empire' the main god of the city of Thebes is called Amon-Re, in which combination the first part signifies the ram-headed city-god, whereas Re is the name of the hawk-headed Sun-God of On. Magic and ceremonial, amulets and formulas, dominated the service of these gods, as they did the daily life of the Egyptians.

Some of these differences may easily derive from the contrast in principle between a strict monotheism and an unlimited polytheism. Others are obviously consequences of a difference in intellectual level; one religion is very near to the primitive, the other has soared to the heights of sublime abstraction. Perhaps it is these two characteristics that occasionally give one the impression that the contrast between the Mosaic and the Egyptian religion is one intended and purposely accentuated: for example, when the one religion severely condemns any kind of magic or sorcery which flourishes so abundantly in the other; or when the insatiable zest of the Egyptian for making images of his gods in clay, stone and metal, to which our museums owe so much, is contrasted with the way in which the making of the image of any living or visionary being is bluntly forbidden.

There is yet another difference between the two religions, which the explanations we have attempted do not touch. No other people of antiquity has done so much to deny death, has made such careful provision for an after-life; in accordance with this the death-god Osiris, the ruler of that other world, was the most popular and indisputable of all Egyptian gods. The early Jewish religion, on the other hand, had entirely relinquished immortality; the possibility of an existence after death was never mentioned in any place. And this is all the more remarkable since later experience has shewn that the belief in a life beyond can very well be reconciled with a monotheistic religion.

We had hoped the suggestion that Moses was an Egyptian would

prove enlightening and stimulating in many different respects. But our first deduction from this suggestion—that the new religion he gave the Jews was his own, the Egyptian one—has foundered on the difference, nay the striking contrast, between the two religions.

II

A strange fact in the history of the Egyptian religion, which was recognized and appraised relatively late, opens up another point of view. It is still possible that the religion Moses gave to his Jewish people was yet his own, *an* Egyptian religion though not *the* Egyptian one.

In the glorious Eighteenth Dynasty, when Egypt became for the first time a world power, a young Pharaoh ascended the throne about 1375 B.C., who first called himself Amenhotep (IV) like his father, but later on changed his name—and not only his name. This king undertook to force upon his subjects a new religion, one contrary to their ancient traditions and to all their familiar habits. It was a strict monotheism, the first attempt of its kind in the history of the world—as far as we know—and religious intolerance, which was foreign to antiquity before this and for long after, was inevitably born with the belief in one God. But Amenhotep's reign lasted only for seventeen years ; very soon after his death in 1358 the new religion was swept away and the memory of the heretic king proscribed. From the ruins of his new capital which he had built and dedicated to his God, and from the inscriptions in the rock tombs belonging to it, we derive the little knowledge we possess of him. Everything we can learn about this remarkable, indeed unique, person is worthy of the greatest interest.[4]

Everything new must have its roots in what was before. The origin of Egyptian monotheism can be traced back a fair distance with some certainty.[5] In the School of the Priests in the Sun Temple at On (Heliopolis) tendencies had for some time been at work developing the idea of an universal God and stressing his ethical aspects. Maat, the Goddess of truth, order and justice, was a daughter of the Sun God Re. Already under Amenhotep III, the father and predecessor of the

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[4] Breasted called him ' The first individual in human history '.

[5] The account I give here follows closely J. H. Breasted's *History of Egypt*, 1906, and *The Dawn of Conscience*, 1936, and the corresponding sections in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. II.

reformer, the worship of the Sun God was in the ascendant, probably in opposition to the worship of Amon of Thebes, who had become over prominent. An ancient name of the Sun-God Aton or Atum was rediscovered, and in this Aton religion the young king found a movement he had no need to create, but one which he could join.

Political conditions in Egypt had about that time begun to exert a lasting influence on Egyptian religion. Through the victorious sword of the great conqueror Thothmes III Egypt had become a world power. Nubia in the south, Palestine, Syria and a part of Mesopotamia in the north had been added to the Empire. This imperialism was reflected in religion as Universality and Monotheism. Since Pharaoh's solicitude now extended beyond Egypt to Nubia and Syria, Deity itself had to give up its national limitation and the new God of the Egyptians had to become like Pharaoh—the unique and unlimited sovereign of the world known to the Egyptians. Besides, it was natural that as the frontiers extended Egypt should become accessible to foreign influences ; some of the king's wives were Asiatic princesses,[6] and possibly even direct encouragement of monotheism had penetrated from Syria.

Amenhotep never denied his accession to the Sun Cult of On. In the two hymns to Aton, which have been preserved to us through the inscriptions in the rock tombs and were probably composed by him, he praises the sun as the creator and preserver of all living beings in and outside Egypt with a fervour such as recurs many centuries after only in the psalms in honour of the Jewish god Jahve. But he did not stop at this astonishing anticipation of scientific knowledge concerning the effect of sunlight. There is no doubt that he went further : that he worshipped the sun not as a material object, but as a symbol of a Divine Being whose energy was manifested in his rays.[7]

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[6] Perhaps even Amenhotep's beloved spouse Nofertete.

[7] Breasted, *History of Egypt*, p. 360 : 'But however evident the Heliopolitan origin of the new state religion might be, it was not merely sun-worship ; the word Aton was employed in the place of the old word for "god" (nuter), and the god is clearly distinguished from the material sun.' 'It is evident that what the king was deifying was the force by which the Sun made itself felt on earth' (*Dawn of Conscience*, p. 279). Erman's opinion of a formula in honour of the god is similar : A. Erman (*Die Ägyptische Religion*, 1905). 'There are . . . words which are meant to express in an abstract form the fact that not the star itself was worshipped, but the Being that manifested itself in it.'

But we do scant justice to the king if we see in him only the adherent and protector of an Aton religion which had already existed before him. His activity was much more energetic. He added the something new that turned into monotheism the doctrine of an universal god: the quality of exclusiveness. In one of his hymns it is stated in so many words: 'Oh, Thou only God! There is no other God than Thou.' [8] And we must not forget that to appraise the new doctrine it is not enough to know its positive content only; nearly as important is its negative side, the knowledge of what it repudiates. It would be a mistake, too, to suppose that the new religion sprang to life ready and fully equipped like Athene out of Zeus' forehead. Everything rather goes to show that during Amenhotep's reign it was strengthened so as to attain greater clarity, consistency, harshness and intolerance. Probably this development took place under the influence of the violent opposition among the priests of Amon that raised its head against the reforms of the king. In the sixth year of Amenhotep's reign this enmity had grown to such an extent that the king changed his name, of which the now proscribed name of the god Amon was a part. Instead of Amenhotep he called himself Ikhnaton.[9] But not only from his name did he eliminate that of the hated God, but also from all inscriptions and even where he found it in his father's name, Amenhotep III. Soon after his change of name Ikhnaton left Thebes, which was under Amon's rule, and built a new capital lower down the river which he called Akhetaton (Horizon of Aton). Its ruins are now called Tell-el-Amarna.[10]

The persecution by the king was directed foremost against Amon, but not against him alone. Everywhere in the Empire the temples were closed, the services forbidden, and the ecclesiastical property seized. Indeed, the king's zeal went so far as to cause an inquiry to be made into the inscriptions of old monuments in order to efface the word 'God' whenever it was used in the plural.[11] It is not to be wondered

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[8] *Idem*, p. 374, *History of Egypt.*

[9] I follow Breasted's spelling in this name; (the accepted English spelling is Akhenaten). The king's new name means approximately the same as his former one: God is satisfied. Compare our Godfrey and the German Gotthold.

[10] This is where in 1887 the correspondence of the Egyptian kings with their friends and vassals in Asia was found, a correspondence which proved so important for our knowledge of history.

[11] *Idem, History of Egypt*, p. 363.

at that these orders produced a reaction of fanatical vengeance among the suppressed priests and the discontented people, a reaction which was able to find a free outlet after the king's death. The Aton religion had not appealed to the people ; it had probably been limited to a small circle round Ikhnaton's person. His end is wrapped in mystery. We learn of a few short-lived, shadowy successors of his own family. Already his son-in-law Tutankhaton was forced to return to Thebes and to substitute Amon in his name for the god Aton. Then there followed a period of anarchy until the general Haremhab succeeded in 1350 in restoring order. The glorious Eighteenth Dynasty was extinguished ; at the same time their conquests in Nubia and Asia were lost. In this sad interregnum Egypt's old religions had been reinstated. The Aton religion was at an end, Ikhnaton's capital lay destroyed and plundered, and his memory scorned as that of a felon.

It will serve a certain purpose if we now note several negative characteristics of the Aton religion. In the first place, all myth, magic and sorcery are excluded from it.[12]

Then there is the way in which the Sun God is represented : no longer as in earlier times by a small pyramid and a falcon, but—and this is almost rational—by a round disc from which emanate rays terminating in human hands. In spite of all the love for art in the Amarna period, not one personal representation of the Sun God Aton has been found, and, we may say with confidence, ever will be found.[13]

Finally, there is a complete silence about the death god Osiris and the realm of the dead. Neither hymns nor inscriptions on graves know anything of what was perhaps nearest to the Egyptian's heart. The contrast with the popular religion cannot be expressed more vividly.[14]

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[12] Weigall (*The Life and Times of Akhnaton*, 1923, p. 121) says that Ikhnaton would not recognize a hell against the terrors of which one had to guard by innumerable magic spells. ' Akhnaton flung all these formulæ into the fire. Djins, bogies, spirits, monsters, demigods and Osiris himself with all his court, were swept into the blaze and reduced to ashes.'

[13] A. Weigall, *l.c.*, p. 103, ' Akhnaton did not permit any graven image to be made of the Aton. The true God, said the king, had no form ; and he held to this opinion throughout his life.'

[14] Erman, *l.c.*, p. 90 : ' Of Osiris and his realm no more was to be heard.' Breasted, *Dawn of Conscience*, p. 291 : ' Osiris is completely ignored. He is never mentioned in any record of Ikhnaton or in any of the tombs at Amarna.'

III

We venture now to draw the following conclusion : if Moses was an Egyptian and if he transmitted to the Jews his own religion then it was that of Ikhnaton, the Aton religion.

We compared earlier the Jewish religion with the religion of the Egyptian people and noted how different they were from each other. Now we shall compare the Jewish with the Aton religion and should expect to find that they were originally identical. We know that this is no easy task. Of the Aton religion we do not perhaps know enough, thanks to the revengeful spirit of the Amon priests. The Mosaic religion we know only in its final form as it was fixed by Jewish priests in the time after the Exile about 800 years later. If, in spite of this unpromising material, we should find some indications fitting in with our supposition then we may indeed value them highly.

There would be a short way of proving our thesis that the Mosaic religion is nothing else but that of Aton, namely, by a confession of faith, a proclamation. But I am afraid I should be told that such a road is impracticable. The Jewish creed, as is well known, says : ' Schema Jisroel Adonai Elohenu Adonai Echod.' If the similarity of the name of the Egyptian Aton (or Atum) to the Hebrew word Adonai and the Syrian divine name Adonis is not a mere accident, but is the result of a primæval unity in language and meaning, then one could translate the Jewish formula : Hear, oh Israel, our god Aton (Adonai) is the only God. I am, alas, entirely unqualified to answer this question and have been able to find very little about it in the literature concerned,[15] but probably we had better not make things so simple. Moreover, we shall have to come back to the problems of the divine name.

The points of similarity as well as those of difference in the two religions are easily discerned, but do not enlighten us much. Both are forms of a strict monotheism, and we shall be inclined to reduce to this basic character what is similar in both of them. Jewish monotheism is in some points even more uncompromising than the Egyptian, for example, when it forbids all visual representation of its God. The most

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[15] Only a few passages in Weigall, *l.c.*, pp. 12, 19 : ' The god Atum, who described Re as the setting sun, was perhaps of the same origin as Aton, generally venerated in Northern Syria. A foreign Queen, as well as her suite, might therefore have been attracted to Heliopolis rather than to Thebes.'

essential difference—apart from the name of their God—is that the Jewish religion entirely relinquishes the worship of the sun, to which the Egyptian one still adhered. When comparing the Jewish with the Egyptian folk religion we received the impression that, besides the contrast in principle, there was in the difference between the two religions an element of purposive contradiction. This impression appears justified when in our comparison we replace the Jewish religion by that of Aton, which Ikhnaton—as we know—developed in deliberate antagonism to the popular religion. We were astonished —and rightly so—that the Jewish religion did not speak of anything beyond the grave, for such a doctrine is reconcilable with the strictest monotheism. This astonishment disappears if we go back from the Jewish religion to the Aton religion and surmise that this feature was taken over from the latter, since for Ikhnaton it was a necessity in fighting the popular religion where the death god Osiris played perhaps a greater part than any god of the upper regions. The agreement of the Jewish religion with that of Aton in this important point is the first strong argument in favour of our thesis. We shall see that it is not the only one.

Moses gave the Jews not only a new religion ; it is equally certain that he introduced the custom of circumcision. This has a decisive importance for our problem and it has hardly ever been weighed. The Biblical account, it is true, often contradicts it. On the other hand, it dates the custom back to the time of the patriarchs as a sign of the covenant concluded between God and Abraham. On the other hand, the text mentions in a specially obscure passage that God was wroth with Moses because he had neglected this holy usage and proposed to slay him as a punishment ; Moses' wife, a Midianite, saved her husband from the wrath of God by speedily performing the operation. These are distortions, however, which should not lead us astray ; we shall explore their motives presently. The fact remains that the question concerning the origin of circumcision has only one answer : it comes from Egypt. Herodotus, ' the Father of History ', tells us that the custom of circumcision had long been practised in Egypt, and his statement has been confirmed by the examination of mummies and even by drawings on the walls of graves. No other people of the Eastern Mediterranean has—as far as we know—followed this custom ; we can assume with certainty that the Semites, Babylonians and Sumerians were not circumcised. Biblical history itself says as much of the inhabitants of Canaan ; it is presupposed in the story of the

adventure between Jacob's daughter and the Prince of Shechem.[16] The possibility that the Jews in Egypt adopted the usage of circumcision in any other way than in connection with the religion Moses gave them may be rejected as quite untenable. Now let us bear in mind that circumcision was practised in Egypt by the people as a general custom, and let us adopt for the moment the usual assumption that Moses was a Jew who wanted to free his compatriots from the service of an Egyptian overlord, and lead them out of the country to develop an independent and self-confident existence—a feat he actually achieved. What sense could there be in his forcing upon them at the same time a burdensome custom which, so to speak, made them into Egyptians and was bound to keep awake their memory of Egypt, whereas his intention could only have had the opposite aim, namely, that his people should become strangers to the country of bondage and overcome the longing for the ' fleshpots of Egypt ' ? No, the fact we started from and the suggestion we added to it are so incompatible with each other that we venture to draw the following conclusion : If Moses gave the Jews not only a new religion, but also the law of circumcision, he was no Jew but an Egyptian, and then the Mosaic religion was probably an Egyptian one, namely—because of its contrast to the popular religion—that of Aton with which the Jewish one shews agreement in some remarkable points.

As I remarked earlier, my hypothesis that Moses was not a Jew but an Egyptian creates a new enigma. What he did—easily understandable if he were a Jew—becomes unintelligible in an Egyptian. But if we place Moses in Ikhnaton's period and associate him with that Pharaoh, then the enigma is resolved and a possible motive presents itself, answering all our questions. Let us assume that Moses was a noble and distinguished man, perhaps indeed a member of the royal house, as the myth has it. He must have been conscious of his great

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[16] When I use Biblical tradition here in such an autocratic and arbitrary way, draw on it for confirmation whenever it is convenient and dismiss its evidence without scruple when it contradicts my conclusions, I know full well that I am exposing myself to severe criticism concerning my method and that I weaken the force of my proofs. But this is the only way in which to treat material whose trustworthiness—as we know for certain—was seriously damaged by the influence of distorting tendencies. Some justification will be forthcoming later, it is hoped, when we have unearthed those secret motives. Certainty is not to be gained in any case, and, moreover, we may say that all other authors have acted likewise.

abilities, ambitious and energetic ; perhaps he saw himself in a dim future as the leader of his people, the governor of the Empire. In close contact with Pharaoh he was a convinced adherent of the new religion, whose basic principles he fully understood and had made his own. With the king's death and the subsequent reaction he saw all his hopes and prospects destroyed. If he was not to recant the convictions so dear to him then Egypt had no more to give him ; he had lost his native country. In this hour of need he found an unusual solution. The dreamer Ikhnaton had estranged himself from his people, had let his world empire crumble. Moses' active nature conceived the plan of founding a new empire, of finding a new people, to whom he could give the religion that Egypt disdained. It was, as we perceive, an heroic attempt to struggle against his fate, to find compensation in two directions for the losses he had suffered through Ikhnaton's catastrophe. Perhaps he was at that time governor of that border province (Gosen) in which—perhaps already in ' the Hyksos period '—certain Semitic tribes had settled. These he chose to be his new people. An historic decision.[17]

He established relations with them, placed himself at their head and directed the Exodus ' by strength of hand '. In full contradistinction to the Bibical tradition we may suppose this Exodus to have passed off peacefully and without pursuit. The authority of Moses made it possible, and there was then no central power that could have prevented it.

According to our construction the Exodus from Egypt would have taken place between 1358 and 1350, that is to say, after the death of Ikhnaton and *before* the restitution of the authority of the state by Haremhab.[18] The goal of the wandering could only be Canaan. After

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[17] If Moses were a high official we can understand his being fitted for the rôle of leader he assumed with the Jews. If he were a priest the thought of giving his people a new religion must have been near to his heart. In both cases he would have continued his former profession. A prince of royal lineage might easily have been both : governor and priest. In the report of Flavius Josephus (*Antiqu. jud.*), who accepts the exposure myth, but seems to know other traditions than the Biblical one, Moses appears as an Egyptian field-marshal in a victorious campaign in Ethiopia.

[18] This would be about a century earlier than most historians assume, who place it in the Nineteenth Dynasty under Merneptah : or perhaps a little less, for official records seem to include the interregnum in Haremhab's reign.

the supremacy of Egypt had collapsed, hordes of war-like Arameans had flooded the country, conquering and pillaging, and thus had shewn where a capable people could seize new land. We know these warriors from the letters which were found in 1887 in the archives of the ruined city of Amarna. There they are called Habiru, and the name was passed on—no one knows how—to the Jewish invaders, Hebrews, who came later and could not have been referred to in the letters of Amarna. The tribes who were the most nearly related to the Jews now leaving Egypt also lived south of Palestine—in Canaan.

The motivation that we have surmised for the Exodus as a whole covers also the institution of circumcision. We know in what manner human beings—both peoples and individuals—react to this ancient custom, scarcely any longer understood. Those who do not practise it regard it as very odd and find it rather abhorrent ; but those who have adopted circumcision are proud of the custom. They feel superior, ennobled, and look down with contempt at the others, who appear to them unclean. Even to-day the Turk hurls abuse at the Christian by calling him ' an uncircumcised dog '. It is credible that Moses, who as an Egyptian was himself circumcised, shared this attitude. The Jews with whom he left his native country were to be a better substitute for the Egyptians he left behind. In no circumstances must they be inferior to them. He wished to make of them a ' Holy People '—so it is explicitly stated in the Biblical text—and as a sign of their dedication he introduced the custom that made them at least the equals of the Egyptians. It would, further, be welcome to him if such a custom isolated them and prevented them from mingling with the other foreign peoples they would meet during their wanderings, just as the Egyptians had kept apart from all foreigners.[19]

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[19] Herodotus, who visited Egypt about 450 B.C., gives in the account of his travels a characteristic of the Egyptians which shews an astounding similarity with well-known features of the later Jewish people. ' They are in all respects much more pious than other peoples, they are also distinguished from them by many of their customs, such as circumcision, which for reasons of cleanliness they introduced before others ; further, by their horror of swine, doubtless connected with the fact that Set wounded Horus when in the guise of a black hog ; and, lastly, most of all by their reverence for cows, which they would never eat or sacrifice because they would thereby offend the cow-horned Isis. Therefore no Egyptian man or woman would ever kiss a Greek or use his knife, his spit or his cooking vessel, or eat of the meat of an (otherwise) clean ox that had been cut with a Greek

Jewish tradition, however, behaved later on as if it were oppressed by the sequence of ideas we have just developed. To admit that circumcision was an Egyptian custom introduced by Moses would be almost to recognize that the religion handed down to them from Moses was also Egyptian. But the Jews had good reasons to deny this fact; therefore the truth about circumcision had also to be contradicted.

IV

At this point I expect to hear the reproach that I have built up my construction—which places Moses the Egyptian in Ikhnaton's era, derives from the political state the country was in at that time his decision to protect the Jewish people, and recognizes as the Aton religion the religion he gave to his people or with which he burdened them, which had just been abolished in Egypt itself—that I have built up this edifice of conjectures with too great a certainty for which no adequate grounds are to be found in the material itself. I think this reproach would be unjustified. I have already stressed the element of doubt in the introduction, put a query in front of the brackets, so to speak, and can therefore save myself the trouble of repeating it at each point inside the brackets.

Some of my own critical observations may continue the discussion. The kernel of our thesis, the dependence of Jewish monotheism on the monotheistic episode in Egyptian history, has been guessed and hinted at by several workers. I need not cite them here, since none of them has been able to say by what means this influence was exerted. Even if, as I suggest, it is bound up with the individuality of Moses, we shall have to weigh other possibilities than the one here preferred. It is not to be supposed that the overthrow of the official Aton religion completely put an end to the monotheistic trend in Egypt. The School of Priests at On, from which it emanated, survived the catastrophe and might have drawn whole generations after Ikhnaton into the orbit of

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knife. . . . In haughty narrowness they looked down on the other peoples who were unclean and not so near to the gods as they were.' (After Erman, *The Egyptian Religion*, p. 181, etc.)

Naturally we do not forget here the parallels from the life of India. Whatever gave, by the way, the Jewish poet Heine in the nineteenth century the idea of complaining about his religion as ' the plague trailing along from the valley of the Nile, the sickly beliefs of the Ancient Egyptians ' ?

their religious thought. That Moses performed the deed is quite thinkable, therefore, even if he did not live in Ikhnaton's time and had not come under his personal influence, even if he were simply an adherent or merely a member of the school of On. This conjecture would postpone the date of the Exodus and bring it nearer to the time usually assumed, the thirteenth century ; otherwise it has nothing to recommend it. We should have to relinquish the insight we had gained into Moses' motives and to dispense with the idea of the Exodus being facilitated by the anarchy prevailing in Egypt. The kings of the Nineteenth Dynasty following Ikhnaton ruled the country with a strong hand. All conditions, internal and external, favouring the Exodus coincide only in the period immediately after the death of the heretic king.

The Jews possess a rich extra-Biblical literature where the myths and superstitions are to be found which in the course of centuries were woven around the gigantic figure of their first leader and the founder of their religion and which have both hallowed and obscured that figure. Some fragments of sound tradition which had found no place in the Pentateuch may lie scattered in that material. One of these legends describes in an attractive fashion how the ambition of the man Moses had already displayed itself in his childhood. When Pharaoh took him into his arms and playfully tossed him high, the little three-year-old snatched the crown from Pharaoh's head and placed it on his own. The king was startled at this omen and took care to consult his sages.[20] Then, again, we are told of victorious battles he fought as an Egyptian captain in Ethiopia and, in the same connection, that he fled the country because he had reason to fear the envy of a faction at court or even the envy of Pharaoh himself. The Biblical story itself lends Moses certain features in which one is inclined to believe. It describes him as choleric, hot-tempered—as when in his indignation he kills the brutal overseer who ill-treated a Jewish workman, or when in his resentment at the defection of his people he smashes the tables he has been given on Mount Sinai. Indeed, God himself punished him at long last for a deed of impatience—we are not told what it was. Since such a trait does not lend itself to glorification it may very well be historical truth. Nor can we reject even the possibility that many character traits the Jews incorporated into their early conception of God when they made him jealous, stern and implacable, were taken

[20] The same anecdote, slightly altered, is to be found in Josephus.

au fond from their memory of Moses, for in truth it was not an invisible god, but the man Moses, who had led them out of Egypt.

Another trait imputed to him deserves our special interest. Moses was said to have been ' slow of speech '—that is to say, he must have had a speech impediment or inhibition—so that he had to call on Aaron (who is called his brother) for assistance in his supposed discussions with Pharaoh. This again may be historical truth and would serve as a welcome addition to the endeavour to make the picture of this great man live. It may, however, have another and more important significance. The report may, in a slightly distorted way, recall the fact that Moses spoke another language and was not able to communicate with his Semitic Neo-Egyptians without the help of an interpreter—at least not at the beginning of their intercourse. Thus a fresh confirmation of the thesis : Moses was an Egyptian.

It looks now as if the train of thought has come to an end, at least for the time being. From the surmise that Moses was an Egyptian, be it proven or not, nothing more can be deduced for the moment. No historian can regard the Biblical account of Moses and the Exodus as other than a pious myth, which transformed a remote tradition in the interest of its own tendencies. How the tradition ran originally we do not know. What the distorting tendencies were we should like to guess, but we are kept in the dark by our ignorance of the historical events. That our reconstruction leaves no room for so many spectacular features of the Biblical text—the ten plagues, the passage through the Red Sea, the solemn law-giving on Mount Sinai—will not lead us astray. But we cannot remain indifferent on finding ourselves in opposition to the sober historical researches of our time.

These modern historians, well represented by E. Meyer,[21] follow the Biblical text in one decisive point. They concur that the Jewish tribes, who later on become the people of Israel, at a certain time accepted a new religion. But this event did not take place in Egypt nor at the foot of a mount in the Sinai peninsula, but in a place called Meribat-Qadeš, an oasis distinguished by its abundance of springs and wells in the country south of Palestine between the eastern end of the Sinai peninsula and the western end of Arabia. There they took over the worship of a god Jahve, probably from the Arabic tribe of Midianites who lived near-by. Presumably other neighbouring tribes were also followers of that god.

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[21] E. Meyer : *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 1906.

Jahve was certainly a volcano god. As we know, however, Egypt has no volcanoes and the mountains of the Sinai peninsula have never been volcanic ; on the other hand, volcanoes which may have been active up to a late period are found along the western border of Arabia. One of these mountains must have been the Sinai-Horeb which was believed to be Jahve's abode.[22] In spite of all the transformations the Biblical text has suffered, we are able to reconstruct—according to E. Meyer—the original character of the god : he is an uncanny, blood-thirsty demon who walks by night and shuns the light of day.[23]

The mediator between the people and the god at this birth of a new religion was called Moses. He was the son-in-law of the Midianite priest Jethro and was tending his flocks when he received the divine summons. Jethro visited him in Qadeš to give him instructions.

E. Meyer says, it is true, that he never doubted there was a kernel of historical truth in the story of the bondage in Egypt and the catastrophe of the Egyptians,[24] but evidently he does not know where that recognized fact belongs and what to do with it. Only the custom of circumcision is he willing to derive from the Egyptians. He enriches our earlier discussion by two important suggestions. First, that Joshua asked the people to accept circumcision ' to roll away the reproach of Egypt ' ; and, secondly, by the quotation from Herodotus that the Phœnicians (which probably means the Jews) and the Syrians in Palestine themselves admitted having learned the custom of circumcision from the Egyptians.[25] But an Egyptian Moses does not appeal to him. ' The Moses we know was the ancestor of the priests of Qadeš ; he stood therefore in relation to the cult, was a figure of the genealogical myth and not an historical person. So not one of those who has treated him as an historical person—except those who accept tradition wholesale as historical truth—has succeeded in filling this empty shape with any content, in describing him as a concrete personality ; they have had nothing to tell us about what he achieved or about his mission in history '.[26]

On the other hand, Meyer never wearies of telling us about Moses' relation to Qadeš and Midian. ' The figure of Moses so closely bound

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[22] The Biblical text retains certain passages telling us that Jahve descended from Sinai to Meribat-Qadeš.

[23] *L.c.*, pp. 38, 58.

[24] *L.c.*, p. 49.

[25] *L.c.*, p. 449.

[26] *L.c.*, p. 451.

up with Midian and the holy places in the desert. . .' [27] 'This figure of Moses is inextricably associated with Qadeš (Massa and Meriba); the relationship with a Midianite priest by marriage completes the picture. The connection with the Exodus, on the other hand, and the story of his youth in its entirety, are absolutely secondary and are merely the consequence of Moses having to fit into a connected, continuous story.[28]' He also observes that all the characteristics contained in the story of Moses' youth were later omitted. 'Moses in Midian is no longer an Egyptian and Pharaoh's grandson, but a shepherd to whom Jahve reveals himself. In the story of the ten plagues his former relationships are no longer mentioned, although they could have been used very effectively, and the order to kill the Israelite first-born is entirely forgotten. In the Exodus and the perishing of the Egyptians Moses has no part at all; he is not even mentioned. The characteristics of a hero, which the childhood story presupposes, are entirely absent in the later Moses; he is only the man of God, a performer of miracles, provided with supernatural powers by Jahve'.[29]

We cannot escape the impression that this Moses of Qadeš and Midian, to whom tradition could even ascribe the erection of a brazen serpent as a healing god, is quite a different person from the august Egyptian we had deduced, who disclosed to his people a religion in which all magic and sorcery were most strictly abhorred. Our Egyptian Moses differs perhaps no less from the Midian Moses than the universal god Aton differed from the demon Jahve on his divine mountain. And if we concede any measure of truth to the information furnished by modern historians, then we have to admit that the thread we wished to draw from the surmise that Moses was an Egyptian has broken off for the second time: this time, so it seems, without any hope of its being tied again.

V

A way unexpectedly presents itself, however, out of this difficulty too. The efforts to recognize in Moses a figure transcending the priest of Qadeš, and confirming the renown with which tradition had invested him, were continued after E. Meyer by Gressmann and others. In 1922 E. Sellin made a discovery of decisive importance.[30] He found in the book of the prophet Hosea—second half of the eighth century—

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[27] *L.c.*, p. 49. [28] *L.c.*, p. 72. [29] *L.c.*, p. 47.

[30] E. Sellin, *Mose und seine Bedeutung fuer die israelitisch-juedische Religionsgeschichte*, 1922.

unmistakable traces of a tradition to the effect that the founder of their religion (Moses) met a violent end in a rebellion of his stubborn and refractory people. The religion he had instituted was at the same time abandoned. This tradition is not restricted to Hosea: it recurs in the writings of most of the later prophets; indeed, according to Sellin, it was the basis of all the later expectations of the Messiah. Towards the end of the Babylonian exile the hope arose among the Jewish people that the man they had so callously murdered would return from the realm of the dead and lead his contrite people—and perhaps not only his people—into the land of eternal bliss. The palpable connections with the destiny of the Founder of a later religion do not lie in our present course.

Naturally I am not in a position to decide whether Sellin has correctly interpreted the relevant passages in the prophets. If he is right, however, we may regard as historically credible the tradition he recognized: for such things are not readily invented—there is no tangible motive for doing so. And if they have really happened the wish to forget them is easily understood. We need not accept every detail of the tradition. Sellin thinks that Shittim in the land east of the Jordan is indicated as the scene of the violent deed. We shall see, however, that the choice of this locality does not accord with our argument.

Let us adopt from Sellin the surmise that the Egyptian Moses was killed by the Jews and the religion he instituted abandoned. It allows us to spin our thread further without contradicting the trustworthy results of historical research. But we venture to be independent of the historians in other respects and to blaze our own trail. The Exodus from Egypt remains our starting-point. It must have been a considerable number that left the country with Moses; a small crowd would not have been worth the while of that ambitious man, with his great schemes. The immigrants had probably been in the country long enough to develop into a numerous people. We shall certainly not go astray, however, if we suppose with the majority of research workers that only a part of those who later became the Jewish people had undergone the fate of bondage in Egypt. In other words, the tribe returning from Egypt combined later in the country between Egypt and Canaan with other related tribes that had been settled there for some time. This union, from which was born the people of Israel, expressed itself in the adoption of a new religion, common to all the tribes, the religion of Jahve; according to E. Meyer, this came about

in Qadeš under the influence of the Midianites. Thereupon the people felt strong enough to undertake the invasion of Canaan. It does not fit in with this course of events that the catastrophe to Moses and his religion should have taken place in the land east of the Jordan—it must have happened a long time before the union.

It is certain that many very diverse elements contributed to the building up of the Jewish people, but the greatest difference among them must have depended on whether they had experienced the sojourn in Egypt and what followed it, or not. From this point of view we may say that the nation was made up by the union of two constituents, and it accords with this fact that, after a short period of political unity, it broke asunder into two parts—the Kingdom of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah. History loves such restorations, in which later fusions are redissolved and former separations become once more apparent. The most impressive example—a very well-known one—was provided by the Reformation, when, after an interval of more than a thousand years, it brought to light again the frontier between the Germania that had been Roman and the part that had always remained independent. With the Jewish people we cannot verify such a faithful reproduction of the former state of affairs. Our knowledge of those times is too uncertain to permit the assumption that the northern Kingdom had absorbed the original settlers, the southern those returning from Egypt ; but the later dissolution, in this case also, could not have been unconnected with the earlier union. The former Egyptians were probably fewer than the others, but they proved to be on a higher level culturally. They exercised a more important influence on the later development of the people because they brought with them a tradition the others lacked.

Perhaps they brought something else, something more tangible than a tradition. Among the greatest riddles of Jewish prehistoric times is that concerning the antecedents of the Levites. They are said to have been derived from one of the twelve tribes of Israel, the tribe of Levi, but no tradition has ever ventured to pronounce on where that tribe originally dwelt or what portion of the conquered country of Canaan had been allotted to it. They occupied the most important priestly positions, but yet they were distinguished from the priests. A Levite is not necessarily a priest ; it is not the name of a caste. Our supposition about the person of Moses suggests an explanation. It is not credible that a great gentleman like the Egyptian Moses approached a people strange to him without an escort. He must have brought his

retinue with him, his nearest adherents, his scribes, his servants. These were the original Levites. Tradition maintains that Moses was a Levite. This seems a transparent distortion of the actual state of affairs: the Levites were Moses' people. This solution is supported by what I mentioned in my previous essay: that in later times we find Egyptian names only among the Levites.[31] We may suppose that a fair number of these Moses people escaped the fate that overtook him and his religion. They increased in the following generations and fused with the people among whom they lived, but they remained faithful to their master, honoured his memory and retained the tradition of his teaching. At the time of the union with the followers of Jahve they formed an influential minority, culturally superior to the rest.

I suggest—and it is only a suggestion so far—that between the downfall of Moses and the founding of a religion at Qadeš two generations were born and vanished, that perhaps even a century elapsed. I do not see my way to determine whether the Neo-Egyptians—as I should like to call those who returned from Egypt in distinction to the other Jews—met with their blood relations after these had already accepted the Jahve religion or before that had happened. Perhaps the latter is more likely. It makes no difference to the final result. What happened at Qadeš was a compromise, in which the part taken by the Moses tribe is unmistakable.

Here we may call again on the custom of circumcision which—a kind of 'Leitfossil'—has repeatedly rendered us important services. This custom also became the law in the Jahve religion, and—since it is inextricably connected with Egypt—its adoption must signify a concession to the people of Moses. They—or the Levites among them—would not forgo this sign of their consecration. They wanted to save so much of their old religion, and for that price they were willing to recognize the new deity and all that the Midian priests had to say about him. Possibly they managed to obtain still other concessions. We have already mentioned that Jewish ritual ordains a certain economy in the use of the name of God. Instead of Jahve they had to say Adonai. It is tempting to fit this commandment into our argument, but that is merely a surmise. The prohibition upon uttering the name of God is, as is well known, a primæval taboo. Why exactly it was

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[31] This assumption fits in well with what Yahuda says about the Egyptian influence on early Jewish writings. See A. S. Yahuda, *Die Sprache des Pentateuch in ihren Beziehungen zum Aegyptischen*, 1929.

renewed in the Jewish commandments is not quite clear ; it is not out of the question that this happened under the influence of a new motive. There is no reason to suppose that the commandment was consistently followed ; the word Jahve was freely used in the formation of personal theophorous names, i.e. in combinations such as Jochanan, Jehu, Joshua. Yet there is something peculiar about this name. It is well known that Biblical exegesis recognizes two sources of the Hexateuch. They are called J and E because the one uses the holy name of Jahve, the other that of Elohim : Elohim, it is true, not Adonai. But we may here quote the remark of one writer : the different names are a distinct sign of originally different gods.[32]

We admitted the adherence to the custom of circumcision as evidence that at the founding of the new religion at Qadeš a compromise had taken place. What it consisted in we learn from both J and E ; the two accounts coincide and must therefore go back to a common source, either a written source or an oral tradition. The guiding purpose was to prove the greatness and power of the new god Jahve. Since the Moses people attached such great importance to their experience of the Exodus from Egypt, the deed of freeing them had to be ascribed to Jahve ; it had to be adorned with features that proved the terrific grandeur of this volcano god, such as, for example, the pillar of smoke which changed to one of fire by night, or the storm that parted the waters so that the pursuers were drowned by the returning floods of water. The Exodus and the founding of the new religion were thus brought close together in time, the long interval between them being denied. The bestowal of the Ten Commandments too was said to have taken place, not at Qadeš, but at the foot of the Holy Mountain amidst the signs of a volcanic eruption. This description, however, did a serious wrong to the memory of the man Moses ; it was he, and not the volcano god, who had freed his people from Egypt. Some compensation was therefore due to him, and it was given by transposing Moses to Qadeš or to the mount Sinai-Horeb and putting him in the place of the Midianite priest. We shall consider later how this solution satisfied another, irresistibly urgent, tendency. By its means a balance, so to speak, was established : Jahve was allowed to extend his reach to Egypt from his mountain in Midia, while the existence and activity of Moses were transferred to Qadeš and the country east of the Jordan. This is how he became one with

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[32] Gressmann, *l.c.*, p. 54.

the person who later established a religion, the son-in-law of the Midianite Jethro, the man to whom he lent his name Moses. We know nothing personal, however, about this other Moses—he is entirely obscured by the first, the Egyptian Moses—except possibly from clues provided by the contradictions to be found in the Bible in the characterization of Moses. He is often enough described as masterful, hot-tempered, even violent, and yet it is also said of him that he was the most patient and sweet-tempered of all men. It is clear that the latter qualities would have been of no use to the Egyptian Moses who planned such great and difficult projects for his people. Perhaps they belonged to the other, the Midianite. I think we are justified in separating the two persons from each other and in assuming that the Egyptian Moses never was in Qadeš and had never heard the name of Jahve, whereas the Midianite Moses never set foot in Egypt and knew nothing of Aton. In order to make the two people into one, tradition or legend had to bring the Egyptian Moses to Midian ; and we have seen that more than one explanation was given for it.

VI

I am quite prepared to hear anew the reproach that I have put forward my reconstruction of the early history of the tribe of Israel with undue and unjustified certitude. I shall not feel this criticism to be too harsh, since it finds an echo in my own judgement. I know myself that this reconstruction has its weak places, but it also has its strong ones. On the whole the arguments in favour of continuing this work in the same direction prevail. The Biblical record before us contains valuable, nay invaluable, historical evidence. It has, however, been distorted by tendentious influences and elaborated by the products of poetical invention. In our work we have already been able to divine one of these distorting tendencies. This discovery shall guide us on our way. It is a hint to uncover other similar distorting influences. If we find reasons for recognizing the distortions produced by them, then we shall be able to bring to light more of the true course of events.

Let us begin by marking what critical research work on the Bible has to say about how the Hexateuch—the five Books of Moses and the Book of Joshua, for they alone are of interest to us here—came to be written.[33] The oldest source is considered to be J, the Jahvistic, in

[33] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XI. Edition, 1910, Art. : Bible.

the author of which the most modern research workers think they can recognize the priest Ebjatar, a contemporary of King David.[34] A little later, it is not known how much later, comes the so-called Elohistic, belonging to the northern kingdom.[35] After the destruction of this kingdom, in 722 B.C., a Jewish priest combined portions of J and E and added his own contributions. His compilation is designated as JE. In the seventh century Deuteronomy, the fifth book, was added, it being alleged that the whole of it had been newly found in the Temple. In the time after the destruction of the Temple, in 586 B.C., during the Exile and after the return, is placed the re-writing called the Priestly Code. The fifth century saw a definitive revision, and since the work has not been materially altered.[36]

The history of King David and his time is most probably the work of one of his contemporaries. It is real history, five hundred years before Herodotus, the 'Father of History'. One would begin to understand this achievement if one assumed, in terms of my hypothesis, Egyptian influence.[37] The suggestion has even been made that early Israelites, the scribes of Moses, had a hand in the invention of the first alphabet.[38] How far the accounts of former times are based on earlier sources or on oral tradition, and what interval elapsed between an event and its fixation by writing, we are naturally unable to know. The text, however, as we find it to-day tells us enough about its own

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[34] See Auerbach, *Wüste und Gelobtes Land*, 1932.

[35] Astruc in 1735 was the first to distinguish between Jahvist and Elohist.

[36] It is historically certain that the Jewish type was definitely fixed as a result of the reforms by Esra and Nehemiah in the fifth century B.C., therefore after the Exile, during the reign of the friendly Persians. According to our reckoning approximately 900 years had then passed since the appearance of Moses. By these reforms the regulations aiming at the consecration of the chosen people were taken seriously: the separation from the other tribes was put into force by forbidding mixed marriages; the Pentateuch, the real compilation of the law, was codified in its definitive form; the re-writing known as the Priestly Code was finished. It seems certain, however, that the reform did not adopt any new tendencies, but simply took over and consolidated former suggestions.

[37] Cf. Yahuda, *l.c.*

[38] If they were bound by the prohibition against making images they had even a motive for forsaking the hieroglyphic picture writing when they adapted their written signs for the expression of a new language.

history. Two distinct forces, diametrically opposed to each other, have left their traces on it. On the one hand, certain transformations got to work on it, falsifying the text in accord with secret tendencies, maiming and extending it until it was turned into its opposite. On the other hand, an indulgent piety reigned over it, anxious to keep everything as it stood, indifferent to whether the details fitted together or nullified one another. Thus almost everywhere there can be found striking omissions, disturbing repetitions, palpable contradictions, signs of things the communication of which was never intended. The distortion of a text is not unlike a murder. The difficulty lies not in the execution of the deed but in the doing away with the traces. One could wish to give the word ' distortion ' the double meaning to which it has a right, although it is no longer used in this sense. It should mean not only ' to change the appearance of ', but also ' to wrench apart ', ' to put in another place '. That is why in so many textual distortions we may count on finding the suppressed and abnegated material hidden away somewhere, though in an altered shape and torn out of its original connection. Only—it is not always easy to recognize it.

The distorting tendencies we want to detect must have influenced the traditions before they were written down. One of them, perhaps the strongest of all, we have already discovered. We said that when the new god Jahve in Qadeš was instituted something had to be done to glorify him. It is truer to say : He had to be established, made room for ; traces of former religions had to be extinguished. This seems to have been done successfully with the religion of the settled tribes ; no more was heard of it. With the returning tribes the task was not so easy ; they were determined not to be deprived of the Exodus from Egypt, the man Moses and the custom of circumcision. It is true they had been in Egypt, but they had left it again, and from now on every trace of Egyptian influence was to be denied. Moses was disposed of by displacing him to Midian and Qadeš and making him into one person with the priest who founded the Jahve religion. Circumcision, the most compromising sign of the dependence on Egypt, had to be retained, but, in spite of all the existing evidence, every endeavour was made to divorce this custom from Egypt. The enigmatic passage in Exodus, written in an almost incomprehensible style, saying that God had been wroth with Moses for neglecting circumcision and that his Midianite wife saved his life by a speedy operation, can be interpreted only as a deliberate contradiction of the

significant truth. We shall soon come across another invention for the purpose of invalidating a piece of inconvenient evidence.

It is hardly to be described as a new tendency—it is only the continuation of the same one—when we find an endeavour completely to deny that Jahve was a new god, one alien to the Jews. For that purpose the myths of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are drawn upon. Jahve maintains that He had been the God of those patriarchs ; it is true—and He has to admit this Himself—they did not worship Him under this name.[39]

He does not add under what other name He used to be worshipped. Here the opportunity was taken to deal a decisive blow at the Egyptian origin of the custom of circumcision. Jahve was said to have already demanded it from Abraham, to have instituted it as sign of the bond between him and Abraham's descendants. This, however, was a particularly clumsy invention. If one wished to use a sign to distinguish someone from other people, one would choose something that the others did not possess—certainly not something that millions could shew. An Israelite, finding himself in Egypt, would have had to recognize all Egyptians as brothers, bound by the same bond, brothers in Jahve. The fact that circumcision was native to the Egyptians could not possibly have been unknown to the Israelites who created the text of the Bible. The passage from Joshua quoted by E. Meyer freely admits this, but nevertheless the fact had at all costs to be denied.

We cannot expect religious myths to pay scrupulous attention to logical connections. Otherwise the feeling of the people might have taken exception—justifiably so—to the behaviour of a deity who makes a covenant with his patriarchs containing mutual obligations, and then ignores his human partners for centuries until it suddenly occurs to him to reveal himself again to their descendants. Still more astonishing is the conception of a god suddenly ' choosing ' a people, making it ' his ' people and himself its own god. I believe it is the only case in the history of human religions. In other cases the people and their god belong inseparably together ; they are one from the beginning. Sometimes, it is true, we hear of a people adopting another god, but never of a god choosing a new people. Perhaps we approach an understanding of this unique happening when we reflect on the connection

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[39] The restrictions in the use of the new name do not become any more comprehensible through this, though much more suspect.

between Moses and the Jewish people. Moses had stooped to the Jews, had made them his people ; they were his ' chosen people '.[40]

There was yet another purpose in bringing the patriarchs into the new Jahve religion. They had lived in Canaan ; their memory was connected with certain localities in the country. Possibly they themselves had been Canaanite heroes or local divinities whom the immigrating Israelites had adopted for their early history. By evoking them one gave proof, so to speak, of having been born and bred in the country, and denied the odium that clings to the alien conqueror. It was a clever turn : the god Jahve gave them only what their ancestors had once possessed.

In the later contributions to the Biblical text the tendency to avoid mentioning Qadeš met with success. The site of the founding of the new religion definitely became the divine mountains Sinai-Horeb.

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[40] Jahve was undoubtedly a volcano god. There was no reason for the inhabitants of Egypt to worship him. I am certainly not the first to be struck by the similarity of the name Jahve to the root of the name of another god : Jupiter, Jovis. The composite name Jochanaan, made up in part from the Hebrew word Jahve and having a rather similar meaning to that of Godfrey or its Punic equivalent Hannibal, has become one of the most popular names of European Christendom in the forms of Johann, John, Jean, Juan. When the Italians reproduce it in the shape of Giovanni and then call one day of the week Giovedi they bring to light again a similarity which perhaps means nothing or possibly means very much. Far-reaching possibilities, though very insecure ones, open out here. In those dark centuries which historical research is only beginning to explore, the countries around the eastern basin of the Mediterranean were apparently the scene of frequent and violent volcanic eruptions which were bound to make the deepest impression on the inhabitants. Evans supposes that the final destruction of the palace of Minos at Knossos was also the result of an earthquake. In Crete, as probably everywhere in the Ægean world, the great Mother Goddess was then worshipped. The observation that she was unable to guard her house against the attack of a stronger power might have contributed to her having to cede her place to a male deity, whereupon the volcano god had the first right to replace her. Zeus still bears the name of ' the Earth-shaker.' There is hardly a doubt that in those obscure times mother deities were replaced by male gods (perhaps originally their sons). Specially impressive is the fate of Pallas Athene, who was no doubt the local form of the mother deity ; through the religious revolution she was reduced to a daughter, robbed of her own mother, and eternally debarred from motherhood by the taboo of virginity.

The motive is not clearly visible ; perhaps they did not want to be reminded of the influence of Midian. But all later distortions, especially those of the Priestly Code, serve another aim. There was no longer any need to alter in a particular direction descriptions of happenings of long ago ; that had long been done. On the other hand, an endeavour was made to date back to an early time certain laws and institutions of the present, to base them as a rule on the Mosaic law and to derive from this their claim to holiness and binding force. However much the picture of past times in this way became falsified, the procedure does not lack a certain psychological justification. It reflected the fact that in the course of many centuries—about 800 years had elapsed between the Exodus and the fixation of the Biblical text by Ezra and Nehemiah—the religion of Jahve had followed a retrograde development that had culminated in a fusion (perhaps to the point of actual identity) with the original religion of Moses.

And this is the essential outcome : the fateful content of the religious history of the Jews.

VII

Among all the events of Jewish prehistory that poets, priests and historians of a later age undertook to portray there was an outstanding one the suppression of which was called for by the most obvious and best of human motives. It was the murder of the great leader and liberator Moses, which Sellin divined from clues furnished by the Prophets. Sellin's presumption cannot be called fanciful ; it is probable enough. Moses, trained in Ikhnaton's school, employed the same methods as the king ; he gave commands and forced his religion on the people.[41] Perhaps Moses' doctrine was still more uncompromising than that of his Master ; he had no need to retain any connection with the religion of the Sun God since the school of On would have no importance for his alien people. Moses met with the same fate as Ikhnaton, the fate that awaits all enlightened despots. The Jewish people of Moses was quite as unable to bear such a highly spiritualized religion, to find in what it offered satisfaction for their needs, as were the Egyptians of the Eighteenth Dynasty. In both cases the same thing happened : those who felt themselves kept in tutelage, or who felt dispossessed, revolted and threw off the burden of a religion that had been forced on them. But while the tame Egyptians waited until

[41] In those times any other form of influence would scarcely have been possible.

fate had removed the sacred person of their Pharaoh, the savage Semites took their destiny into their own hands and did away with their tyrant.[42]

Nor can we maintain that the Biblical text preserved to us does not prepare us for such an end to Moses. The account of the ' Wandering in the Wilderness '—which might stand for the time of Moses' rule—describes a series of grave revolts against his authority which, by Jahve's command, were suppressed with savage chastisement. It is easy to imagine that one of those revolts came to another end than the text admits. The people's falling away from the new religion is also mentioned in the text, though as a mere episode. It is the story of the golden calf, where by an adroit turn the breaking of the tables of the law tablets—which has to be understood symbolically (= ' he has broken the law ')—is ascribed to Moses himself and imputed to his angry indignation.

There came a time when the people regretted the murder of Moses and tried to forget it. This was certainly so at the time of the coming together at Qadeš. If, however, the Exodus were brought nearer in time to the founding of their religion in the oasis, and one allowed Moses—instead of the other founder—to help in it, then not only were the claims of the Moses people satisfied, but the painful fact of his violent removal was also successfully denied. In reality it is most unlikely that Moses could have participated in the events at Qadeš, even if his life had not been shortened.

Here we must try to elucidate the sequence of these events. We have placed the Exodus from Egypt in the time after the extinction of the Eighteenth Dynasty (1350). It might have happened then or a little later, for the Egyptian chroniclers included the subsequent years of anarchy in the reign of Haremhab, the king who brought it to an end and who reigned until 1315. The next aid in fixing the chronology —and it is the only one—is given by the stele of Merneptah (1225–1215), which extols the victory over Isiraal (Israel) and the destruction of their seeds (*sic*). Unfortunately the value of this stele is doubtful ; it is taken to be evidence that Israelite tribes were at that date already

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[42] It is truly remarkable how seldom we hear during the millennia of Egyptian history of violent depositions or assassinations of a Pharaoh. A comparison with Assyrian history, for example, must increase this astonishment. The reason may, of course, be that with the Egyptians historical recording served exclusively official purposes.

settled in Canaan.[43] E. Meyer rightly concludes from this stele that Merneptah could not have been the Pharaoh of the Exodus, as one had previously been wont to assume. The Exodus must belong to an earlier period. The question who was Pharaoh at the time of the Exodus appears to me an idle one. There was no Pharaoh at that time, because the Exodus happened during the interregnum. But the Merneptah stele does not throw any light on the possible date of the fusion and the acceptance of the new religion in Qadeš. All we can say with certainty is that they took place some time between 1350 and 1215. Within this century we assume the Exodus to have been very near to the first date, the events in Qadeš not far from the second. The greater part of the period we would reserve for the interval between the two events. A fairly long time would be necessary for the passions of the returning tribes to cool down after the murder of Moses and for the influence of the Moses people, the Levites, to have become so strong as the compromise in Qadeš presupposes. Two generations, sixty years, might suffice, but only just. The date inferred from the stele of Merneptah falls too early, and as we know that in our hypothesis one assumption only rests on another we have to admit that this discussion shews a weak spot in the construction. Unfortunately everything connected with the settling of the Jewish people in Canaan is highly obscure and confused. We might, of course, use the expedient of supposing that the name in the Israel stele does not refer to the tribes whose fate we are trying to follow and who later on were united in the people of Israel. After all, the name of the Habiru (= Hebrews) from the Amarna time was also passed on to this people.

Whenever it was that the different tribes were united into a nation by accepting the same religion it might very well have been an occurrence of no great importance for the history of the world. The new religion might have been swept away by the stream of events, Jahve would then have taken his place in the procession of erstwhile gods which Flaubert visualized, and of his people all the twelve tribes would have been ' lost ', not only the ten for whom the Anglo-Saxons have so long been searching. The god Jahve, to whom the Midianite Moses led a new people, was probably in no way a remarkable being. A rude, narrow-minded local god, violent and blood-thirsty, he had promised his adherents to give them ' a land flowing with milk and honey ' and he encouraged them to rid the country of its present

[43] E. Meyer, *l.c.*, p. 222.

inhabitants ' with the edge of the sword '. It is truly astonishing that in spite of all the revisions in the Biblical text so much was allowed to stand whereby we may recognize his original nature. It is not even sure that his religion was a true monotheism, that it denied the character of god to other divinities. It probably sufficed that one's own god was more powerful than all strange gods. When the sequence of events took quite another course than such beginnings would lead us to expect there can be only one reason for it. To one part of the people the Egyptian Moses had given another and more spiritual conception of God, a single God who embraces the whole world, one as all-loving as he was all-powerful, who—averse to all ceremonial and magic—set humanity as its highest aim a life of truth and justice. For, incomplete as our information about the ethical side of the Aton religion may be, it is surely significant that Ikhnaton regularly described himself in his inscriptions as ' living in Maat ' (truth, justice).[44] In the long run it did not matter that the people, probably after a very short time, renounced the teaching of Moses and removed the man himself. The tradition itself remained and its influence reached—though only slowly, in the course of centuries—the aim that was denied to Moses himself. The god Jahve attained undeserved honour when, from Qadeš onward, Moses' deed of liberation was put down to his account ; but he had to pay dear for this usurpation. The shadow of the god whose place he had taken became stronger than himself ; at the end of the historical development there arose beyond his Being that of the forgotten Mosaic God. None can doubt that it was only the idea of this other God that enabled the people of Israel to surmount all their hardships and to survive until our time.

It is no longer possible to determine the part the Levites played in the final victory of the Mosaic God over Jahve. When the compromise at Qadeš was effected they had raised their voice for Moses, their memory being still green of the master whose followers and countrymen they were. During the centuries since then the Levites had become one with the people or with the priesthood and it had become the main task of the priests to develop and supervise the ritual, besides caring for the holy texts and revising them in accordance with their purposes. But was not all this sacrifice and ceremonial at bottom

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[44] His hymns lay stress on not only the universality and oneness of God, but also His loving kindness for all creatures ; they invite believers to enjoy nature and its beauties. Cp. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience.*

only magic and black art, such as the old doctrine of Moses had unconditionally condemned ? There arose from the midst of the people an unending succession of men, not necessarily descended from Moses' people, but seized by the great and powerful tradition which had gradually grown in darkness, and it was these men, the prophets, who sedulously preached the old Mosaic doctrine : the Deity spurns sacrifice and ceremonial ; He demands only belief and a life of truth and justice (Maat). The efforts of the prophets met with enduring success ; the doctrines with which they re-established the old belief became the permanent content of the Jewish religion. It is honour enough for the Jewish people that it has kept alive such a tradition and produced men who lent it their voice,—even if the stimulus had first come from outside, from a great stranger.

This description of events would leave me with a feeling of uncertainty were it not that I can refer to the judgement of other, expert, research workers who see the importance of Moses for the history of Jewish religion in the same light, although they do not recognize his Egyptian origin. Sellin says, for example : [45] ' Therefore we have to picture the true religion of Moses, the belief he proclaimed in one, ethical god, as being from now on, as a matter of course, the possession of a small circle within the people. We cannot expect to find it from the start in the official cult, the priests' religion, in the general belief of the people. All we can expect is that here and there a spark flies up from the spiritual fire he had kindled, that his ideas have not died out, but have quietly influenced beliefs and customs until, sooner or later, under the influence of special events, or through some personality particularly immersed in this belief, they broke forth again more strongly and gained dominance with the broad mass of the people. It is from this point of view that we have to regard the early religious history of the old Israelites. Were we to reconstruct the Mosaic religion after the pattern laid down in the historical documents that describe the religion of the first five centuries in Canaan we should fall into the worst methodical error.' Volz [46] expresses himself still more explicitly. He says : " that the heaven-soaring work of Moses was at first hardly understood and feebly carried out, until during the course of centuries it penetrated more and more into the spirit of the people and at last found kindred souls in the great prophets who continued the work of the lonely Founder.'

[45] Sellin, *l.c.*, p. 52.

[46] Paul Volz : ' Mose ', 1907, p. 64.

With this I have come to an end, my sole purpose having been to fit the figure of an Egyptian Moses into the framework of Jewish history. I may now express my conclusion in the shortest formula: To the well-known *duality* of that history—*two peoples* who fuse together to form one nation, *two kingdoms* into which this nation divides, *two names* for the Deity in the source of the Bible—we add two new ones: the founding of *two* new religions, the first one ousted by the second and yet reappearing victorious, *two* founders of religions, who are both called by the same name Moses and whose personalities we have to separate from each other. And all these dualities are necessary consequences of the first: one section of the people passed through what may properly be termed a traumatic experience which the other was spared. There still remains much to discuss, to explain and to assert. Only then would the interest in our purely historical study be fully warranted. In what exactly consists the intrinsic nature of a tradition, and in what resides its peculiar power, how impossible it is to deny the personal influence of individual great men on the history of the world, what profanation of the grandiose multiformity of human life we commit if we recognize as sole motives those springing from material needs, from what sources certain ideas, especially religious ones, derive the power with which they subjugate individuals and peoples—to study all this on the particular case of Jewish history would be an alluring task. Such a continuation of my essay would link up with conclusions laid down twenty-five years ago in 'Totem and Taboo'. But I hardly trust my powers any further.

PRELIMINARY NOTES UPON THE PROBLEM OF AKHENATEN

BY

JAMES STRACHEY

LONDON

These notes are essentially of a tentative and provisional nature, since they are based upon a quite inadequate survey of the material. It seemed perhaps worth while, however, to publish them even in their present unsatisfactory form in view of their possible bearing upon Professor Freud's study of Jewish monotheism—though it is important to add that he himself is not, I believe, inclined to accept my conclusions.

My general aim has been to reconsider the problem of Akhenaten in the light of advances in our knowledge since Abraham wrote upon the same subject in 1912.[1] This new knowledge is of two kinds: (A) Egyptological and (B) Psycho-Analytical.

(A) Fresh Egyptological Discoveries

(1) *The Karnak Colossi.*—In 1925, in the course of some drainage work outside the eastern boundary wall of the Great Temple of Amun at Karnak, there were unexpectedly dug up the well-preserved remains of two colossal statues of Akhenaten. Excavations were continued in the neighbourhood, and during the course of the next few years fragments of some forty colossi (all of them portraits of Akhenaten) were brought to light. These works are without parallel in Egyptian art. Although (as we shall see presently) they must have been constructed quite early in Akhenaten's reign, they manifest to an extreme degree the peculiarities of what is known as the Amarna style. They are considered by most archæologists as quite incredibly hideous, and have been described as ' monstrosities ' and ' abominations ' ; but the extraordinary force of the realism with which the king's gigantic features are portrayed makes them, for me at least, a welcome relief from the interminable rows of stuffed sand-bags that form such a large proportion of the millennia of official Egyptian sculpture.

Almost the last colossus to be discovered (in 1929) was the most remarkable of all. It shows the king, to use the words of its discoverer, Chevrier, ' nu et asexué '.[2] But the entry in the official guide to

[1] ' Amenhotep IV (Echnaton) ', *Imago*, Bd. I, 1912 ; English translation in *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. IV, 1935.

[2] ' Les travaux de Karnak ', *Chronique d'Egypte*, No. 12, 1931.

the Cairo Museum is even more to the point: 'It might almost be imagined', runs the tactful comment, 'that he is represented as a woman'. And such is indeed the case. The statue, which stands some ten feet high, depicts Akhenaten, naked, except for the usual crown and sceptres, with prominent breasts, a narrow waist, wide hips, a protruding abdomen and no sign whatever of any genital organs.

The shock of this discovery seems to have reduced the Egyptologists to silence; for, so far as I have been able to discover, no word of comment has ever been made upon the subject from that day to this. I shall therefore be obliged to fall back upon some speculations of my own.

(*a*) First, as to the *date* of the statues. Their fragments, together with indications of the bases upon which they stood, were found spaced at regular intervals in two rows at right angles to each other. Originally, therefore, they probably stood round the *inside* of an immense courtyard (or possibly round the *outside* of a building). This building was evidently part of the Temple of the Aten (the Sun's disc) which was known to have been built by Akhenaten at Thebes in the early part of his reign but of which the position had hitherto been quite untraced. Since 1929 excavations upon the site have been continued, but with next to no results. As regards the actual dating of the statues themselves. The cartouches visible upon the two statues of which I have photographs contain only the titles of the Aten (in its earlier form); but according to Eduard Meyer [3] some at least of these statues have the name of Amenophis IV carved upon them—which would prove them to belong to the very earliest years of the King's reign, before he adopted the name of Akhenaten. Meyer can (as is shown by the date of the volume) only be referring to those statues in the series which were the first to be discovered. But both the style and the situation of the statues suggest that they all belong to approximately the same date.

It therefore seems fairly safe to assume that the nude statue, like the rest, belongs to the beginning of the reign.

(*b*) How is the nude statue to be accounted for?

(i) Was Akhenaten really a woman? It is interesting to recall that Champollion, when he drew up his first sketch of the history of Egypt from his newly-acquired knowledge of hieroglyphics, insisted that Akhenaten was a Queen; and he was with diffi-

[3] *Geschichte des Altertums*, Bd. II, Abt. I, 1928, S. 387.

culty persuaded of the contrary. (It must be remembered that Akhenaten's predecessor and collateral ancestor, Queen Hatshepsut, habitually speaks of herself as King of Egypt, uses the masculine gender, appears in many of her portraits with a false beard and, in the scenes in her temple that shew her birth, is represented with a still more essential sign of masculinity.) The strongest argument against this theory is that King Akhenaten shews every sign of having been the father of six fine girls. Moreover, his daughters bear a remarkable resemblance to their presumed father. However, since it is now the fashion to believe that their mother, Queen Nefertiti, was also their father's sister, the family likeness does not prove a great deal. I have heard an Egyptologist suggest that the obscure character Ay, who was known as ' Father of the God ' and ultimately succeeded Tutankhamen on the throne, may among his numerous functions have performed the important one of procreating Akhenaten's daughters. But I can discover no evidence whatever to support this idea.

(ii) Did Akhenaten suffer from some physical disease that would account for his appearance ? Long before the discovery of the nude statue, and merely upon the basis of Akhenaten's strange appearance in many of the more ordinary pictures and sculptures of him, large numbers of theories had been suggested upon these lines. One of the more recent and plausible was put forward by Elliot Smith, who was an anatomist who had some knowledge of Egyptology. He thinks it probable that Akhenaten suffered from Fröhlich's syndrome (dystrophia adiposo-genitalis). This disorder of the pituitary gland would, in his opinion, account for the peculiarities both of Akhenaten's body and mind.[4] The nude statue subsequently discovered, if it actually represents the king's appearance, might be held to confirm this theory ; since one of the effects of Fröhlich's syndrome is in fact (in the case of males) an under-development of the penis, often accompanied by undescended testicles. On the other hand, the difficulty about the six daughters seems to apply equally to this explanation. And, moreover, if Akhenaten's genitalia really looked so

[4] Elliot Smith, *Tutankhamen*, 1923, pp. 83–88.

unlike a male's as the statue represents, is it not probable that he would in fact have been mistaken for a girl from the time of his birth onwards ?

(iii) Did Akhenaten, though more or less normally formed, choose to have a statue made of himself representing him as a woman ? It seems quite obvious from the circumstances that the statue can only have been made and exhibited by the king's permission and, indeed, by his express orders. Although this possibility seems very far-fetched, it seems to be less in contradiction to the known facts than the other two theories.

I should be inclined on the whole, however, to favour a combination of theories (ii) and (iii). I should suppose that Akhenaten's physical development was abnormal—possibly owing to dyspituitarism—but not so abnormal as to prevent his having children or as to lead to his being mistaken for a female ; and I should further suppose that some psychological cause led him to exaggerate this abnormality in his imagination and to give expression to the imaginary exaggeration in the form of the statue. We shall return to this psychological question later ; but meanwhile I should like to suggest that the enormous stress laid by Akhenaten in his religion and art upon truth and realism is ultimately derived from his absorption in the particular problem of truth and realism that is raised by this statue : Was Akhenaten really a man ? Or was he really a woman ?

(2) *The Supposed Coffin of Akhenaten.*—The chronology of the whole period is extremely doubtful and confused—partly because all the four kings of the ' heretical ' movement are omitted from the official lists of kings. Things have latterly been further complicated by the introduction of the notion of ' co-regencies ', according to which the Egyptian kings of this time introduced their chosen successors into the kingship (in the same sort of way as the later Roman Emperors). Thus according to Pendlebury[5] the first eleven years of Akhenaten overlapped with the last eleven years of Amenophis III, and Akhenaten a year before he died made his successor Smenkh-ka-re (formerly known as Saa-ka-re) co-regent. On this theory Akhenaten was sole ruler for only about six years, though Amenophis III is supposed to have been incapacitated by illness during the latter part of his life. But this view does not seem to be well substantiated.

(The question is a very important one from the point of view of my

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[5] *Tell el-Amarna*, 1935, p. 33.

problem—which is concerned to discover how far Akhenaten *personally* was responsible for the establishment of the new religion and art. If it turns out that during the all-important first years of his reign the power was still in the hands of other people—e.g. of Amenophis III or of Queen Ty—then we shall have to attribute much more weight to political and other extraneous influences. But I am inclined to think that it can be shown that the growth of Egyptian Imperialism on the one hand and the infiltration of Asiatic ideas on the other are in themselves quite insufficient to account for the monotheistic experiment.[6])

One important chronological difficulty, however, seems to have been removed by recent discoveries. In 1907 a ' cache ' was found in the Valley of the Kings which contained portions of Queen Ty's funerary equipment, a coffin containing a badly-damaged mummy, as well as a set of canopic jars. At the first glance it was supposed that the body was that of Queen Ty ; but subsequent examination (by Elliot Smith) in Cairo showed that the body was that of a man. It was then found that the inscriptions on the coffin appeared to indicate that it belonged to Akhenaten himself. The body was examined further by Elliot Smith who pronounced, chiefly from a consideration of the state of the epiphyses, that it was that of a man aged not more than 25 or 26.[7] This pronouncement caused the greatest perplexity ; for it seemed to prove that Akhenaten (who reigned at least 17 years) must have ascended the throne at the age of 8 or 9, and thus that his heresy was in full swing by the time that he was 12. Under pressure, Elliot Smith admitted that the skeleton might conceivably be that of a man of 27 or 28 ; and his diagnosis of Fröhlich's syndrome was partly determined by the consideration that that disorder is sometimes accompanied by a delay in ossification.

From the very first, however, Sethe absolutely refused to accept these conclusions,[8] and he was supported by Meyer.[9] In Sethe's view, based upon historical and archæological evidence, Akhenaten must have been at least 25 or 26 when he became king and thus about 43 when he died. The newly-found colossi at Karnak seem to settle the matter.

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[6] Cf. Wolf, ' Vorläufer der Reformation Echnatons ', *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache*, Bd. LIX, 1924, SS. 116–117.

[7] *The Royal Mummies* (Catalogue général du Musée du Caire), 1912, p. 54.

[8] ' Beiträge zur Geschichte Amenophis' IV ', *Königl. Ges. der Wissensch. zu Göttingen*, 1921.

[9] *Op. cit.*, S. 381.

It could scarcely be maintained that they represented a boy of 12 years old. Moreover, a fresh examination of his supposed coffin led Engelbach (then Curator of the Cairo Museum) to declare in 1931 that the inscriptions showed that it was certainly not Akhenaten's and that it most probably contained the body of his successor Smenkh-ka-re.[10] The beautifully modelled and highly realistic portrait-heads upon the canopic jars lent weight to this theory : they certainly do not represent Akhenaten ; we know that they are not Tutankhamen's ; so that by a process of exclusion we seem driven to Smenkh-ka-re.

(3) *Akhenaten and Smenkh-ka-re.*—This same shadowy figure is also brought into prominence by some of the results of further excavations made at Tell el-Amarna in recent years by the Egypt Exploration Society. The facts here seem still to be highly uncertain. But it appears that, during the very last years of Akhenaten's reign, Queen Nefertiti fell into disfavour. She left the King's palace and had another palace built for herself in another part of the city. At about the same time her name was removed from certain inscriptions and replaced by that of Akhenaten's eldest daughter Meritaten, who was married to Smenkh-ka-re.[11] It is presumed that the latter's co-regency dates from the same period. (Incidentally, the well-known plaque in Berlin, which is reproduced in the translation of Abraham's paper, showing a queen offering flowers to a king, is now believed to represent this younger couple rather than Akhenaten and Nefertiti.)

Some further facts (or semi-facts) about Smenkh-ka-re and his relations to Akhenaten may also be mentioned. It seems that towards the end of Akhenaten's reign Smenkh-ka-re adopted the name ' Neferneferu-Aten ' which was in fact Nefertiti's pre-nomen. There are moreover indications on certain inscriptions that he was referred to with feminine grammatical pronouns. Further, he uses as one of his royal names (within his cartouche) ' Beloved of Wa-en-Re [i.e. Akhenaten] ' which is said to be unparalleled in a king's titulary. Finally, there is a plaque in Berlin showing Akhenaten embracing another royal personage. This second figure has usually been regarded as Nefertiti ; but Newberry gives reasons for believing that this cannot be so and that the second figure is actually Smenkh-ka-re. He concludes that Smenkh-ka-re was adopted by Akhenaten as a kind of

[10] ' The so-called coffin of Akhenaten ', *Annales du Service*, Tome XXXI, 1931.

[11] See, in particular, Gunn, in Peet and Woolley, *The City of Akhenaten*, Part I, 1923, p. 155.

Antinous and that this event, together with the young man's assumption of the Queen's name, may have been connected with Akhenaten's separation from Nefertiti.[12] Whatever truth there may be in all this, there can be no doubt that it is largely owing to suspicions of this kind that Akhenaten has in recent years lost so much of his popularity among Egyptologists. Twenty years ago he was a great reformer and a saintly forerunner of Christ; nowadays he is a feeble eccentric and a decadent æsthete.

(B) Fresh Psycho-Analytical Views

At the date (1912) of the publication of Abraham's paper, not a very great deal was known on the subject of the so-called 'negative' Œdipus complex, although the Schreber case had already appeared.[13] As a matter of fact Abraham actually quotes that case, although only as giving evidence that the sun is often used as a father-symbol. His own paper is entirely concerned with shewing how Akhenaten's life was dominated by the *positive* Œdipus complex. No doubt what he says in this respect still holds good, but it seems now to give only a very incomplete explanation of the facts. In the light of our present knowledge, what seems clearly to differentiate Akhenaten from all the other kings of Egypt of whom we have any information was the importance of his passive feminine object-relation to his father and the ways in which he dealt with it. This view is supported both by the new archæological evidence that I have just summarized on the subject of Akhenaten's inherited sexual disposition and also by a number of the details of his religion and of his career.

At the very beginning of his reign there are signs of an attempt at a more normal attitude. A certain number of inscriptions and reliefs have been found at Karnak which were originally representations of Amenophis III but which have been usurped by his son by the simple process of substituting on them his own name for his father's without any attempt at altering his father's portrait.[14] This procedure of usurpation is, of course, a normal one throughout the long history of Egyptian rulers. Akhenaten, however, was evidently unable to proceed far along these lines, for almost at once and, it seems, almost

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[12] Newberry, 'Akhenaten's eldest Son-in-Law', *Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, Vol. XIV, 1928.

[13] Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. III; first published in 1911.

[14] Schäfer, 'Altes und Neues zur Kunst und Religion von Tell El-Amarna', *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache*, Bd. LV, 1918, S. 8.

suddenly,[15] he launched out upon the new ideas, from which anything in the nature of direct competition with his father was markedly absent.

Akhenaten did not, of course, become a manifest passive homosexual. He appears, rather, to have dealt with his feminine impulses upon a pattern of the paranoid type ; and he carried out his projections in a manner which is familiar to us. The loving and destructive elements in his relationship to his father were separated from each other and projected upon different derivatives.

On the one hand there was the Aten—an entirely benevolent imago. Its paternal attributes are, of course, not in doubt ; it is explicitly the procreator of the world in general and of Akhenaten in particular. And, although it is carefully de-anthropomorphized, traces of its real identity emerge in various ways. It is treated more clearly as a king of Egypt than any of the other gods ever were [16] : it always wears a Uræus and its titulary is inscribed within two royal cartouches. Thus the universal power of the Aten and the monotheistic nature of his cult are partly at least a representation of the supreme imperial world dominion wielded by the Pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty, though no doubt at a deeper level they are a projection of Akhenaten's infantile phantasies of omnipotence and uniqueness. But the Aten's intimate relations with Akhenaten are not merely paternal. It has not only procreated him ; it enters into him and there creates ideas, thoughts, knowledge, which he then hands on to the rest of the world. The vehicle of the Aten's inspiration are its rays, each of which terminates in a hand, usually holding an Ankh (the hieroglyph meaning ' life ')—the *crux ansata* which, in later times at all events, is an acknowledged phallic symbol. This celebrated picture of the ' raying Aten ', seen in countless drawings and reliefs, is to my mind *the* pathognomonic symptom of Akhenaten's case. These rays are the prototype of the various kinds of irradiations which have troubled paranoiacs through

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[15] It may be recalled that on one of the Boundary Stelæ at Tell el-Amarna there is a mysterious reference by Akhenaten to some fearful event which occurred in the fourth year of his reign—some behaviour apparently on the part of the Priests of Amun (Davies, *El Amarna*, Part V, 1908, pp. 30–31). And this date probably coincides roughly with the first appearance of the pictures of the ' raying Aten ', with the changes in his own name, and also with his decision to abandon Thebes.

[16] Gunn, ' Notes on the Aten and his Names ', *Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, Vol. IX, 1923.

all the centuries and which trouble them to-day. (They play an important part, incidentally, in the case of Schreber himself,[17] whose mythology, culminating in his own effemination, shows many resemblances to Akhenaten's.) For Akhenaten, however, the rays were wholly benevolent. His enemy lay in another direction.

The destructive component in his relation to his father was projected upon the Theban god Amun, upon the priests of Amun and ultimately upon all the gods of the old Egyptian pantheon. We have no direct evidence of the existence in Akhenaten of a sense of being persecuted by this enemy, though it is reasonable to attribute his decision to abandon Thebes and his retreat to Tell el-Amarna at least in part to some such feeling. We have good evidence, however, of his reaction to that feeling in the active attacks which he himself delivered against this same enemy. And the most concrete example of this which we possess—the systematic erasing of the name of Amun from every accessible inscription throughout the length and breadth of the land—is at the same time our best proof that the enemy he was fighting was ultimately his father : the name of Amun was, of course, a part of his father's name, which thus shared in the general obliteration.

The other half of Akhenaten's negative Œdipus complex—his identification with his mother and rivalry with her—is a more obscure question. His (in essentials) monogamous relation with Nefertiti and his apparent insistence upon her equality with him (as shewn, for instance, in their being represented pictorially as equal in size) differs greatly from the practice of most of his predecessors and successors, and may perhaps be regarded as implying a narcissistic basis for his object-choice. And again, his active homosexual attitude at the end of his life towards the young Smenkh-ka-re (if it is accepted as a fact) may indicate his adoption of a maternal attitude towards him. But I suspect that more is to be learnt from considering his motives in constructing the new city of Akhet-aten and his attitude towards it. The validity of the psycho-analytic view of a city as a female symbol is amply confirmed from the texts upon the Boundary Stelæ erected by Akhenaten around the new site : he seems almost explicitly to be offering a new wife to his father the Aten.[18] The name of the new town itself confirms this. It is to be called Akhet-aten, ' the horizon of the Aten '. To us the word horizon implies something remote and flat. To the Egyptian it meant something quite different—namely, the

[17] Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

[18] Davies, *The Rock Tombs of El Amarna*, Part V, 1908, pp. 28–34.

tops of the hills which line each side of the narrow Nile Valley. The point is made quite clear by the hieroglyph for the word Akhet which is

—a picture, that is to say, of the sun between the hills and actually a suitable symbol of sexual intercourse. There seems to me to be a double motive, therefore, behind Akhenaten's enormous interest in building the new city. On the one hand he is offering his father a new love-object, one which is closely identified with himself, instead of the old one, Thebes. But on the other hand he is performing an act of reparation towards his mother, making her once more whole and fresh, and thus repudiating his own destructive impulses towards her.

And this leads me to a mention of one last psychotic feature in Akhenaten's mental history—namely, to the signs of a general withdrawal of his cathexes from the external world. According to one reading of the inscriptions on the Boundary Stelæ, the King vows that he will never again cross the boundaries of Akhet-aten but will remain within them for the remainder of his life. Whether this anticipation of Pio Nono correctly renders the text or not, it is certain that for all practical purposes it represents the actual event. Akhenaten withdrew himself and all his interests within the boundaries of his Horizon and (as we know from the Amarna tablets) allowed his external world to crash in ruins around him.

Conclusion

Here, then, is my hypothesis. Akhenaten appears to have been born with an unusually large feminine component in his constitution. For reasons of which we know nothing, he re-acted to this along lines which, in an ordinary man living to-day, we should describe as paranoid. Since, however, he was in fact the King of Egypt, he was not regarded by his contemporaries as mad and was not shut up in a lunatic asylum. Instead of this, he founded a monotheistic religion and succeeded in imposing it upon his subjects. If this is so, it seems possible that the accident that a person of this peculiar type of mind was also the most powerful individual in the world may have been responsible for the first emergence of monotheism in the history of the human race.

A DREAM OF DESCARTES: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNCONSCIOUS DETERMINANTS OF THE SCIENCES[1]

BY

STEPHEN SCHÖNBERGER

BUDAPEST

In a short work entitled *Olympica*,[2] René Descartes, the celebrated French philosopher and man of science, tells us how, when he was twenty-three years old, ' cum plenus forem enthousiasmo et mirabilis scientiæ fundamenta reperirem ', he once had three dreams. He has given us an account of these dreams in the work referred to, accompanied by his comments on them and the information that the doubts which had hitherto tormented him entirely ceased to trouble him from that day.

Although Freud [3] himself has remarked in connection with this dream that analysis of the dreams of historical figures offers little promise because we are compelled to dispense with the dreamer's associations, it was also Freud who shewed us that, even when the material available is unsatisfactory and incomplete, it sometimes enables us to make constructions with useful results: only we must never forget the hypothetical character of these constructions. I propose to consider this principle as applicable in the present paper.

I must crave your indulgence if, bearing in mind the limited time at my disposal, I have resolved to forgo any attempt to present you with a complete description or detailed analysis of the three dreams and to content myself with an account of those aspects which I consider strictly necessary for a proper understanding of my thesis.

So far as concerns the first dream, I shall merely remark that, to all appearance, it centres round masturbation and homosexuality. In the second dream Descartes hears a peal of thunder and awakes in terror; everywhere in the room he sees sparks, which he regards with curiosity. He then falls asleep again and in the dream which follows

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[1] Read before the Fifteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Paris, 1938.

[2] *Œuvres de Descartes*, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannéry, 1897–1910, tome X, pp. 179–188.

[3] Freud, ' Brief an Maxim Leroy über einen Traum des Cartesius ' (1929), *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. XII, S. 403.

he sees himself turning over the pages of a dictionary. Suddenly he notices that he is holding a collection of poems without being able to tell how it came into his hands. While turning over its pages, he begins reading a poem beginning with the words ' Quod vitæ sectabor iter '. A person whom he does not recognize advises him to read a poem beginning ' Est et Non '. Descartes tries to find it but fails. Meanwhile he feels that the dictionary is less complete than he had at first supposed. Failing to find the poem for which he is looking, Descartes recommends a more beautiful one, beginning with ' Quod vitæ sectabor iter '. While searching for this poem, he comes across a number of small portraits in copper-plate [*taille douce*] which greatly appeal to him.

The observations supplied by Descartes on the separate elements of the dream are to be regarded as equivalent to associations and can therefore be utilized to advantage in undertaking an analysis of the dream. With regard to the collection of poems he remarks that ' wisdom, which resides in the hearts of all men, like the sparks of fire latent in stones ', finds a more perfect expression in poets than in philosophers ; and we shall be justified in assuming that this observation refers equally to the sparks of the preceding dream. As we know, a spark is produced by the impact of two stones ; and perhaps our hypothesis will not seem too far-fetched if we add that the impact of two stones is a symbol of coitus.

I need only refer to the case of a child analysed by Mrs. Klein [4] which shews that for the child in question the collision of two objects symbolized parental intercourse. One of my patients complained among other things that he was too often liable to see sparks. In the course of his analysis we had to recognize that the sparks symbolized sexual acts between his parents of which he had too often been a witness. Moreover we should remember that the association of the primal scene with the idea of sparks, light and fire is attested by numerous examples drawn from mythology. I need only mention here the Prometheus legends.

Accordingly sparks are associated with the idea of coitus or rather symbolize the sexual act itself. It is not therefore altogether unlikely that the sight of the sparks in the dream was psychically equivalent to the sight of the performance of a sexual act.

According to Descartes the spark that is within us is wisdom itself ;

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[4] *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, 1932, p. 42.

and in the light of the preceding considerations we may assume that wisdom is parental intercourse, something within us, that we have introjected. The third dream is concerned with the expression, we might almost say the projection of this wisdom. In it the idea of wisdom is expressed in three distinct forms. Of the dictionary Descartes observes that it is ' all the sciences gathered together ' ; in the poem entitled ' Est et Non ', Ausonius,[5] its author, concludes that the world is composed of affirmations and negations. But so far from leading us to a true knowledge of the world, this discovery only proves a source of embarrassment. The poem beginning with the words ' Quod vitæ ' [6] is from the pen of the same poet. Here the author treats of the different problems of life, including the problems of sexual life, enshrines them in antitheses and discovers of each solution in turn that it is a source of terror and anxiety. In the dream Descartes regards the dictionary, ' the sciences gathered together ', as a very imperfect compilation. He is equally critical of the poem entitled ' Est et Non ' and is only really pleased by the poem which expresses the anxieties attendant on uncertainty. While searching for this he finds the small portraits in copper-plate [*en taille douce*], and perhaps we may assume that these represent the imago or figure of a tender mother [*taille de la mère douce*]. Accordingly, bearing these considerations in mind, it would seem that the significance of the details of the dream which I have been describing to you is as follows : the expression of uncertainty and of the anxiety attendant on this have enabled the philosopher to gain possession of his mother.

As I mentioned earlier, Descartes had this dream after he had made a scientific discovery. As we have seen he *finds* in the dream a collection of poems without knowing whence it came or how it happened to fall into his hands. This find is in our view to be regarded as the representative in the dream of the scientific discovery ; and if we accept this hypothesis we may say that a discovery is nothing other than the expression of a state of uncertainty.

Continuing along this path, I propose to try and determine the nature of the scientific discovery which Descartes made before the day of the dream in question. M. Charles Adam assumes that it must have been a mathematical discovery. He is thinking specially of four of

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[5] D. M. Ausonii Burdigalensis *Opuscula*, Teubner, Leipzig, 1886, p. 91.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

Descartes' ideas and he surmises that the internal labour accomplished by the philosopher must have given birth to them at approximately the same time as he had the dream. These four ideas, namely universal mathematics, the reform of algebra, the possibility of expressing quantities by means of lines and lastly the possibility of expressing lines by means of algebraical symbols might be said to constitute the elementary bases of analytical geometry.[7] And one of these ideas, the possibility, namely, of expressing quantities by means of lines, happens to accord perfectly with the hypothesis I have just elaborated that a discovery is the expression of something.

In support of my views concerning the relation between the dream and the mathematical discovery of which I have been speaking, allow me to draw your attention to the following considerations. In the dream, as we have seen, the dictionary, that is to say ' the sciences gathered together ', is contrasted with another dream-element, the poem beginning with the words ' Quod vitæ ', by which, I have assumed, the discovery is represented in the dream. In his *Geometry* Descartes observes that the early mathematicians were completely ignorant of the relations between arithmetic and geometry and consequently of the idea which, according to my hypothesis, is identical with the discovery which preceded the dream or forms one element of it. Thus, remarks Descartes, ' they merely gathered together the propositions on which they had happened by accident '.[8] In his *Geometry*, then, he passes the same judgement on the early geometricians as he passes on the dictionary in the dream. And he thinks that their ideas of geometry are as imperfect in comparison with his own as the dictionary in comparison with the poem which, according to our hypothesis, corresponds to his discovery, that is, his idea of the possibility of expressing quantities by means of lines.

Now according to this hypothesis there is a further element underlying the discovery, *the element of uncertainty*. In one of Descartes' letters written in 1629 we may read the following sentences : ' There is a branch of mathematics which I like to call the science of miracles, because it teaches one to make such happy use of light and air that one can bring about with its help all the same illusions which the magicians are said to have conjured up with the help of Demons. So far as I am aware, there has never been an exponent of this science

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[7] *Œuvres*, tome XII, p. 50.

[8] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 376.

and I know of no one apart from him [M. Ferrier] who might aspire to become one.' [9]

Accordingly, as M. Charles Adam suggests, the ' science of miracles ', the fundamental principles of which Descartes discovered on the day of the dream, is really a branch of mathematics. And if we ask ourselves which branch of mathematics, the reference to Ferrier will help us to understand certain points. For Ferrier was a glass-cutter who on the basis of Descartes' calculations cut lenses for him, so that it was Descartes who constructed the curves limiting the lenses in question.[10] Thus the ' scientia mirabilis ' would be that branch of mathematics which makes it possible to calculate the curves limiting lenses. But it is to analytical geometry that we owe the possibility of calculating the data relating to curved lines ; and Descartes held that one of the less immediate aims of that science was to extend our knowledge of lenses. The calculation of the data relating to curved lines, as Descartes himself asserts, depends on ' two unknown and indeterminate quantities ' [11] which he introduced, represented and expressed. These two quantities are related to a certain point on the curve and constitute what we now call ordinates ; by their aid we can determine all the data of a curve, both as a whole and in detail. These quantities correspond perhaps to the state of uncertainty which as we have suggested contributed to the discovery. But if this is true, in other words, if our hypothesis is correct, the ' fundamentum scientiæ mirabilis ' is nothing other than the representation of ordinates, the indeterminate quantities on which analytical geometry is based. Perhaps we may derive support for my argument from the fact that after describing the ordinates Descartes proceeds to demonstrate the use of his system on curved lines of which he observes himself that they are ' very useful in the theory of catoptrics and dioptrics '.[12]

If this line of thought is correct I shall be justified in saying that Descartes, on the day before the dream, discovered that, by introducing ' indeterminate quantities ' or ordinates and by representing and expressing them, in other words by means of analytical geometry, it is possible to acquire precise data concerning curves. These data in

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[9] *Op. cit.*, tome I, p. 21.

[10] *Op. cit.*, tome XII, p. 90.

[11] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 394.

[12] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 424.

turn enabled him to construct lenses so that his science came to resemble the secrets of the magicians.

There are two points in particular to which I should like to call your attention. The first is that Descartes achieves certainty, in other words arrives at certain knowledge, by expressing a state of uncertainty. The second point is that, as was previously mentioned, a less immediate aim of these investigations is to extend our knowledge of lenses. But we know that Descartes' study of mathematics and geometry furnished the model for his thought, and so it will not come as a great surprise if we maintain that the two factors which we uncovered in our analysis of his geometry will be found to determine the general method of his reasoning. I propose to try to establish this in connection with the *Discourse on Method*, which is devoted to just these questions of his method of reasoning. This work contains a fuller exposition of his thought, and I hope to be able to make use of it to throw some light on the significance and genesis of these factors. But once again owing to the limited time at my disposal I shall have to rely exclusively on the *Discourse* for my material.

In this work Descartes begins by recording that all the knowledge which he acquired in the course of his education was imperfect, since 'we have all been children before being men and since we were long obliged to be governed by our appetites and by our teachers, who often enough contradicted one another'.[13] He therefore repudiates everything which he had hitherto accepted as valid. He likens this work of destruction to the demolition of a house;[14] and while pursuing his inquiries he builds himself a house, a provisional code of morals[15] to serve until the new house is completed.

But the house in which we live, as our analyses have taught us, is a symbol of the mother; and the destruction of this house, of his mother then, entails in Descartes a destruction of all morality, i.e. of the super-ego, for we have seen that he felt constrained to furnish himself with a code of morals to serve him for the time being. However, since the super-ego dwells within us, the metaphor of the house in which we live requires to be interpreted inversely; the house signifies a mother, an inner moral sense, an introjected object. And having due regard to the whole of our previous discussion we may say that the

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[13] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 13.

[14] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 22.

[15] *Ibid.*

starting-point of Descartes' thought is an attempt to destroy the introjected mother, in other words the super-ego.

Descartes himself has supplied us with a clear explanation of the origin of this attempt at destruction. During his childhood there had been conflicts between the super-ego (his teachers) on the one side and his appetites (the id) on the other ; these conflicts were responsible for his essay in destruction which was directed against the super-ego and formed, as we have seen, the starting-point and mainspring of his thought.

In parenthesis let me add that Descartes frequently argues from the psychical processes operating in children and babies to explain certain mental processes of adults. We are indebted to Dr. Jones for calling our attention to this point.[16]

Having thus briefly explained the unconscious foundations of Descartes' thought, I propose now to try to follow his line of reasoning.

All that had hitherto seemed to him most certain is now declared doubtful ; everything is denied and destroyed. ' But immediately afterwards I noticed that, while I thus wished to think all things false, it followed necessarily that the " I " who thought this should be something, and remarking that this truth " *I think, therefore I am* " was so certain and so assured . . . I came to the conclusion that I could accept it as the first principle of the philosophy for which I was seeking '[17] We see then that thinking and reasoning are in Descartes' eyes equivalent to doubt, denial and destruction, and further that doubt and uncertainty have secured him possession of a primary assured truth. We have seen that the unconscious source of the uncertainty and doubt present in Descartes was to be found in his attempt to destroy his super-ego—an interpretation which is incidentally in perfect harmony with the views of Mrs. Klein.[18] Accordingly, in the light of our previous discussion, we may say that the achievement of conscious recognition of his attempt to destroy his super-ego, an attempt to which we trace the primitive source of his uncertainties, first secured him possession of a primary certainty.

We have seen that Descartes displayed a preference in his dream

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[16] Jones, ' Die Bedeutung der frühesten Eindrücke für die Erzeugung von Vorliebe und Abneigung ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. I, 1913, S. 563.

[17] *Œuvres*, tome VI, p. 32.

[18] *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, Chapters VIII and IX.

for the expression of uncertainty and that his analytical geometry is based on the expression of indeterminate quantities, which makes it possible to establish some other facts with absolute certainty. We have seen too that the same mental mechanism, the conquest of certainty with the aid of a previous state of uncertainty, played a fundamental part in Descartes' philosophy. At the same time in elucidating these states of uncertainty I have tried to shew the part played by Descartes' conflict with his super-ego and by the resulting attempt to compass its destruction.

We can also establish connections between Descartes' attempt to destroy his super-ego and some objects which occupy a place in his thought. ' Because I knew nothing but fire which could produce light, excepting the stars, I studied amongst other things to make very clear all that pertains to its nature ; . . . how nearly all things can be consumed or converted into ashes by its means ; and finally how of these ashes, by the intensity of its action alone it forms glass. Since this transformation of ashes into glass seemed to me as wonderful as any other process in nature I took particular pleasure in describing it.' [19]

In my analysis of the dream I suggested that the sparks (i.e. fire) which appeared in it simply represented the primal scene, the introjected object or super-ego. In the *Discourse* Descartes also suggests that our veins contain animal spirits ' which resemble a flame that is very pure and very vivid '.[20] But we know that ashes commonly symbolize fæces ; possibly the choice of the expression ' consume ' will provide us with a further reason for treating ashes as equivalent in this context also to fæces, the final product of the processes of digestion. And since glass is formed of ashes it would seem to follow that glass possessed for Descartes the significance of fæces in a modified form. According to Descartes then, there is a fire within us, in other words a destructive super-ego which finally converts our inner substance into fæces ; and the modification which is to take effect in the fæces or ashes that are the final product of the process of destruction is the transformation which seems to him ' as wonderful as any other process in nature '.

The question then arises what may be the unconscious meaning of

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[19] *Œuvres*, tome VI, pp. 44–45.

[20] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 54.

this transformation, which is psychologically so significant. Ashes, like fæces, are a dark or opaque substance, whereas glass is clear and transparent. In Mrs. Klein's experience [21] the earliest object of the epistemophilic impulse is the inside of the body, and the impulse itself originates in phantasies connected with the idea of destroying this. But we can satisfy our curiosity with regard to the inside of transparent objects, as we cannot with those that are opaque ; consequently this primitive form of the epistemophilic impulse secures fulfilment the moment it fastens on transparent objects, with the result that the destructive phantasies which give rise to it can finally be paralysed. Accordingly, glass—that is to say, the clear substance—symbolizes knowledge and truth ; and indeed it was Descartes who assumed as a general rule ' that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true '.[22] The psychological connections subsisting between knowledge and the quality of transparency betray their presence even in our everyday language ; we speak of truths being clear, transparent, evident, of knowledge which illuminates, etc.

As knowledge is able to paralyse the impulse to destroy, transparent objects symbolize a state of mind immune from destructive tendencies. In his provisional code of morals Descartes abjures (*inter alia*) all things impossible : thus for example he renounces all claim to ' have our bodies formed of a substance as little corruptible as diamonds '. [23] But we have already seen that there dwelt in his mind certain destructive forces making for the disintegration of his body. If therefore the body is incorruptible as transparent diamonds, its incorruptibility symbolizes the paralysis of its own destructive tendencies.

If these interpretations are correct, we may say that objects like fæces which are dark in colour and are not transparent symbolize conflict and destruction, in short a ' bad object ' ; clear and transparent objects symbolize knowledge, a state of mind immune from conflict and destruction, in short a ' good object ' ; and the process whereby ashes are transformed into glass is nothing other than the transformation of a ' bad object ' into a ' good object ', hence a process of reparation.

The explanation I have just given of the unconscious meaning of

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[21] Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

[22] *Œuvres*, tome VI, p. 33.

[23] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 26.

transparency which was suggested to me by Descartes himself derives support not only from the evidence of language but from other sources as well. Thus, as Róheim tells us in one of his works,[24] the Australian medicine-man effects his magical cures with the help of a piece of quartz which he is supposed to keep in his anus ; that is tantamount to saying that the quartz is a symbol of fæces, just as is glass in my hypothesis. In the course of the ceremony to which the ordinary man must submit before he can become a magician, the contents of the candidate's body are changed into incorruptible quartz.[25] As in Descartes' comparison, then, a transparent object is at the same time an incorruptible object. and so we see that even among the most primitive of men a transparent object, and consequently transparent fæces, is endowed with special magical powers and symbolizes a paralysis of the forces of destruction,

It should not be difficult to demonstrate the presence of these same connections in alchemy, which could be said to occupy a position mid-way between the stage reached by the physical and natural sciences as viewed by men like Descartes and the earliest beginnings of those sciences. As we know, the efforts of the alchemists were concentrated on discovering the philosophers' stone, which was required to possess among other qualities that of being transparent. The philosophers' stone has the magical power of transmuting non-precious metals, especially lead, into precious ones, of curing all ills and of bestowing eternal youth upon him who possesses it. It was necessary that the philosophers' stone should consist of a raw material (' *prima materia* ') ; and this was completely identified in the eyes of the alchemists with different sorts of excrement, especially with fæces or else with semen.[26] I shall here confine my remarks to the former. To begin with it is clear that we are once more dealing with a transparent object of anal origin. And since of the properties possessed by lead the alchemists were at pains to single out its softness and dark colouring, it seems reasonably likely that this metal stood as a symbol of fæces. We know that it has long been generally acknowledged among analysts that gold is to be interpreted as a fæcal symbol. Thus to the alchemists it seemed possible by means of the philosophers' stone, i.e. a transparent object of anal origin, to convert worthless into precious fæces.

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[24] ' Nach dem Tode des Urvaters ', *Imago*, Bd. IX, 1923, S. 100.

[25] *Op. cit.*, S. 101.

[26] H. Silberer, *Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik*, 1914, S. 81.

It is well known that the utterances of the alchemists bore a somewhat extraordinary and mystical character. They adopted a condensed style, heavily laden with symbols. Moreover, it was precisely those accounted the most famous among them who attributed only a secondary value to experiment and treated it merely as a pretext for discussing other subjects. Now it is highly interesting and instructive to find that their expressions clearly reveal—and here I would refer to Silberer and Hitchcock [27]—that for the alchemists the philosophers' stone represented man himself. They regarded metals in the same light; in their eyes the physical and chemical properties of these symbolized the various human character-traits, which amounts once again to saying that the alchemist's aim was to transform a being who is identified with fæces into another more precious one. An alchemist quoted by Silberer [28] asserts, for example, that the rays of the sun are unable to penetrate ashes or gravel, that the truth of Christ, that is, can never illuminate Adam; ashes and gravel must be dissolved before they can be converted into pure glass, before man, that is, can be born regenerate so that the light may penetrate him. In this connection we may ask ourselves how man's nature is affected by this regeneration. The alchemists declared that they were striving ultimately to attain to God, and that to achieve their aim it was first necessary to purify the conscience.[29] Regenerate man has found God once more and his conscience is pure as glass. Hence the search for the philosophers' stone, i.e. for a transparent object, symbolizes an attempt to purify the conscience, to enhance the value of the super-ego. A clear and tranquil conscience is the privilege of a man immune from conflicts. True possessor of the philosophers' stone, he is incorruptible and the boon of eternal youth is his. Thus it follows from what we have said that the two themes comprised in the symbolism of the philosophers' stone, the transmutation of metals into gold and the factor of incorruptibility, imply that the personal subject identified with his object strives to rid himself of his destructive tendencies, to become regenerate, with the result that the existence of subject and object now identified with each other is permanently assured. In short the transparent philosophers' stone is a symbol of constructive omnipotence.

Tempting as it might be, I cannot pursue this analysis of alchemy

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[27] Silberer, *op. cit.*, S. 97, quoting E. A. Hitchcock.

[28] *Op. cit.*, S. 109.

[29] *Op. cit.*, S. 99.

further, but must rest content with having shewn that the philosophers' stone, like the magician's crystal and Descartes' glass, symbolizes fæces which have been rendered transparent. These transparent fæces, now identical with the subject himself, symbolize a paralysis of the forces of destruction directed against the bad super-ego, in short they symbolize a super-ego restored and improved.

We have seen that transparent objects are invested with great significance in the mind of the magician, the alchemists and of Descartes himself as well as in our everyday speech ; it becomes clear that we are here dealing with the expression of certain general tendencies of the human mind. Róheim [30] has observed that, if we succeed in proving that the quartz-crystal is, as it were, an objectification of certain of man's instinctual tendencies, we shall probably be able to claim that we have grasped *in statu nascendi* not only the problem of the medicine-man but the spirit of medicine itself and so of all empirical science in general. I propose to try and demonstrate the truth of this with the help of the material which I have already placed before you. I shall start from the assumption that at a primitive level of development when the child first begins to explore the real world and his orientation towards objects is still determined by the strictly limited number of his viewpoints, one of these was precisely whether an object was or was not transparent and whether it was light or dark in colour. Now we know that the child's epistemophilic impulses are at first directed to the inside of the body ; and since the fæces issue from inside the body and are even identified with it, they are thought of as a source from which we may learn something of its nature. But since fæces are neither transparent nor light in colour, our thirst for knowledge is left unsatisfied and unassuaged. And if we bear in mind the connection between ignorance and destructive tendencies which have not as yet been paralysed, we might say that by their non-transparent products anal functions naturally tend to convince the child, by daily repetition as it were, that inside his body reign conflict and destruction, that he carries within him a bad super-ego, in other words that the content of his body is bad. This engenders a need to remedy the absence of any transparent quality in fæces, or rather the inside of the body identified with fæces. For if an opaque object becomes transparent, the impulse to know can then be satisfied and the destructive tendencies paralysed, in other words the condition of the object and

[30] *Op. cit.*, S. 100.

so of the body identified with it has been improved and restored. In this process whereby an opaque object is transformed into a transparent one I believe that we shall find the unconscious source of the empirical sciences.

We owe to Mrs. Klein [31] the discovery that the processes of destruction result in the child's conception of objects becoming changed and distorted. Perhaps the hypothesis I have put forward merely supplements Mrs. Klein's in so far as it suggests that these destructive processes cause objects to become opaque and dark in colour.

Here I can only refer quite briefly to the intimate connections subsisting between the processes I have been describing and therapeutic treatment. The magician effects his cures with the help of the quartz-crystal ; the philosophers' stone also possesses the power of healing all forms of sickness ; and Descartes, who dissected numerous bodies, tells us that he ' resolved not to employ the time which remains to me in life in any other matter than in endeavouring to acquire some knowledge of nature which shall be of such a kind that it will enable us to arrive at rules for medicine more assured than those which have yet been attained '.[32] Similarly I shall confine myself to a bare mention of the fact that an orientation determined by the transparency of objects is often to be observed in connection with the complaints uttered by patients in states of depersonalization. The patient sometimes tells us that objects seem transparent and frequently complains that his limbs feel like glass. But I must abandon this topic and return to the original subject of my paper, Descartes' dream.

You may possibly remember that the Scientia Mirabilis, the elements of which Descartes had discovered on the day before his dream, enabled him to construct lenses, themselves transparent objects, and consequently presented itself to him as a science equalling in value that known to the magicians. And so we find the two factors which we discussed operating on three different planes : on the one hand we have the uncertainty in the dream, the indeterminate quantities (i.e. the ordinates) in geometry and the reasoning equivalent to doubt in philosophy ; and on the other hand we have the intense interest in glass, the construction of lenses and other discoveries in the field of optics and the clear, distinct conclusions of philosophy.

We have seen that transparent objects symbolize a restored con-

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[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

[32] *Œuvres*, tome VI, p. 78.

science, i.e. super-ego ; and indeed it was his clear and distinct thoughts which persuaded Descartes of the existence of God, in other words of the super-ego, and served to render him like one who has possession of a transparent object. Similarly it was his discovery which enabled him to construct lenses and freed him from his doubts, which as we know have their origin in the destructive tendencies directed against the super-ego. And what is the *method* employed by Descartes to achieve this end ? The expression of uncertainty in the dream, the representation of indeterminate quantities in geometry and the fact of thinking in philosophy. This was for Descartes the first incontrovertible fact, so that he could use it as a model for the process of reconstruction. This is the discovery which humanity owes to Descartes, and this it is which distinguishes the man of science of our times—of whom Descartes was one of the earliest representatives—from the magician and the alchemist, even although exactly similar unconscious tendencies are at work in them. All three are bent upon reconstituting the super-ego identified with the object which they had once wanted to destroy. But while the magician achieves hallucinatory possession of a quartz-crystal which enables him to accomplish hallucinated miracles, and while the alchemist submits real objects to procedures dictated by his projections and designed to secure him possession of a magic crystal, Descartes discovered that thoughts inspired by uncertainty possess a clarity capable of being substituted for the transparent objects which symbolize certainty : ' I had only to consider in reference to all these things of which I found some idea in myself whether it was a perfection to possess them or not '.[33] That is to say, an object which has been darkened by the process of destruction may be restored to its original clear condition if our conception of it is clear. And so the jumble of magic is succeeded by experiment and exact observation, the immense importance of which for the natural sciences Descartes did not fail to recognize.

Descartes held that geometry is the true abode of clear ideas.[34] Consequently this science is well designed to render objects clear, that is to restore the super-ego by means of the technique now familiar to you. And indeed Descartes in his philosophy makes use of the methods of geometry to prove the existence of God,[35] just as he uses them to

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[33] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 35.

[34] *Op. cit.*, tome VI, p. 36.

[35] *Ibid.*

describe the properties of lenses, i.e. of transparent objects (we have pointed out the connections between these and a restored super-ego) and to construct them (as we suggested in connection with the dream).

We have seen that in Descartes scientific research began with an act of destruction, that the method which it employed was reconstruction, and that the result of this process of reconstruction is a regenerated super-ego just as it is God for philosophy and transparent objects or convincing truths for science. It only remains for us to consider what Descartes himself believed he had found in his dreams. While searching for the poem commencing ' Quod vitæ sectabor iter ', which I regard as the element in the dream corresponding to his discovery, he finds a number of small copper-plate portraits representing, as I suggest, the imago of his mother. Thus the object is transformed into a tender mother, the demolished house of the *Discourse* is to be rebuilt, and this moreover is entirely due to the scientific methods which succeed in clarifying it. In the same way the magician transforms his patient into a generous mother from whose body he sucks the quartz-crystal after having first injected it.[36] So too the alchemist refers to the philosophers' stone, when in an active state, as the pelican, because it possesses the power of transmuting base into precious metals, sacrificing itself in the process just as the pelican nurtures its young on its own blood.[37]

We believe that we have been able to shew that the mainspring of scientific thought, as indeed of so many human activities, is the striving to regain possession of the tender mother whom everyone is destined to lose in the course of his development and whose death must have been for Descartes, then a child in his second year,[38] the supreme tragedy of his life.

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[36] Róheim, *op. cit.*, S. 106.

[37] Silberer, *op. cit.*, S. 136.

[38] *Œuvres*, tome XII, p. 9.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CLINGING AND EQUILIBRIUM[1]

BY

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Imre Hermann has quite rightly called our attention to the significance of clinging in the mental life of man. I propose here to adduce certain facts which confirm his ideas and amplify them. The investigations which Dr. J. Bieber and I have carried out with newly-born infants[2] have shown us that the act of sucking is in fact always accompanied by a heightening of muscular tension, especially in respect of grasping. In so far as grasping can be voluntarily initiated, it enables sucking to proceed more easily. Hermann quite correctly comments upon the amount of energy involved in the act of grasping.

According to Watson and Richter[3] new-born babies and monkeys are actually able to maintain themselves suspended by the strength of their grasping-reflex. Richter has shewn that the grasping-reflex in monkeys regularly disappears in the process of development. The fact that the grasping-reflex makes it possible to cling in defiance of the law of gravity and subsequently diminishes is another reason which points to the probability of there being a connection between grasping and sucking. A child must feel securely perched against its mother's body while sucking. In pathological cases we find that grasping and groping are very frequently bound up with a sucking-reflex.[4] It is certain that grasping and sucking may be activated afresh if the so-called pre-frontal region of the brain is destroyed. This is also a typical occurrence in severe alcoholic disturbances of the brain[5] in which the principal lesion is to be found mainly in the subcortical area (in the neighbourhood of the fourth ventricle, the

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[1] Some observations on Imre Hermann's paper ' Sich-Anklammern—Auf-Suche-Gehen ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXII, 1936.

[2] Report in preparation.

[3] P. Richter, ' The Grasping Reflex in the New-born Monkey ', *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 26, 1931.

[4] F. M. R. Walshe and E. Graeme Robertson, ' Observations on the Form and Nature of the Grasping Movements and Tonic Innervation seen in Certain Cases of Lesion of the Frontal Lobe ', *Brain*, Vol. 56, 1933.

[5] *Encephalopathia alcoholica* (Bender and Schilder).

aqueduct and the floor of the third ventricle). Grasping and sucking were also observed by Gamper in his mid-brain organism. There is no object in going into further details of this here. Grasping is even present in organisms with malformations of the brain who are unable to suck. A very interesting finding of Bieber's which I can confirm is that sucking reinforces the grasping-reflex and *vice versâ*. For example, we very often find in cases with severe lesions of the brain that it is at first only possible to activate the grasping-reflex. If we reinforce this, we elicit a sucking-reflex too. The reverse also can happen. It follows that we are dealing with a function forming a single whole. The child sucks as he clings to his mother. But this original association of the functions is not maintained. At the next stage in his development the child must learn to stand upright and walk. Clinging is still very essential to him but it is now needed to enable him to stand erect against the forces of gravity. In alcoholic disorders one can observe that the grasping-reflex becomes especially marked when the subject is in danger of falling backwards. In cases of paralysis agitans with a tendency to be propelled backwards (retropulsion), I have very often noticed that forced grasping was present and became especially marked while retropulsion was taking place. Here the grasping-reflex aims at securing support in the struggle to assume or maintain an upright position without loss of equilibrium. It is not so much contact with the mother's body that is sought as her help in dealing with the dangers of gravity. Especially in cases of paralysis agitans there is often no sign of the sucking-reflex. Grasping has become an independent function. In the course of the child's later development grasping undergoes a further change of aim: the child seizes an object and brings it to his mouth (taking nourishment). But the relation between grasping and sucking has now become something entirely different from what it was in the new-born infant. In the original sucking-clinging function, clinging served to secure the child's equilibrium (protection against being dropped) and physical warmth (proximity to the mother's body), especially when absorbing nourishment. At a later stage the clinging helps him to preserve an upright posture. In either case we may say that it helps to counter the forces of gravity. We may go further and say that it is one of the functions of a mother to safeguard her child against these forces. Drs. L. Bender and A. Blau [6] have been able to shew that children suffering from injuries

[6] In an unpublished work.

to the cerebellum develop an especially great need for support and tenderness. They require their mother's (parents') support against the forces of gravity. These problems merge into the great problem of posture and preservation of equilibrium which anatomically is related to the apparatus regulating this (the vestibular apparatus) and that concerned with the stance and postural reflexes. It seems that children respond with anxiety and panic whenever they feel uncertain of being able to maintain their position. This panic may be compared with the sensations brought on by turning round and then suddenly making a movement of the head (Purkinje's falling phenomenon). Adults react to such situations with feelings of dizziness. I do not hesitate to say that this powerful apparatus constitutes one of the nuclear formations of the ego in an analytical sense. It is in the first place only indirectly connected with grasping, holding and mastering, although, as Hermann rightly points out, such connecting-links do undoubtedly exist. But I think it would be more correct to assume that the act of taking hold which is involved in the grasping-reflex is not simply to be accounted for by reference to the erotogenicity of the hand—just as we assume that an ego-component also is present in the act of sucking. Both ego-functions by their very nature (ego and id have their roots in the same soil) form a natural starting-point for libidinal-oral and tactile-libidinal functions. A more important point is that sucking and clinging and being supported lead to a union and fusion, or, one might say, to a re-union, with the mother's body, and thus enter directly into the main stream of the libido, as Rotter-Kertész [7] especially has shewn so well.

Clinging may take place by means of the mouth to the nipple and other parts of the body or by means of the hands to the breast, hair and other parts of the body. But its aim is always support and union. It is a matter of posture and position (tonic) and leads secondarily to the momentary act (phasic) which may be rhythmic (sucking) or arhythmic. Attacking and mastering are phasic. I am convinced therefore that these manifestations are only indirectly related to sado-masochism.

These considerations have a direct clinical bearing on our conception of the anxiety-neuroses. In one of my cases the patient slept with her mother until the age of ten, her hand pressed against her

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[7] ' Der tiefenpsychologische Hintergrund der inzestuösen Fixierung ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXII, 1936.

mother's bosom. At an early age she felt that she had been deserted by her father who frequently had occasion to travel to Europe and died when she was four years old. Her mother bestowed her love on a stepfather who, according to an important early memory, had refused to let her eat bread. The problem of equilibrium and nourishment presented itself at the moment that withdrawal of love had aggravated the problem of equilibrium. In another case which came under my observation the patient, a woman of thirty whose anxiety-neurosis had lasted for more than five years, found it especially difficult to walk on an inclined surface. (Similarly it was only with difficulty that she could walk across a marble floor : the reflections seemed to play havoc with its solidity.) In her fifth year she often felt giddy when travelling on the underground and vomited. During her childhood she would run to her father and put her arm around him only to find her advances coldly repulsed. At four years she was unable to sit on a swing. She was perpetually afraid that someone might trip her up. She had been warned by her mother against sliding down haystacks. Her mother never went out and before her death was unable to walk alone any more, suffering as she did from a pernicious anæmia accompanied by disturbances affecting her equilibrium. During the patient's anxiety-attacks it was impossible for her to walk and she would hold on to her chair. All these factors only acquired significance because neither her father nor her mother had ever afforded her the erotic gratification which she had not the courage to demand of them for fear that her mother might tear her to pieces. She was also possessed by a fear of being burst asunder from within by a child, by some coveted object (perhaps by her father's penis). But this anxiety would appear to have been directly concerned with instances of aggressive behaviour on the part of her mother and a nurse towards animals which occurred in her fourth year. Her dread of being left alone and powerless to maintain her equilibrium and her dread of being torn and burst asunder from without and within did not apparently stand in a genetic relationship to one another, although there were doubtless connections between them. Her fear was that she would be punished for masturbation and this fear activated her other anxieties. Her dread of being dismembered was closely bound up with her own aggressiveness which was sustained by exceptionally strong feelings and aimed at dismembering other persons, more especially her mother.

It is far from my intention to ascribe to this mechanism a decisive rôle in every anxiety-neurosis, although it seems to be almost invariably

present. But we can frequently demonstrate its existence in other cases as well ; we then find numerous dreams of flying and gliding, leaping across difficult passages or steep inclines, or floating over precipices, almost always accompanied by a feeling that the parents (father and mother) have not been sufficiently generous with their love (contact, support, embraces).

Hermann contrasts ' clinging ' with ' going exploring ' and believes that he has found here an important pair of antithetic instincts. I feel more disposed to contrast ' clinging ' in the first instance with ' maintaining one's position '. It is a fact that children are uncommonly proud of every advance they make in physical equilibrium. They are insatiable in their demands to be swung, thrown, caught or lifted in the air. If however they do not feel sufficiently secure in their possession of the love of adults, these games, as I was able to observe in one case, are accompanied by increased feelings of uncertainty. In favourable cases a child acquires the necessary confidence to enable him to maintain his posture and to avoid being left completely at the mercy of the forces of gravity. Thus we see that the child strives to make himself independent of others in preserving his equilibrium, although he does not find it pleasant to renounce the libidinal gratification afforded by support and contact with his mother. At a further remove this satisfaction in securing his equilibrium leads to the child running away from his mother ; a process which can be bound up with the acquisition of fresh objects to lean upon (love-objects). Dependence in the matter of posture is sooner or later felt as a compulsion, as an obstacle to the subject's freedom of movement, to which, as to every other interference with movement, he reacts with rage and destructiveness. But behind this mechanism, which must be regarded in the first instance as being imbued with libido, we shall once more encounter the ' ego-apparatus ' which clamours for postural independence in accordance also with evolutionary laws. Children conduct endless experiments to test their equilibrium, as anyone can easily convince himself by observing them. Every anxiety-neurotic experiences the bitterness of the restrictions which his illness imposes. Helene Deutsch has pointed out that the victims of agoraphobia hate and punish the person who protects them against their anxiety. At the same time the presence of that person acts as an assurance that he is still alive. The death-wishes against the person to whom one clings and looks for support are unmistakable. According to the peculiar libidinal structure of each patient the death of this ' supporting figure ' may simply be

experienced in terms of his removal or, as in the case just mentioned, of his dismemberment. The fear of insanity so often present in anxiety-neurotics corresponds to their fear of their own destructive rage, especially in so far as this is directed against the ' supporting figure '. In this connection it should be mentioned that all cases of agoraphobia reveal a wish to embark on distant travel, to ' run away ', to ' go and explore '. Here again I believe that the desire for and progress towards postural independence are to be ascribed to the nuclear structure of the ego-organization, but that libidinal postures of great significance are co-ordinate with this part of the ego's structure. Fundamentally they are postures which free one from dependence on a ' supporting figure ', lead away from it, deprive it of its libidinal significance or finally bring about its destruction (by dismemberment). At this point we may once more recall that proximity, approximation in space (to a loved object) and finally contact are indispensable conditions for a positive erotic relationship, whereas remoteness in space is incompatible with any close libidinal attachment.

REGRESSION OF EGO-ORIENTATION AND LIBIDO IN SCHIZOPHRENIA [1]

BY

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In his well-known paper on the case of Schreber Freud describes the interrelation between libidinal phases and regression, between the symptom and defence mechanism. The withdrawal of cathexis from objects plays the smaller part in the psychotic process ; the main part of it is reconstruction. We need only recall the names of the authors to whom we owe the knowledge of details of the process of reconstruction : Tausk, Abraham, Nunberg, Staercke, Ophuijsen, Bibring, etc. And we shall only emphasize what Abraham confirms, namely, that the ejection of the introjected object can only occur at a certain level of psychosexual development. According to Freud it is an open question whether reconstruction is carried out through a progressive cathexis of libidinal stages. In 1926 Fenichel suggested that the reappearance of archaic phases of libidinal development may not be due to regression but may be regarded as a curative, progressive process, as a movement from ego to object cathexis, which however has not attained its goal but has stopped midway ; for instance, on the path from narcissism to object love, it progresses as far as homosexuality.

We find not only a rivalry between the libidinal stages but also between developed and archaic mechanisms of reconstruction. Hermann, for instance, supposes that projection and auditory and visual hallucinations are the work of successful reconstruction which endeavours to overcome subordinate forms of the orientation of perception. These are the olfactory and thermic orientations, the genetic psychological prototypes of projection. The question which we are here discussing is that of thermic orientation. This is the prototype of exchange of cathexis between ego and object. An object becomes warm when another object in contact with it gives up a part of its own quantum of heat and becomes cold. In this way the various qualities of the objects are interchanged, a ' flowing over '

[1] Read before the Fifteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Paris, 1938.

[' *Ueberfliessen* '] into each other takes place.[2] A special form of thinking is associated with thermic orientation which has this characteristic of flowing over.

Flowing over also plays a very important part in the genesis of identification. Hermann supposes that group-identification is based on a previous ' collective pattern ' [' *Kollektivschema* '] which originally comprises the members of the family, and that this collective pattern becomes a reality in family life. Here we have no isolated cathexis of single objects but a common cathexis (with the attribute of ' flowing over ') of the family as a unity. In this phase we cannot speak of identification but only of its preliminary phase—flowing over. The tendency contrary to flowing over would be isolation or limitation. The splitting of the ego and the grotesque mannerisms in schizophrenia shew us what an immense effort the ego must mobilize towards flowing over into the group-concept. These views have been partly demonstrated by Hermann in reference to the Schreber case. We may expect therefore that in schizophrenia during the regression to early ego-situations we shall find these forms of orientation and thinking.

In what follows I shall give some case material. A patient complained : ' My head is burning and I am in a strange condition. There are things spoken out of my head, I express the thoughts of others, my head is so open. It is connected with suggestion ; what I think somebody else understands ; what somebody else thinks I understand. I notice when we are sitting closer to each other it is not so bad. These are thoughts that have been put into me.' He feels his head oozing and can hardly keep his thoughts together. Later he says that his disease began when his friends moved to other towns and he was left alone and missed the company of his friends. When he called on them, he saw that they had become cooler towards him and held to each other.

The transitivist phenomena in this case are clear evidence of flowing over. The narcissistic cathexis of the head which is the source of permanent thermic sensations makes it pervious to the thoughts of himself and of others. He tries to get rid of these sensations by sitting nearer to somebody, thus dramatizing the process of introjection. We find a close connection with depersonalization, especially as exemplified in a case of Hermann's,[3] in which the content of a recurring phantasy

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[2] Hermann, ' Das Ich und das Denken,' *Imago*, Bd. XV, 1929, S. 326.

[3] *Op. cit.*, S. 327, footnote.

was that the members of the patient's family were sitting close to each other. His depersonalized limbs stood for the introjected members of his family. We may suppose that there is some relation between the development of the collective pattern and the bodily pattern. The loss of my patient's friends, the dispersal of a friendly group, is autoplastically symbolized in the defects of the bodily pattern. The unity of the group, which might be expressed in the form ' We knew each other's thoughts ', must find its expression in the regression to a collective pattern with the quality of flowing over. In his loneliness he finds an echo of his thoughts. In Goethe's words :

> ' Zerstoben ist das freundliche Gedränge,
> Verklungen, ach ! der erste Widerklang.' [4]

Another patient complained about the contact of internal and external electricity, by which he was being influenced. During his sleep poisons are injected into his body. The destructive substances sometimes ooze through the urethra in the form of gases. The heavy and light gases, the transplantation of glands, are all the tools of an alien will, to which he is subjected. This type of delusion obviously demonstrates the dissolution of the continuity of the limits of the body-ego in the form of permeability. The ideas of diffusion clearly shew the rôle of thermic orientation. The delusion of transference of will shews the beginning of a regressive dissolution of the super-ego (accompanied by flowing over) into the group-concept. We can, I think, find this regressive identification in all sorts of delusions of being influenced, hypnotized, etc. I spoke of the *beginning* of a dissolution, since it passes through various stages before its full evolution. For instance, a patient of mine felt at the beginning of the process as if suggestion were being used upon him, he could not find ideas of his own, he had to seek them ; later on, other people knew his thoughts even in distant towns. According to Schneider the final stage of regressive identification is identification with the Universe, or, as we should say, flowing over. This phenomenon can be observed in the ' Unio Mystica ' of some acute schizophrenic states and in the oscillations of the limits of the ego while falling asleep and awakening (Federn, Isakower). Awakening from insulin shock—from an experimentally provoked regression—was described by a patient as

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[4] [Literally : ' The friendly crowd is scattered ; the first echo, alas, has died away.']

follows : ' I feel as if everything were closely connected with me by a kind of fog and I feel as if my awakening self and my surroundings were beginning to move together like the wheels in a piece of clockwork.'

Lastly I will describe some elements in the megalomanic delusional system of a paraphreniac. His divine rôle occupies the central position. He is sixty nonnillio ages old. Mankind were not aware of the passing of this time because they were partly dead, partly frozen. It is only he who had some part of the sun and so had the power to resurrect the dead, to create new solar systems and to thaw the old ones. When the rearrangement of the Universe (in which he is constantly hindered) is finished, it will be his duty to ' give sun ' in an aeroplane or in a ship in accordance with the circulation of the Universe. At present the power is in his hands : the light, the sun, the warmth. All the spheres are united by his power and are inseparable and indestructible. They tried to kill him a hundred thousand times, but, when he was lying dead, everything froze, and he had to thaw everything again. His presence means light, life, and warmth. People do not notice when he is flying round in the Universe, because they are frozen in their places. His work is carried out by high voltage magnetism, which emanates from his surroundings. He must rebuild the whole Universe, because, if it is not completed, there will be no ' sungiving '. He separated off a part of the sun for the growing earth, but it was not enough. ' Transitation ' is necessary ; so he flies into his copies, ' types ' ; he exists in innumerable copies and if he is needed anywhere the ' chief psychical group ' flies into the copies. Decomposition is consequently carried through, not only in himself but in time and space as well, in the form of ' double-orientation '. He gives the history of his divine rôle as follows : ' When after my birth I became conscious, I found myself in a locality, in which I gave light and warmth to myself and to others. The bigger the Universe, the more predominant the sungiving becomes. I started sunshine. At my birth I produced it, along with atoms, light and warmth. At the beginning the Universe was a canoe, in which I alone had a place. This was the first building. The caul was the canoe and this was also the first Universe.'

We see that the patient has to rebuild the lost external world ; everything is frozen, destroyed again and again, and he thaws it with ' sungiving '. He is constantly travelling, trying to get to an intermediate station, to arrive at his permanent lodging, at the house ' which is closely connected with the person ', which was, to begin with,

an atom, a canoe, and finally the caul. His work would be finished, if everything would thaw, and warmth would emanate everywhere. But through his tragic power the united cosmic systems have become indestructible. The whole Universe lives and dies with him. He tries to prevent these unifications in vain, it is only his ' Vulgo H.I.' (Homo Primus) which differentiates him from his copies. All things are decomposed but flow over into each other again. The heroic attempt at reconstruction, the attempted thawing of the frozen world, is doomed to eternal failure. Libido in its purely narcissistic state cannot recreate objects. An increase in the quantity of the mobilized libido always increases the transformation of the object-world into the ego, on account of the narcissistic quality of the libido in question (Hoffmann). The world is full of his copies, doubles, projections of the periphery of his ego. He ' transitates ' into his own doubles ; ego and external world merge into a unity in spite of every effort. Differentiation from the external world at this stage of diffuse narcissism can be carried out by a splitting inside the ego, by decomposition. So we may suppose that decomposition is the tendency opposite to the narcissistic libidinal aim of flowing over. This calls to mind the theory of Hermann, the instinct of grasping and separation and especially of ' self-grooming ', the detachment of the periphery of the ego in the service of self-cure, and further the ' dual-unity ' [' *Zweieinigkeit* '] of Hoffmann. The quality of flowing over implied in the unification at this stage is particularly emphasized by Hoffmann. According to him the primitive ego is not yet separated from the object during the stage of ego development at which its separation from the id is still incomplete. Nunberg is of opinion that this process never comes to an end : ' the tendency of the ego to reunite with the id, to maintain its unity, never ceases '. Thus the desire to undo the separation never ceases and the parts of the mental apparatus are projections of this desire.

Here the question arises whether we have a right to assume that the thermic orientation of perception plays an important part in the tendency to unification and in the libidinal characteristics of flowing over. May we suppose that all these phenomena express in a regressive way some elements of historic truth ?

Perhaps we may be able to learn something from the psychophysiology of early infancy. Freud and Ferenczi assume that intrauterine life and early infancy have much more continuity than we should think in view of the dramatic interlude of birth. In spite

of this I think that psycho-analysts, apart from Rank and Jones, have not paid adequate attention to one of the most important elements in the trauma of birth. The moment of being separated from the mother involves amongst other things an immense decrease of temperature. We know that the fœtus has a much higher temperature than the mother. After delivery, its situation is catastrophic; to use an exaggerated expression, it is in danger of freezing. The temperature of its body falls rapidly and six hours after birth it has dropped one and a half or two and a half degrees. We see therefore that among the various environmental traumas there is an immense change of temperature against which the infant is defenceless. At the same time we have thermo-lability, which means that the infant's own temperature depends on the temperature of its environment. In its thermo-regulation it is not yet separated from the external world and has a tendency to merge into the temperature of its environment. If ' mimicry ' is the phylogenetic ancestor of identification, as Rado says, we should add that its ontogenetic origin can be found in the thermic flowing over of early infancy. One of the principal impulses of this undifferentiated organism must be to regain its lost warmth; its wish to return to intrauterine life is mainly a desire to return to a previous temperature, to an environment of a temperature identical with its own. The regulation of nutrition helps it to attain the average temperature. The connection between nutrition and warmth in melancholia was long ago emphasized by Rado. Although the vaso-motor thermo-regulation of the infant is undeveloped, it is capable of a highly developed thermic perception. The investigations of Canestrini and Erasmus Darwin and in particular Peiper's experiment demonstrate the infant's vivid unpleasurable reaction to thermic differences. We can therefore draw a parallel between body-temperature, identity with the external world, flowing over and diffuse narcissism. We may even regard all these concepts as identical. But we must pause for a moment. Narcissism means a state of the ego in which it is filled with ego libido. We know from Freud that at the beginning the libido is based upon the organs of self-preservation. With this as a starting point it would have been possible to base the hypothesis of an ' epidermic-thermic libido ' on purely theoretical grounds. Freud, as you will remember, regards the epidermis as the erotogenic zone *par excellence*. And when he describes the difference between ego and object libido and their reciprocally varying intensity (' the more that is absorbed by the one, the more impoverished does

the other become ')[5] we may hazard the theory that he was thinking especially of temperature. The content and aim of this primitive narcissistic libidinal position is warmth, its object is quite undifferentiated. We should emphasize that this form of libido is based upon the epidermis as an organ of self-preservation with the passive narcissistic libidinal aim of being warmed or cuddled, and that it has no relation to Jung's energic theory of the libido.

We can obviously now understand the possibility of the displacement of the limits of the ego, their lability and modifications in extension. The displacement of the limits of the ego during sleep and waking can be explained by the oscillation in the economics of the ' epidermic thermic libido ' owing to regression during sleep. It is unnecessary to enumerate further data ; it is for the reader to judge the heuristic value of the term. We wish only to remark that we see in the decrease of temperature at birth the prototype of the castration-complex, since this is the point at which a loss suffered in the subject's own body is added to the separation from his mother.

An objection might evidently be raised to the effect that we have neglected the grasping impulse and the oral libido and over-estimated the rôle of the epidermis. We shall attempt to answer this objection by inverting the argument. Schilder and Wechsler, in the concluding sentences of their paper, ' Was weiss das Kind vom Körperinneren ? '[6] remark that our epidermis is our own private property though only the sheath of our self, but that in our deepest infantile strata we do not know whether there is anything inside beyond what has been thrust into us from without. We may add that in intrauterine life the libido probably cathects the internal organs and only later, after birth, extends outwards to the periphery, the skin. Thus its importance increases, because our skin in the region of the head—in the epidermic projection of our internal organs—represents our whole self. In the nihilistic delusions in which the body becomes an empty sack, through which the nourishment falls, we may suppose that regression has taken place to the phase in which all libido is detached from the internal and external world and only the epidermis is cathected. We interpret the ' epidermic thermic libidinal cathexis ' as a diffuse ' preference for the periphery ' [' *Randbevorzugung* '] (to borrow Hermann's phrase), from

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[5] Freud, ' On Narcissism : an Introduction ' (1914), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 33.

[6] *Imago*, Bd. XX, 1934.

which the hand and mouth and the further stages of pregenital libidinal development subsequently derive their individually different quantities. And when we remember how Freud continues his description of the difference between object and ego libido (' the highest form of development of which object libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to yield up his whole personality in favour of object-cathexis')[7]—then we can see the process of evolution which has led thermic libido to the final goal of object love.

Finally I may remind you again of my psychotic cases, who are bound to the lost objects of their love by various forms of radiation. Frobenius quotes from Schäfer the Egyptian myth of the primal parents. The Sky and the Earth were copulating, when Shu lifted the sky and separated them. In the Maori variant, Rangi the Male, the Sky, lies on Papa, the female, the Earth, and their children are in eternal darkness. The children plan a revolt, and Tane, the God of Strength, advises them to separate their parents. They vainly attempt to do so. At last Tane himself, without heeding the protests of his parents, using his head and feet, pushes his mother away from his father. This was the origin of light, the separation of the Earth from the Sky and the beginning of life. In the Greek variants of Uranus and Cronos separation is finally achieved by castration. As you see, light originates between those who have been separated and thermic flowing over reunites them. Mythology, however, describes the pre-œdipal phenomenon on an Œdipus level.

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[7] Freud, *loc. cit.*

A DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN FORMS OF RESISTANCE [1]

BY

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BOSTON

The subject of defence mechanisms, which was first opened up by Freud in his *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926), has received a further expansion and clarification in Anna Freud's recent book.[2] It will undoubtedly give a stimulus to further investigations in the same field.

The analyst has an opportunity during treatment of studying the mechanisms of defence in their purest form. He meets with them under the aspect of resistance, i.e. in the functions which ward off or weaken the psychical tendencies mobilized by the analysis. Confronted with defence mechanisms which function well and perform positive services to the ego, psycho-analytical treatment has only one task: that of strengthening them, in so far as they do not function as a resistance against repressed material which is important for the ego.

It is obvious to all of us that the resistances which we encounter as an ' anti-cathexis ' will have a particular character appropriate to each form of neurosis and to each analytic situation. Nevertheless it seems worth while to attempt to bring about a certain grouping and order in this mass of self-evident material.

To begin with, it is, in spite of everything, not entirely clear why in certain individuals one type and in others another type of defence stands in the foreground, and why, although other forms of defence are simultaneously present, the analytic situation is predominantly coloured by some particular defensive tendency.

I have attempted, first and foremost, to arrange the typical forms of resistance in three groups, corresponding to the three chief currents which together constitute the essence of analytical technique, and to subdivide these in turn into typical sub-groups and lastly to investigate them in relation to their origin.

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[1] Read before the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Marienbad, 1936.

[2] *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, 1937.

These three groups are :—

(1) The intellectual, or, as they are better termed, the ' intellectualizing ' resistances, corresponding to the intellectual ' working through ' of the analytic material.

(2) The transferencè resistances (especially the ' acting out ' which remains so puzzling to us)—in many cases the central task of analytic endeavour.

(3) Those resistances which are connected with the *recollecting* of infantile material.

For the present discussion I have chosen the ' intellectual forms of defence '—in spite of the greater fascination which the problem of ' acting out ' usually exerts.

The meaning of ' intellectual resistances ' may be formulated shortly as follows. In place of positive efforts to help in the process of intellectually working over the material, the patient seeks to force his analysis in that one direction alone and to substitute for analytic *experiencing* either an ostensibly affirmative ' understanding ' or a negative criticism.

If, then, we run through our ' intellectualizing ' patients in our mind, my impression is that we shall find the following types :—

(*a*) Highly intellectual individuals of a genuinely sublimated sort who are able to place the good weapons at their command more or less extensively at the service of their resistances. Against this method of defence by the patient we have no *direct* means of attack. Although at one time the sublimation was a help to the defensive forces, it has in the course of time acquired mental elements (such as perceptual contents, talents, etc.) which contain material foreign to the analysis.

(*b*) Obsessional neurotics, whose intellectual resistances are well known to us in the form of direct ' reaction formations ' and ' isolations '.

(*c*) Patients with blocked or disturbed affects, who, having repressed the affective side of their life, have retained the intellectual side as the sole means of expressing their mental personality.

Analysis has been shown to be especially difficult in the case of these three types of resistance. For the patients obtain from their defence a ' secondary gain ' of narcissistic satisfaction and have so much the less reason for renouncing this mode of defence.

More amenable to analytic treatment are those intellectual resistances whose rôle as a process of defence reveals itself in two directions :

(1) when they themselves are already affected by neurotic disturbance, and (2) when they constantly reappear in the analytic treatment at the point at which an objectionable instinctual impulse or an unwelcome affect threatens to present itself. The usual technique of the analyst, which consists either in not entering into intellectual argumentation at all or in seeking to invalidate the defence by pointing out its narcissistic tendencies, is here completely useless.

An approach to the resistance from the side hostile to the ego, that is, from the side where what is being warded off is situated, is frequently found to be quite inadequate. This is not to be wondered at, since the difficulty consists precisely in the ability of the ego to master promptly by intellectual means the warded off material and thus to effect a reinforced resistance to it. We must therefore make a direct attack on the defensive process itself; but we can be successful in this only if we have thoroughly grasped the nature of that processs.

The analysis of a defensive process is possible only under one condition: there must be a weak spot in it somewhere, so that it gradually takes on the character of a symptom, or so that in some form it comes into conflict with the remainder of the ego.

It may also happen that the defensive process takes on a very complicated character, being carried out in several steps, and that what is pathological and unsuccessful in the patient is to be sought precisely in that place where everything appears to be functioning well and to the advantage of the ego.

Let me illustrate this by an example. A 45-year-old man in a prominent and responsible position was sent for an analytic exploration of his peculiar state. Whether he was suffering from a neurosis or not was still uncertain. For several months he and his friends had observed that his mental abilities had been losing ground. It was a question of a progressive weakening of his powers of mental retention. This became so noticeable that suspicions of the beginning of a general paralysis were aroused. Although the physical findings were negative throughout, the presence of some organic disease of the brain still seemed most probable. The patient himself said that he felt his intellectual defect very intensely, but that he had the impression that the disturbance of his powers of retention existed in isolation from the remainder of his mental faculties. He was working with especial ease and increased interest on some scientific problems and hoped soon to be able to publish the results. This claim could not be

diagnosed as a tendency to paralytic ideas of grandeur, for the patient was already a prominent publicist.

During the treatment I observed that the patient was very eager to interest me in material belonging to his past and produced present-day material only in so far as it concerned his erotic life. As soon as he approached his professional or scientific interests he would avoid the subject with the excuse that it was not worth while and that he knew that patients spoke about professional and scientific matters chiefly in order to avoid the more important affective ones. For the patient knew a great deal about analysis and the theory of its technique.

The analyst often finds himself forced to give up the technical routine of analysis and to let himself be guided by intuition. It was easier to do so in this case precisely because my patient's difficulties lay in the intellectual sphere. I insisted the more energetically on dealing with the intellectual side as the patient had really been sent for diagnostic purposes and there could be no question of a long analysis. I soon discovered that his loss of retentive powers related only to scientific matters, and principally to what he had just read. To obtain a clearer picture of his mental life I asked him to bring me his latest manuscripts and to discuss with me the problems contained in them. I will give you a short *résumé* of the results of a couple of weeks' investigation. For some years the patient had had a very intense friendship with another man whose great scientific talents had always greatly impressed him. The fields of interest of the two friends, while closely related, did not create a situation of rivalry. The friend was a pure theoretician, while my patient took a more practical interest in the field of education. But owing to certain professional circumstances my patient too was forced more into the theoretical field. His latent homosexual aggressiveness against his friend and his burning envy of him underwent repression, and my patient now discovered the following complicated method of defence. Through identification on the one hand and an aggressive ' taking away ' on the other, he appropriated the thoughts of his friend. These thoughts were known to him in part from his friend's publications and in part from private discussions. In order to deny, however, the unconscious plagiarism, he forgot everything which he had read or had heard from his friend ; and he extended this mode of behaviour to other fields of activity. This disturbance of mental retentiveness, which has the same structure as a parapraxis such as forgetting a word, is a very interesting phenomenon.

But in my patient the process of defence did not stop at the disturbance of his retentive powers. A careful examination of his theoretic productions showed that his unconscious plagiarism referred not only to his thoughts but to his creative efforts. His scientific work turned out to be an ingenious piecing together of ideas which his friend had already put in writing. The disturbance of his retentiveness served only as a preliminary step to this plagiarism, which could be successful only because he had 'forgotten' what his friend had already said.

The discovery of this complicated process did not take place at the point which was felt to be pathological, i.e. in the patient's weakness of memory, but in the activity which had been taken for a successful sublimation, i.e. in his apparently undisturbed scientific achievements.

The patient was very much shaken by this discovery, for the process had been completely unconscious to him. I myself saw in this situation yet one more example of those paradoxes with which analysis has to struggle. In general we refuse to take an interest in the patient's case in so far as it regards his purely intellectual pre-occupations, and consider it as a resistance when he seeks to guide the analysis in this direction. In matters of the intellect we are interested in his disturbances only in so far as they hide an inhibition or a symptom. His sublimations, so long as they are successful, lie outside our interests.

The patient whom we have been discussing should be a warning to us. For it often happens that what was regarded as a successful sublimation turns out to be an unsuccessful defensive process; and—as in this case—it may be only because the apparently successful activity seeks to creep behind a wall of resistance that the analyst's attention is attracted towards it. In psycho-analysis there are no hard and fast rules.

In the analytic unravelling of an intellectual defensive process of this kind it seems to become clear that the defence itself conforms in its structure to a neurotic symptom, that is, that there are contained in it not only an ascetic trend directed against the instinctual danger, but also an affirmative and gratificatory one, though in this case it is quite unconscious.

I should like to give another example to illustrate what I have been saying. An especially intelligent woman came to me for analysis on account of professional difficulties; these consisted in a purely intellectual inhibition of her scientific abilities. Her principal resistance

showed itself in the constant efforts she made to give her analysis a didactic, intellectual character. But in the end, with the help of the transference, the analysis was successfully converted into an emotional experience and led to a good therapeutic result.

After her analysis, the patient provided an interesting epilogue to it. She declared that she had not the slightest recollection of the material which had come up during her analysis. This was all the more strange in a patient who had so thoroughly worked over her analysis on intellectual lines. In addition, she believed that her own efforts as an analyst were less successful than they might have been, because she was too much inclined to carry the analysis on to the intellectual plane.

The situation, which became quite clear in the analysis, was that since her childhood she had had to struggle against an especially strong sexual curiosity and against active tendencies to make sexual investigations. This curiosity was opposed by strong external and internal prohibitions. The rejected strivings were continued in the sublimated form of her intellectual proclivities—the defence thus received its specific character from the nature of that which had been warded off.

Analysis had indeed helped the patient to revive and deal with the sexual investigations hidden behind the defence ; at the same time, however, my opposition to any ' intellectualizing ' on her part, which had the effect of a prohibition, repeated the prohibiting attitude of her very ascetic childhood environment. After the analysis—in deferred obedience—we see the old process being repeated. She renounced ' knowledge ' exactly like the child who apparently accepts sexual enlightenment only promptly to repress it once again.

But the fact that she sought to ' intellectualize ' with her own analysands originated in another unconscious motive. This ' intellectualizing ' was not only a sublimation of her infantile sexual curiosity, but also represented an identification with her father. She followed the same profession as he and was interested in the same kind of scientific work. Before her analytic treatment she had come to grief over this process of identification because of the fact that she was a girl and found her activities hampered by the anatomical difference.

Anna Freud regards the tendency to intellectualization in puberty as an effort of the ego to master the instincts with the aid of thought processes. According to my view, this form of defence appears only in those young people in whom *specific* instinctual tendencies in early childhood have already prepared a defensive process of this kind, and

in such a manner that that process can cover a gratification of instinct. In the case of our patient it was sexual curiosity and everything connected with it which was indirectly gratified by the ' intellectualization '.

But to a defensive process of this type, formed early in life, there must be added, according to my observations, a later factor before this form of defence can be established and fixated. In the case under discussion this factor was the patient's identification with her father. I believe that it is these later factors which are decisive for the further development of the intellectualizing tendencies of puberty.

At this point I should like to make an observation which is not directly connected with my theme, but offers a contribution to the problem of the influence of affective factors on retentive memory.

It is considered to be an established fact that the presbyophrenic phenomena of defects of memory are of an organic nature and show themselves purely in the intellectual sphere. In this connection I have been following up for some time a fact which came to my notice by chance. This is that the frequently increased ability of the presenile to recall memories from their more distant past does not appear to confine itself to conscious material. Childhood experiences, and phantasies, which have been excluded from consciousness all through life, often spring up spontaneously with great plasticity. My patient's old grandmother, a very puritanical and sexually repressed woman, acknowledged her sympathy for analysis when she recalled, in her seventieth year, Œdipus phantasies and sexual experiences which she had forgotten all her life. My further observations appear to show that there is an early stage of presbyophrenia, in which material which has up till then been unconscious is remembered as well.

I am inclined to suppose that this process originates when the ego, in renouncing sexual wishes, can also give up those inhibitions and resistances which it had built up against dangers that now no longer exist. Although this theory may be wrong, the observation underlying it is certainly true.

Closely related to the ' intellectualizing ' form of those defensive processes which express themselves as a resistance, is another form—that of ' rationalization ' or turning to reality.

I assume that in a patient with this sort of defensive processes what has happened is that he has successfully disposed of his entire

anxiety in regard to his internal institutions by avoiding them. He has simply fled from the gloomy world of his mental life into reality ; and he proceeds to utilize reality as a defence against the analytic evocation of the ghosts which he has successfully dispelled. In consequence he hastens to translate the interpretations in analysis into the language of material reality. Thus figures of speech, symbols, and psychical reality are alien to him even when he does accept them intellectually and understands them. In his analysis he sometimes gives the impression of being stupid, sometimes of making fun of the treatment. But one soon discovers that it is a question of resistance and that he is making use of a form of defence which has freed him from anxiety on former occasions.

Here is an example of what I mean. A well-educated man who was pursuing active studies in the natural sciences, had turned his attention to experimentation with great keenness and would accept as ' science ' only that which could be objectively demonstrated—was written in black on white, as it were. Science was to him a collocation of facts. Hypotheses, problems and everything that is not directly demonstrable, he called ' poetry but not science ', and declared that he would have nothing to do with such matters.

He rejected analytic interpretations as ' not demonstrable ', and sought to invalidate his transference experience through argumentation. In this way he often succeeded in struggling successfully against his anxiety states, for quite a long while ; but in the end they overpowered him and made the treatment possible.

The patient was the last child in the family. He was born two months after the death of his father. There was a great deal of filial feeling in his family circle and he was extremely envious of his older brothers and sisters because they had known, and been loved by, his father. He entertained phantasies full of longing and—encouraged by his nurse—hoped some day to see his father as a ghost. Yet later this expectation was transferred into a fear. His energetic mother freed him from the influence of this nurse and the patient found consolation and help in his mother's assurance that there were no such things as ghosts, that no one had ever seen one yet and that death was decay and irrevocable annihilation.

Now we can understand, I think, the sources from which his turning to reality sprang and his denial of things which were not ' materially ' demonstrable.

This patient's attitude was determined by a quite individually

coloured prehistory. But exactly the same reactions and defensive processes can, as observation shows, also be turned against the ghosts which dwell within the subject and which threaten to return.

Another patient of mine exhibited a still more ' realistic ' mode of behaviour. He concerned himself only with things which were useful, was interested in culture only because, after all, one had to ' do what the others did ' and let himself be analysed because afterwards he could make more money and better his position.

In the analysis he showed himself unable to link his mental phenomena with a verbally conscious comprehension of them, as will be seen from his attitude to his dreams and their interpretation. He dreamed that a strikingly beautiful youth was revealed on closer inspection to be a hateful hairy ape with frightfully long arms. His associations pointed very clearly to his conflict over masturbation as well as to the identity of the ape with his own person. He understood and accepted this interpretation, yet the next day he repudiated it because he had seen in the mirror that he was not hairy at all and the measurement of his arms showed that they were much shorter than the ape's—consequently he could not be the ape.

After the interpretation of another dream, in which I was able to show him his negative transference as revealed in the identification of myself with a deceitful old fruit seller, he inquired of common acquaintances about my honesty, so as to prove to himself and to me that my interpretation possessed no reality value whatsoever.

This patient, too, had—as his analysis showed—learned early on in life to set up against his internal anxieties a reality which was innocuous because he could record and check up on it.

There was in him no trace of a Don Quixote who, carried along by the force of his illusions, of the unreal, would translate them into his life. Much rather was he a Sancho Panza ; for he gave everything which was unreal, phantastic, or spiritual, the character of the crudely real. Reality gave him protection and enabled him to obtain satisfactions which were not prohibited.

We assume that this type of defence as we observe it in our patient had originated in that period in which the anxiety of the child was directed to the external world and in which the testing of reality had at the same time the effect of freeing him from anxiety, like a game in which the father, disguised as a wolf, cries out in order to quiet the mounting anxiety of the child : ' But look, that's not a wolf, it's papa.' Hence it appears as if reality-testing and adaptation to reality not

only originate under the pressure of necessity, but also as a consequence of their function in freeing from anxiety.

This method, already prepared in childhood, for gaining freedom from anxiety seems to me to be especially operative in the prepubertal stage before the onset of the genital trends. From analytic experience I have the impression that it serves chiefly for defence against the newly mobilized activity of phantasies and that it represents a defence form which is more complete and more ominous than ' intellectualization.' While in the latter case the function of affect and phantasy is replaced by intellect, in the former the thinking process itself is limited and the fear of phantasies is transferred to the fear of thinking.

A typical example is the gifted 12-year-old boy, with his head full of phantastic plans for the future, who suddenly exclaims that he wants first of all to prove, as a common worker in a factory, which of his chemical and physical ideas can be realized. This boy is a youthful fore-runner of a certain kind of specialists who are to be found as group-products in some civilized societies. My first patient, in his clearly neurotic structure, is a prototype of such a group. I think we may expect to find certain civilizations which are deeply imbued with this particular form of defence against anxiety. These reactions may be deflected in one direction—for example in that of scientific research so that the unreal, the poetic and the mystical are represented to excess in art, religion, and philosophies of life. I believe that too forcible an education on lines of reality strongly reinforces this defence mechanism. This was the case with my last patient cited above.

From the point of view of the technical art of the analyst there arise here great difficulties. For, so long as he has not shattered the ' reality values ' of the patient, his efforts are almost hopeless, and in doing so he is going contrary to the analytic task of making the patient adapted to reality.

In complete contrast to the ' realization ' type, there is another type of patient whose characteristic is an especial intuition for his own internal processes, a striking gift for ' internal perception.' So far as I know them, this kind of patient comes as a candidate for training in analysis and gives the impression of having a particular psychological aptitude for the profession of analyst.

Closer observation shows, however, that this acuteness of ' internal perception,' which strikes us as a talent, is in fact a defensive process. We find that the patient (or candidate) lives in a severe anxiety state,

which has neither a phobic nor yet a ' free-floating ' character. It gives the impression, rather, of a state of rigidity from panic. The main way in which the internal anxiety finds expression is in numerous anxiety dreams of a persecutory character. The patient works brilliantly in the first phase of the analysis, sees and understands things which are usually unconscious and takes away from the analyst every possibility of interfering in his analysis. This activity which is forcibly directed on to his internal life goes along with a markedly passive attitude towards the real world about him. These patients are more or less adapted to reality, but they do not exert much will-power and allow themselves to be dominated by men and circumstances.

Their internal perception is gradually revealed as a sharpened self-observation with the aim of defending against internal dangers. They are like a timid listener in the dark who perceives sounds more clearly. One of these patients actually told me that he observed himself so exactly ' so as not to go insane '. This introspection always becomes intensified when the transference becomes stronger and the understanding collaboration of the analyst more dangerous. Gradually this defence becomes unsatisfactory and the anxiety takes on more and more a transference character. In one case it was transformed into a paranoid attitude to the analyst. One could observe *in statu nascendi* the process of transformation from ' internal perception ' to the ' hostile observer ' in the external world. Whether this is a question of the reinforcement and breaking through of repressed instinctual tendencies, which provoke by an anxiety signal the defending forces of self-observation, or whether it is primarily a matter of an increased activity of the ego or super-ego, remains at present an open question.

This process certainly has analogies with hypochondria and depersonalization (in Schilder's sense), in which also an attempt is made to objectify and master rejected mental contents by means of self-observation.

The line of demarcation between the positive and the pathological functioning of such an ' intuitive ' attitude is not clear-cut. Where this attitude takes on more and more the character of a resistance in the analysis we are led on the one hand to think of the familiar clairvoyance of the schizophrenic, and on the other to take into consideration the possibility of a preliminary stage of a paranoid process.

I have, for the present, set up three forms of ' internal perception.'

(1) A purely positive achievement on the part of the observing portion of the ego without pathological reaction, which is therefore not

an object of direct analytical treatment, even when it is used as a defence.

(2) An endo-phobia, i.e. a phobia of the internal part of the self, in which the strengthened introspection affords freedom from anxiety but with internal restrictions.

(3) Paranoia turned against the inner self, in which the introspecting ego is felt as something strange and so plays the part of persecutor. The comprehension of this type leads directly to the problem of depersonalization and other forms of schizoid reaction, but is not the theme of my paper.

I have attempted to show how a specific way of reacting of the ego, which began as a defence mechanism, can either become an immovable and positive possession of the mental apparatus, or merely form a thin veil over the subject's neurotic fears—a veil which must be drawn away by analysis in order to allow what it conceals to be dealt with.

I have brought forward a few types to show that something that has hitherto been of positive value in the ego can be made to serve a negative purpose during the analysis and that it must be destroyed by the process of analysis ; but that this should only be done if there is a possibility of creating a better economy in the mental life of the individual. Whether such a possibility exists or not is a question which analytic experience and tact alone can decide.

ABSTRACTS

General

Siegfried Bernfeld. 'Zur Revision der Bioanalyse.' *Imago*, 1937, Bd. XXIII. pp. 197–236.

It is not Bernfeld's intention either to give an objective survey of bio-analysis—psycho-analysis applied to biology—or to criticise it, but to contribute to the revision of its fundamental principles. By this he means discussion of meaning, nature and scope of those analogies that are to be found in all bio-analytical papers.

In two examples from the literature he demonstrates two different kinds of analogies which play a part in bio-analysis. In the first instance it is the similarity between animals (i.e., bees in a paper by Broughton) and man on the basis of a man more or less undefined and physiognomical impression. In the second instance it is a common procedure to compare laws of various branches of science by means of abstract models of relations or structures. An example of the latter is Brun's investigation on ants. Bernfeld does not deny similarities found so frequently in organic nature, but gives reasons for his doubting the usefulness of the physiognomical method in science. In using this kind of analogies Ferenczi's bio-analysis is closely related to the German philosophy of nature from Herder to Fechner. In spite of all this one need not take bio-analysis as a romantic line of psycho-analysis as particularly Alexander has done; there are indications that it will find a place in modern theoretical biology. The latter does not, however, use physiognomical interpretations but models of structure. From the abundance of Ferenczi's ideas *one* is described in detail: the application of psycho-analytical knowledge to organs, to parts of organs, and to tissues. The investigation of the logic of thinking, by means of which Ferenczi arrived at his psycho-analysis of organs, shows that it is exclusively based on a physiognomical outlook. Ferenczi's contribution is therefore a physiognomy of organs. It is linked up with explanations of energetics, but Ferenczi's conception of energy is not clear and it is not identical with Freud's. It is based on a personification of organs which gives rise to serious scientific doubts. Ferenczi justifies his attempt by saying that this method proves useful. But this justification is not sufficient and overlooks a logical mistake. One is not justified in considering organs as persons on account of their being analysable, but the assumption that they can be taken as persons makes a psycho-analytical interpretation possible. In spite of everything the physiognomy of organs contains an important core. There are striking and interesting similarities between organs and persons. For a scientific treatment of these similarities

it would first be necessary to define them precisely. The application of the physiognomical view to biology as it is used in analysis demands in order to be scientific an instrument which makes it possible to test and to compare those similarities. This can possibly be done by using mathematical methods. Alexander's theory of the vectors of behaviour is an attempt to approach this aim. It is shown that it uses mathematical conceptions which are not appropriate. Further in an introductory discussion it is shown that the instrument needed exists in the mathematical science of topology.

Author's Abstract.

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Isador H. Coriat. 'Current Trends in Psychoanalysis.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, October, 1938, Vol. XXV, No. 4, pp. 445–452.

The emphasis is placed on psycho-analysis as a scientific method. It has reduced many concepts to certain definite laws and has made clear the determination of mental processes. The relation of psychoanalysis to psychiatry is considered most important because it has developed understanding of the purpose of abnormal mental functioning.

The improvements in training of present day analysts are discussed, and in suggestions for future advance it is pointed out that practical therapeutic application of analysis to large masses of people is necessary, that the constant analytic study of the analyst's life is important, that further study of the structure of the ego gives the best promise of further understanding and progress.

Clara Thompson.

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Benedykt Bornstein. 'Struktural-logischer und ontologischer Aspekt des Freudschen Begriffes der Verdrängung.' *Imago*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, pp. 370–375.

An attempt is made to confront Freud's conception of repression with Hegel's conception of abolition (Aufhebung). It is shown that both principles answer to the same formula $a \lessdot a's\ (a + a' - a')$. Furthermore it can be shown that this principle in this general form has a universal character and that its realisations exist in different spheres of reality.

K. Friedlander.

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R. W. Pickford. 'Imagination and the Nonsense Syllable: A Clinical Approach.' *Character and Personality*, 1938, Vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 19–40.

A short study is presented of imagination, as revealed by phantasies on memory experiments with nonsense syllables. A classification of imaginative processes is given, and a short *résumé* of methods of memory testing.

The associations to lists of nonsense syllables given by members of a class in psychology are analysed with the help of psycho-analytic theory, and conclusions are drawn as to the suitability and value of various word and syllable stimuli for different purposes, and in different people.

R. A. Macdonald.

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Clinical

Anny Katan-Angel. 'Die Rolle der "Verschiebung" bei der Strassenangst.' *Internat. Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, S. 376.

By reference to a case the author describes the mechanism of displacement which helps the adolescent to obtain a normal development for his sexual instincts. In puberty the Ego is threatened by dangers arising from the Super-Ego, Id and the outside world. The defence mechanisms are directed against the impulse and against the object. In normal development the defence against the impulse should not succeed. If the impulse succeeded in breaking through in relation to its original object incest would be the result. Therefore the impulse can only become conscious if the object changes. The mechanism which the Ego employs in this defence against the incest object is displacement. The author proposes to call this special case of displacement which belongs to normal development in puberty, 'Wegverlegen.'

The author further demonstrates that in some cases of her own and some described in literature, as a result of the failure of this process of displacement in puberty, anxiety was displaced from the incest object to the street with a resulting agoraphobia. In agoraphobia not the impulse itself but the product of the defence is displaced. Instead of incest anxiety agoraphobia results. The difference between 'Wegverlegen' and displacement is to be seen in the fact that 'Wegverlegen' means the final abandonment of the incestuous impulses whilst in other types of displacement infantile strivings can still be detected and the process can be undone.

K. Friedlander.

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Herman Nunberg. 'Psychological Interrelations between Physician and Patient.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1938, Vol. XXV., No. 3, pp. 297–308.

The ill person's need to be cared for places him in a unique position, and the adult in this position turns for dependence not to the mother but the physician. The latter becomes not only a helping but a threatening figure, and illness often has the meaning of punishment and expiation.

If the physician does not win the patient's confidence, the patient will become hostile and may even unconsciously suppress the will to recover. On the side of the physician, the relationship is also influenced by emotional factors. The doctor game of childhood is an attempt to master by activity something which one has experienced passively. It is also an attempt to overcome the sense of guilt because the physician is allowed to see and know everything. When the infantile sexual curiosity becomes adherent to the adult scientific one, the physician may be disturbed in exercising his duties. He may identify with his severe aggressive father and inspire fear in the patient. This does away with his own inferiority feeling but will disturb his professional efficiency. The feeling of guilt can find an outlet through a feeling of compassion. In compassion there is a negation of aggression. This also may become a serious obstacle to the performance of medical duty. The physician is in danger of being too active or passive.

The physician in granting protection to the patient derives his willingness to protect from his own childhood and his identification with his parents.

Clara Thompson.

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A. N. Fox. "Omnipotence as a Defence." *Psychoanalytic Review*, October, 1938, Vol. XXV, No. 4, pp. 505–508.

Omnipotence is one of the earliest mechanisms for bounding instinctual drives. Analysis of omnipotence leads inevitably into violent situations and when successfully handled to profound alterations of character The need for omnipotence may account for the overstressing of new situations with accompanying derogation of old ones even in the analytic movement.

Clara Thompson.

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Eduard Hitschmann. 'Observations on Agoraphobia and other Neurotic Anxiety States.' *Internat. Zeitschrift. f. Psychoanalyse*, 1937, Bd. XXIII, s.s 393–401.

The author establishes in a comparative study the etiological community of five clinical pictures, which may also replace one another during development. These are: pavor nocturnus, animal phobias, obsessive fear of the death of the parent of the same sex (a condition isolated and described by him in 1915), hysterical dread of death, and agoraphobia (fear of death in the street). He stresses the central significance of repressed *aggression* in their causation; aggressive components being converted into feelings of guilt, which result in castration anxiety in the child and dread of death in the adult.

Regarding the symptomatology of fear of death from heart disease, the author stresses the regularity with which it arises through *identification*, with persons suffering from heart disease or merely cardiac hypochondria or with those who have died from the former, and among these the parent of the same sex is most frequent. At the same time such patients are often disposed to hypochondriacal self-observation of the heart through unconscious identification of it with the genital.

Attention is drawn further to the frequent combination of these phobias with *obsessive symptoms*, especially compulsive impulses, and this corroborates the demonstration of the etiological significance of aggression.

The article is amplified by the citation of characteristic subsidiary symptoms of the five neuroses and their interpretation. It closes with the sentences: " The comparative study of our five neuroses thus points clearly to the fundamental problem whose depths could hitherto be probed only by early child analysis: *Unresolved Œdipus complex, guilt from aggression, fear of death from the urge to kill.* But in normal persons " microsymptoms " of the same pathogenesis correspond to the increased anxiety of the neurotic, if we will only see them.'

Author's abstract.

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CHILDREN

Susan Isaacs. ' Psychology and the School.' *The New Era*, 1938, Vol. XIX, No. 1, pp. 18–20, includes a summarised report of her lectures given during the New Educational Fellowship Conferences in Australia and New Zealand.

H. Shean-Dare.

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D. W. Winnicott. " Shyness and Nervous Disorders in Children,' *The New Era*, 1938, Vol. XIX, No. 7, pp. 189–191.

It is important for the teacher to be able to come to a conclusion as to the relative normality or abnormality of the shy and nervous child. Cases illustrating this difference are briefly depicted. Some psychological insight on the part of the teacher, and proper history-taking, can help towards a correct diagnosis.

H. Shean-Dare.

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Dorothy Burlingham. ' Probleme des psychoanalytischen Erziehers.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1937, Bd. XI, Heft. 2, Ss. 91–97.

The author finds that analytical pedagogues, fully convinced of the truth and value of analytical theory, tend to fall into three groups in their method of applying it: (*a*) those who are appalled by their increased

knowledge of children's difficulties, and seek to avoid adding to conflicts by trying to make life in school and kindergarten as pleasant as possible, with few demands ; (*b*) those who see the difficulties clearly and sharply, with a good eye for symbolic actions and for reading the child's unconscious, and trust to interpretation while unprepared for a stormy transference as the chief result ; (*c*) those who, wishing to understand the child from all sides, particularly the home background, end in frequently unsuccessful attempts to send the mother to be analysed. The difficulty of keeping the balance between the needs of the individual child and the needs of the group of children has an addition in the differing requirements of children from 'non-analytical' and from 'analytical' homes. The teacher, by an analytical attitude to a neurotic child, should help to prepare the ground for an analysis proper.

N. Searl.

BOOK REVIEWS

La Psicoanalisi. By Enzo Bonaventura. (A. Bocca, Milano, 1938. Pp. 416. Price L. 22.)

Bonaventura, the director of the psychological laboratory of the University of Florence,[1] is generally esteemed as a serious psychologist. It is the first time that a good summary of psycho-analysis—outside the sphere of psycho-analysts—comes from the pen of an Italian psychologist, who recognises this science as a very important inquiry. Bonaventura's aim was to give the educated layman a correct conception of psycho-analysis ; therefore this treatise has the advantages and the disadvantages of any exposition. It is distinguished by a clear style, by a simplified, easily intelligible representation and by a well-arranged combination of the material. All more complicated phenomena and connections, the most important problems which analysts have put to themselves and which still remain open, are naturally not mentioned. Although the author has slipped into a few inexact or slight erroneous statements, this does not however sensibly diminish the value of the book. Some illustrations, strewn here and there in the book, have not any reference to the subject in question or, in any case, a very superficial one as, for instance, the picture of a catatonic man, or of an old demented woman, and the drawing made by a schizophrenic.

We will now give a brief report on the contents of the ten chapters in which psycho-analysis is explained. The author introduces the reader to the sphere of treatment with the description of apparently senseless symptoms which prove to be connected with emotional events. After mentioning the pre-analytical conception of such phenomena, he reports on the well-known case of Anna O., treated, in 1881, by Joseph Breuer, and thus the author comes to describe the historical development of the new method, from catharsis to psycho-analysis. Freud's psycho-analysis has arisen from the knowledge of the hidden meaning that apparently senseless symptoms have. Hypnosis was then abandoned and replaced by the methods of free associations.

To illustrate the unconscious the author keeps mostly to instances of unconscious automatisms, as, for example, actions we execute mechanically whilst our attention is turned elsewhere. Only when he speaks about psychological determinism and the affections does he enter properly into the sphere of the unconscious, as studied in psycho-analysis. Inexact and

[1] In accordance with the new decrees concerning the Jews he has been dismissed, a few months after the issue of this book, from his appointment. The second edition of it will probably not appear.

in part erroneous is the distinction, made by the author, between the id and the Ego. He attributes to the id all unconscious phenomena, inclusively the unconscious portions of the Ego. However, such a distinction, as also that between the unconscious and the pre-conscious, would be too complicated and would overstep the boundaries of this popular treatise.

Psychic repression, as discovered by Freud, is rightly described, and the Super-Ego is indicated as the internal institution which inhibits the condemned instincts and thus effects the unconscious repression. In this connection the statement made on the general problems of memory is very sound.

The psycho-pathology of everyday life is discussed and some instances are given which explain Freud's conception on errors and parapraxes.

The theory of the instincts is then propounded and introduced with a statement of the conception of psychic energy. In speaking of the dynamic and economic points of view the author tries 'to be just' to the pre-analytical investigators, as Herbart, Fouillée and others; he then mentions psychic cathexis, as put forward by Freud. In a superficial manner the dislocation of the cathexis is mentioned, without saying how it is topically localized in the unconscious system.

The Pleasure Principle, the regulator of psychic life, is, in the author's opinion, subjected to criticism and designated as a hedonistic principle, often refuted by facts. The Reality Principle is compared with the 'arithmetical morality' of Bentham.

Very opportune, on the contrary, is the emphasis with which the author alleges that Freud has never affirmed that all instincts are derived from sexuality, and thus he attacks the erroneous opinion of 'pansexualism'. In order to state the Freudian 'dualism of the instincts' he mentions the distinction between libido and that energy which belongs to the egoistic ego-instincts, and he then explains the repetition-compulsion and comes to the 'death-instinct', put forward by Freud. Unfortunately the author has made a mistake in the translation of the passage, relative to this, in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle': he translated the *idleness of living substance*, as Freud characterised the repetition-compulsion, as *idleness of matter* (materia), which is without sense.

What distinguishes Bonaventura is his endeavour to connect everywhere the psycho-analytical acquisitions with the pre- or out-analytical assertions: by trying to demonstrate—and not always with reason—that Freud, whose new discoveries he exhibits as such, has had predecessors. Non-analytical studies on the little child are mentioned in detail. It is referred to the so-called 'Nypiology' (a new science put forward by Ernesto Cacace), whose object of inquiry is the child in its first year of life from all possible points of view: from the anthropological, physiological, psychological, etc.

By his statement summarizing infantile sexuality, as studied by Freud, we find terms as ' complex of Narzissus ', ' Inferiority-complex ' ; and the author speaks of the ' dangerous vice of masturbation '.

By reviewing Freud's ' Interpretation of Dreams ' the author makes a point of contesting the priority of having inquired into the psychology of the dreams in modern times. Nevertheless he acknowledges fully the great worth and originality of Freud's pioneer work in this sphere, too. But he enumerates many authors who dealt scientifically with dreams, in modern times, ignoring the rich literature which is to be found in Freud's famous ' Interpretation of Dreams '. After a short statement of Freud's main view regarding the latent contents of the dreams, he expresses some reservation concerning the assertion that the dreams are always fulfilments of wishes and the interpretation of symbols.

The weakest chapter is that which treats of the theory of the neurosis. The ' choice ' of neurosis is not at all mentioned. The statement of psycho-analytic therapeutics gives the reader an idea of the way in which it produces its effect, although the method is not duly considered. On the other hand, as an experimental psychologist, he lays a great stress upon the association-experiments.

After the clinical part the author emphasizes the importance of psycho-analysis for the history of culture, concentrating upon Freud's studies on Totemism and the religions. He does not quite agree with Freud's conceptions of religious feeling and is convinced that in the depths of this feeling there resides something unneurotic as well; religious feeling expresses, in his opinion, a deep connection of the human soul with real transcendental factors.

On the contrary, Bonaventura gives great credit to Freud's statement about group-psychology, the importance of which lies in the convergence on the conductor of the libido of all individuals composing the group.

In this and other parts, as for instance on the psycho-analytical contribution to research in language, we meet, now and then, with some inexactitudes. For example, the author explains the antithetic sense expressed by the primitive words as deriving from ambivalency and does not mention that the one word means a couple of opposite qualities.

In due course the ' dissidents ' are mentioned too, while he stops particularly on Jung's doctrine of the psychological types for which he has appreciatory words. He mentions also Jung's conception of symbolism, then the Adlerian amount of inferiority-feelings, of the masculine protest, of the fiction, of the instinct of self-preservation as stated by Rivers, etc. In this chapter is to be found also an enumeration of the best known psycho-analysts of every country, as well as the main criticisms made by the opponents of psycho-analysis. He exposes the absence of compre-

hension with which some opponents, as Morselli, Tanzi-Lugaro, etc., criticize psycho-analysis.

The tenth and last chapter is dedicated to the position which the author himself takes towards the Freudian doctrines. After a warm recognition of the positive successes of the analytic therapy, he doubts the 'monogenesis' of the neurosis, as he calls the statement that one part of the neurotic conflict is always a libidinal claim of the id.

E. Weiss.

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Manual of Psychiatry. By Aaron J. Rosanoff. Seventh edition. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Chapman and Hall Ltd., London, 1938. Price 30*s*.).

This manual of psychiatry has gone through a rather lengthy evolution. The author, who has been a very active investigator in psychiatry and psychopathology in general from the time he entered the New York State Hospital Service, gave out in 1905 a translation of the French *Manuel de Psychiatrie* by J. Rogues de Fursac. Those who knew Rosanoff and his work could discern even in the first edition many of his own contributions; and as the editions continued, in 1908, 1911, 1916, etc., and the volume grew, as it were, by accretion, the original work of Fursac served as a mere skeleton for the new discoveries in psychiatry and psychopathology.

The present volume, forming the seventh edition of this work, is a thorough compilation of the various branches of psychopathology that enter into the study and practice of psychiatry. It is, as the author claims, the result of a scanning of the literature of the psychiatric and contiguous fields and 'represents an attempt to give a comprehensive bird's-eye view of the entire field of psychiatry and mental hygiene'.

Looking through this book, one feels that the author has faithfully fulfilled this task. Both the student and the experienced psychiatrist will find in this manual a comprehensive *aperçu* and a careful review of the whole field of psychiatry. The book is unique in many ways. The practising psychiatrist who has not been able to keep abreast of the vast psychopathological discoveries of the last generation will find here a comprehensive and lucid account of such topics as the large-scale studies of mental disorders in twins, the new discoveries in cerebral physiology resulting from extirpation of various lobes, the investigation of temperament and neuroses through the application of the method of Pavloff's conditioned reflexes, the studies of criminology of the last decade, and the recent studies of suicides. The author freely quotes the original authorities on subjects and problems that he, himself, could not fully investigate, for he justly maintains that 'To-day no individual worker in the field can write a text-book of psychiatry on the basis of his own experience alone'.

That is precisely what Rosanoff did with the subject of psycho-analysis.

Unlike others who, knowing nothing of the subject, misrepresent and give a garbled account of it, he quotes Freud—with Freud's permission—and thus gives a correct and fair review of Freud's contributions.

This book is a real text-book and is especially to be recommended to American students of psychiatry.

A. A. B.

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A Biological Approach to the Problem of Abnormal Behaviour. By Milton Harrington. (Science Press Printing Co. Lancaster, Pa., 1938. Pp. 454.)

This author has previously published an ' Analysis of Psycho-analysis ' setting forth his reasons for rejecting psycho-analysis. In the present volume he gives what he considers a new approach to the problem of abnormal behaviour. The theory he adopts is bio-mechanistic. It is based on the assumption that our thoughts, feelings and actions are results of the functioning of a structure or mechanism which developed in the cause of evolution ; and that abnormal forms of thought, feeling and action occur because of the limitations and defects of this mechanism. He regards states of consciousness as by-products of the physiological processes and he rejects the concept of the unconscious. He stresses three factors as determining the form of behaviour called forth in response to a stimulus : (1) The structural pattern of the nervous system. (2) The law of confluence, the tendency for streams of energy to flow together and find outlet by a common path. (3) The tension mechanism. The latter he subdivides into four : (*a*) pain mechanism ; (*b*) pleasure mechanism ; (*c*) anger mechanism ; (*d*) laughter mechanism, which is a safety valve for the discharge of nervous energy. He rejects subconscious drives and stresses ' that it is thought which makes behaviour purposive in those cases in which it is purposive '. According to the author mental ills are due on the one hand to the situations of life which make demands upon the organism that it is unfitted to meet, and on the other to bad heredity, faulty education and somatic disease which bring about limitations and defects in the organism.

The author writes in a clear style and describes in a simplified way both normal and abnormal behaviour. The reviewer, however, fails to see in the book the promised new approach to the problem of mental behaviour.

P. C. Goolker.

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Modern Society and Mental Disease. By C. Landis and J. D. Page. (Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York. Pp. 190.)

Statistical analyses of mental diseases, from the standpoint of sociology, throw considerable light upon the influence of so-called exogenous factors

upon mental disorders. In this monograph Landis and Page have furthered the understanding of such circumstances as age, environment, educational and economic status, marriage and eugenics, and heredity and sterilization, as those conditions are related to psychiatric discorders.

Of the many conclusions drawn by the authors the reviewer herein samples a few. Each of their conclusions is the result of statistical studies of large groups and is not the result of the study of single individuals. Without knowledge of the deeply-lying structures of the psyche, however, together with their conscious and environmental representations, it does not seem plausible to draw conclusions regarding the influences of conditions (personal or environmental) upon the psyche. The authors believe that ' the basic etiological factors of " mental " disease are physiological and constitutional rather than psychological '. They argue that ' if the basic factors were psychological, then we should find the highest rates of incidence either in those times of greatest social stress, such as war, disaster, or great social insecurity, or particularly at those age periods in the life of the individual when the stress of personal adjustment is the greatest '.

The authors assume that war is a social stress. How valid is such an assumption ? War brings about regimentation by military powers, who, by designating the pursuits of the individual, relieve him of individual initiative. War provides an outlet for the sado-masochistic side of his life. War does a lot of things, but the response of the individual to war is, to a large part at least, determined by the constitution of the individual's psyche. From this point of view war may or may not be a personal stress ; it may be a personal relief.

It is equally untenable to expect ' disaster ' to be associated with increased incidence of mental disease. Are we not familiar with the psychical relief that often accompanies ' disaster ' ? (When is a disaster a disaster ?) The symptoms of a psychoneurotic patient disappeared completely while his wife was ' dying ' with pneumonia ; the symptoms re-appeared when she returned to health. (The symptoms of another patient left him while he was spending several months in a hospital with broken bones.) When and to what is disaster disastrous ?

It does not seem reasonable to assume that what is commonly described as disaster is detrimental to everything it affects. Schizophrenia is disastrous to the environment and to the conscious life of the individual, yet it is a boon to the unconscious. Studies on the etiology of mental disturbances appear to be incomplete when they fail to take into consideration the very organ that is known to be disordered.

Landis and Page conclude that, because the records showed no increase in the rate of psychoses as a consequence of the World War or of the economic depression of 1929–32, psychoses are not psychogenic. It

appears that they might more reasonably have concluded simply that the World War and the economic depression did not seem to have increased the rate of psychoses.

' The way of life, the cultural background, and the physical environment of the American Indian, the African negro, the European and the Chinese are quite different, yet as we have shown, they are all susceptible to the same mental diseases . . .' Landis and Page have performed an important piece of work, in that they make it appear that factors outside of the individual seem to be less instrumental in the production of mental disorders than factors within himself. This valuable contribution has nothing to lose, if only it stops with that idea.

The book is rich in statistical surveys. The authors say that ' expectancy calculations indicate that at least one person out of every twenty will become a mental hospital patient at some time during his life '. They show that the incidence of mental disease is higher in the older age groups. ' Youth is a period of relative immunity '. Their observations lead them to believe that ' without question the incidence of hospitalized mental cases is much higher for urban than for rural communities', though ' there is no evidence that urban life, *per se*, causes insanity '. As regards educational and economic level, ' every mental disease occurs at every educational and economic level '.

Leland E. Hinsie.

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Traumatic Mental Disorders in Courts of Law. By William A. Brend. (William Heinemann (Medical Books) Ltd., London, . 1938. Pp. 102. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.* net.)

There is surely nobody more qualified to write with authority on this subject. Besides being an able physician, Barrister-at-law and Lecturer on Forensic Medicine at Charing Cross Hospital, Dr. Brend is the author of a ' Handbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology ' and editor of Dixon Mann's well-known ' Forensic Medicine and Toxicology ', both being already in the seventh edition. Moreover, during the War he was officer in charge of the Special Medical Board for Functional Nerve Disorders and subsequently Neurologist to the Ministry of Pensions ; and now, as Medical Referee under the Workmen's Compensation Act to several County Courts, he has specialized in just those cases of which he has so much experience and which are discussed in the present book.

He has done the work remarkably well. He writes with clarity, there is no padding and the book is interesting and readable. He discusses the difficulties which are liable to confront an inexperienced medical witness, owing to the rigidity of Court procedure, which is also reviewed, relates many interesting cases to illustrate his points, criticizes the Workmen's

Compensation Act as it now stands and makes suggestions for its improvement.

As everybody knows, psycho-analysis is taboo in a Court of Law and the legal mind refuses to recognize the existence of the unconscious. This however does not preclude a doctor from making use of psycho-analytical knowledge for diagnostic purposes and as an aid to assessing how much a workman's incapacity is due to his injury and how much to his inherent constitution or mental make-up. Accordingly there is very little reference to psycho-analysis in this book, but Dr. Brend does mention one patient in which he utilized his psycho-analytical knowledge in deciding the merits of the case in view of compensation.

Every medical man in the kingdom is liable to be called at some time or other to give evidence under the Workmen's Compensation Act and we can confidently recommend all to keep a copy of Dr. Brend's book on the bookshelf for ready reference.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

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The Pharmacological Shock Treatment of Schizophrenia. By Manfred Sakel. (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series 2. New York and Washington, 1938. Pp. 133. Price, $2.75.)

This is a first-hand account of the much debated modern method of pharmacological shock treatment of schizophrenia by the man who introduced it and has laid the foundations of it. The book contains an outline of the method of treatment, laboratory findings and a detailed clinical account of the technical and psychological management of the patients, illustrated by a number of case histories. There is also an interesting theory attached to it, which the author modestly describes as ' working hypothesis '.

All these details are of little concern to the psycho-analyst as long as he understands the essentials of the method. These consist of the following : by the injection of large doses of insulin a deep hypoglycæmia is produced. This is a lowering of the sugar level in the blood. In this way the patient experiences a number of hypoglycæmic shocks, deliberately produced, which can be ended deliberately as well by giving sugar. The effect of this is a clearing up of the patient's mind during the hypoglycæmia to begin with, but persisting more and more during the rest of the time. One can observe an interesting phenomenon called ' Inversion of the reaction ', namely, that in a more advanced stage of the course of treatment the patient shows psychotic symptoms only during hypoglycæmia and is clear for the rest of the time. It is important to note that this is not merely an effect of shock as such, because a definite influence in the same direction can be observed sometimes by hypoglycæmia produced without shock. In a certain number of cases the result becomes more or less permanent,

especially when due care is being taken of the psychological management of the patient during and after the course of treatment. Psychotherapy seems indeed indispensable if the best results are to be obtained.

The claim put forward by the pioneers of this method is best represented by quoting the remarks made in the Foreword to the present book by Professor Poetzl who, as chief of the University Clinic for Neurology and Psychiatry of Vienna, made the introduction of this method possible. He writes :

' I arranged the introduction of this method to the Vienna Psychiatric Clinic because the first cases that I saw treated demonstrated to me that it surpassed by far any other treatment of schizophrenia at present available. It was clear to me that the remissions I saw in these cases were not merely accidental but were directly caused by the treatment itself. When the treatment was then tried on a large series of patients, we had a percentage of practical results which were two or three times better than the most optimistic statistics for spontaneous remissions in schizophrenia.'

An introduction by Nolan D. C. Lewis shows caution and remarkable objectivity in the valuation of the results and conclusions drawn. As the present reviewer happens to know by private communication that observers from other great institutions are very much more sceptical as regards the results, he feels that Lewis's summary of the present consensus of opinion can be regarded as just and objective. According to him, there is agreement in general on the following points :—

(1) That the clinical aspects of the disorder can be removed or favourably influenced in a relatively large percentage of certain types of patients, at any rate for a period of time ;

(2) That some types are not favourably influenced but continue as before in their disorder ;

(3) That there is a considerable variety of psychological and physiological reactions during the therapeutic procedure itself, apparently depending not only upon the inherent individual integrations of the patient, but also upon the nature of the insulin and the technique of the physician ;

(4) That the results have brought more forcibly to mind a possible reversibility in at least some of the physio-pathological and psychopathological processes involved in the disorder ; and

(5) That metabolism is influenced by the insulin situation as indicated by . . .'

A Preface by Foster Kennedy makes interesting reading, especially for analysts, because for some reason he makes use of the occasion for polemics against Freud and his school. He is not altogether negative, however, but stresses that Freud's view is not incorrect but true only in part, representing only one angle of view. He says: ' The psycho-analyst seems to see like Polyphemus with but a single eye.'

His point of view deserves perhaps the particular attention of the committee of psycho-analysts recently set up by the Psycho-Analytical Society in this country with the special purpose of investigating the effects and results of this treatment from a psycho-analytical point of view. We may hope that their efforts will bear fruit in showing that psycho-analysts are not so one-sided after all and that psycho-analysis does more than ' figure skate ' on the surface of the problem.

A very interesting paper on the matter from a psycho-analytical point of view appeared in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Vol. XXIII, 1937, by Gustaw Bychowski: ' Psychoanalyse im hypoglykämischen Zustand '.

S. H. Foulkes.

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The Quest of the Overself. By Paul Brunton. (E. P. Dutton & Company, New York, 1938. Pp. 299. Price $3.00.)

The aim of the book is to clarify the practice of meditation (Yoga) to the Western mind, to formulate a modernized method of inward thought and inward living, and to clarify divine self-comprehension. Brunton considers Yoga as an ' indrawing of man's mind toward his inner god-like self '. The author's method is an introspective self-enquiry, which includes a rational analysis of the self and also a process of abstract meditation.

A great part of the book is devoted to instructions in self analysis, breathing exercises, eye exercises and concentration on the heart. The author then drifts into mysticism. The Overself-atom, which the author, without any physiological support, locates in the heart, ' cannot be separated from its parent-God in the Universe . . . that which exists in the human being as the Overself-atom exists also outside him as the Universal Spirit '.

The book is written with feeling and conviction and enables one to get some understanding of the aims of the practice of meditation.

P. Goolker.

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The Achievement of Personality in the Light of Psychology and Religion. By Grace Stuart. (The Macmillan Co., N.Y., 1938. Pp. 191. Price, $1.75.)

This book, with an introduction by L. W. Grensted, D.D., consists of nine chapters, the first six of which constitute a significant summary of modern psychological teachings from the point of view of the achievement of personality.

The psychological chapters first dispose of behaviourism from the teleological point of view with which psycho-analysis is familiar. There

follow chapters upon the psychology of Freud, Adler and Jung, which she describes as psychology stressing respectively the need for love, the need for significance and the need for security. There follows a chapter upon moral conflict, in which the point is made that Freud is pessimistic concerning the possibility of achieving love, Adler feels that the human being is truly insignificant and Jung finds humanity in such great insecurity as to suggest a necessity for a religious faith, which he apparently feels is a myth. The writer endeavours to solve the impasse by stressing what she feels is slighted by these three writers, the importance for personality of other persons in the environment and the fact that personality is worthless without human relationship. She suggests that successful psycho-therapy depends upon the possibility that the patient may find love, significance and security in the therapist as a human being or through therapy may become able to find this relationship with some other human being. She attributes many of the failures of psycho-therapy to the lack of a suitable person for the patient to love. She feels that loving and giving is as important as being loved and that the value of such love depends in part upon the real value of the beloved. These chapters impress the reviewer as the most dispassionate and authentic he has seen in a book of this character.

The last three chapters make an heroic and dignified effort to introduce the principle that the need of a human being for love, significance and security implies the existence in the universe of a Lover. The effort to establish the existence of a personal God consistently avoids the depreciation of scientific psychology and shows the writer as a friendly, fair-minded person.

The book ends with a quotation from Bridges from which two lines give a clue to the error which a Freudian finds in the writer's point of view. These lines,

> " 'twixt self and not self, mind and body, mother and child,
> 'twixt lover and loved, God and man : but ONE ETERNAL,'

indicate that the writer is not able to accept the idea that the concept which she espouses of a universal loving God arises from the universal longing of man for union with the Good Mother. If one were to criticize this book, it would be with the suspicion that its psychological chapters may not be appreciated by unfamiliar readers because of their great condensation of the subject matter and its religious chapters may fail to carry conviction to the psychologist who is familiar with the depth of child analysis. This criticism is perhaps inevitable of any book covering this material for popular reading and this book remains in the reviewer's opinion the best he has seen of its type.

Lewis B. Hill.

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Recent Experiments in Psychology. By Leland W. Crafts, Theodore C. Schneirla, Elsa E. Robinson, Ralph W. Gilbert. (Mc. Graw-Hill Publishing Company, London, 1938. Pp. xiv. + 417. Price, 12*s*. 6*d*.)

This book belongs to a category of which there have hitherto been very few examples in psychological literature. There is an almost embarrassing choice of general text-books, a great number of treatises dealing more or less systematically with some general branch or aspect of psychology, e.g. experimental, educational, medical, industrial or animal psychology, while still other volumes are expositions from the point of view of schools, psycho-analysis, individual psychology, behaviourism, Gestalt, etc. The viewpoint adopted in the present work is quite different, the investigations reviewed having been ' selected on the basis of their psychological importance, their adaptability to the requirements of detailed exposition and their interest to the student '. The ' general reader ', however, is also catered for, and it is for him presumably that terms ' possibly unfamiliar '—e.g. ' introspection ', ' psychiatrist '—are explained, as they occur (though, curiously enough, he is supposed to be familiar with the significance of coefficients of correlation, p. 390).

There is no doubt that the method adopted, in spite of its absence of systematic foundation, is eminently successful. The book can be confidently recommended to the intelligent general reader who is anxious to know what experimental psychology is about (though he should, at the same time, be warned that it is very far from being representative of the whole of modern psychology, or even of the whole of experimental psychology). The fact that each of the twenty-eight chapters is complete in itself makes it a far less serious undertaking for the reader than a systematic text-book, which must be mastered as a whole ; at the same time, each chapter will enlarge the reader's understanding of the standpoint and methods of the experimental psychologist, of the problems that he tackles, the difficulties he encounters, and the degree of success that he achieves. To the student of psychology and the psychologist *von Beruf* the book should also be welcome as presenting in convenient and attractive form the results of many recent investigations, with some at least of which he will as yet be unfamiliar.

The method adopted in the case of each chapter is to start with a brief introduction to some particular problem, to follow this with a somewhat detailed description of the methods and results of some specific piece of research dealing with the problem (though in some cases two or more researches covering the same, or closely related, fields, are reviewed), and to end with a summary and critical discussion of the results obtained. Exposition, description and discussions are all admirably clear, tables, diagrams and illustrations being added wherever necessary. The range of topics covered is very large—from the ' The Origin of the Cat's Responses

to Rats and Mice ' through ' The Electro-physiology of the Nervous System ' and the ' Representative and Expressive Effects of Music ' to ' The Judgment of Vocational Aptitude and Success from Photographs '. The great majority of the investigations dealt with have appeared during the last ten years, and nearly all of them are American in origin, and reflect the prevailing behaviouristic trend of American psychology, albeit a behaviourism of a very moderate kind as compared with the original more belligerent Watsonian variety. The work as a whole gives us a vivid impression not only of the wide field over which the experimental psychologist works, but also of his resourcefulness in dealing with the special difficulties presented by his problems, of the use he makes of the techniques supplied by other sciences, especially physics and physiology (though his use of mathematics is not quite adequately represented), and perhaps also of his heroism (or his hard-heartedness). It has always proved a somewhat difficult matter, for instance, to arouse any but the mildest emotions in the artificial atmosphere of the laboratory, but some modern psychologists have adopted drastic methods of overcoming the orectic inertia of their subjects. Thus Landis in a study of ' Facial Expression in Emotion ' after such milder stimuli as jazz records, classical music, readings from the Bible and from the case histories of Havelock Ellis, asked his subjects to write an account of the ' meanest, most contemptible or most embarrassing thing they ever did ', their description being then read aloud by the experimenter; this was followed by pictures of skin diseases (the subjects being asked to imagine themselves similarly afflicted), pornographic pictures, decapitation of live rats (by the subject himself, or, if he refused, by the experimenter), electric shocks while fishing with the hand in a pail of frogs, and ' repeated electric shocks ' while engaged in mental arithmetic. It is clear that such experiments afford magnificent opportunities for the sublimation of sadistic impulses.

A reviewer could chat at length upon the varied subjects dealt with in this interesting book. He could discuss, for instance, the very topical subject of racial differences in ability, as illustrated by the work of Klineberg, who, carrying out tests in France, Germany and Italy, could find in general no difference of intelligence level as between the Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean inhabitants of these countries (though he did find that in all these countries the urban were superior to the rural populations). He could deal with the fascinating subject of ' sexual photoperiodicity ' as revealed by recent experiemnts showing the influence of light upon the migratory habits of birds and fish. He could speculate upon the significance of the newly discovered electric waves exhibited in the action potentials of the human brain and in particular upon the curious relation between brain waves and mental-age level (certain ' alpha rhythms ' appear to manifest themselves only at or above the mental age of four, being absent in the

feeble-minded—of whatever chronological age—who have not attained this level). He could draw attention to the amazing way in which Lashley's experiments on brain function in relation to intelligence appear to agree with Spearman's two-factor theory, arrived at by utterly different methods (Lashley's ' correlation function ', in virtue of which the brain functions as a whole, seems to correspond exactly to Spearman's ' g ', his ' projection function ', in virtue of which each part of the brain possesses some special power, to Spearman's ' s '—a most interesting point which has been omitted from the authors' discussion of Lashley's results). He could debate the fascinating question as to whether the experiments of Hull and Montgomery have successfully disposed of the claims of the graphologists. And so on indefinitely ; for this is eminently a book for scientific browsing. Here, however, we must conclude by mentioning one or two of the chapters which may be of special interest to psycho-analysts.

In view of the ever increasing importance attached by analysts to the earliest impressions in the individual's life, they may be glad to read of the observations of Pratt, Nelson and Sun upon ' The Behaviour of the Newborn Infant ', as the result of which they conclude that in the first days after birth there is very little specificity of response of the kind that is termed reflex or instinctual. Stimulation of all exteroceptors gives rise to a generalized response, though this response is strongest in the neighbourhood of the part stimulated. ' Any stimulus may release almost any reaction in the newborn ' ; hence it is concluded that all the more specific responses (especially those which are classified as instinctual) are determined through conditioning or experience—a result which is of course in harmony with the psycho-analytic conclusion as regards the importance of environmental factors in the very early stages of development.

The same absence of relatively specific, instinctual, behaviour is revealed by Kuo's experiment on the reactions of kittens to rats and mice. Kittens can be made to ' love ' and to ' fear ' these animals, as well as to pursue and kill them, and Kuo himself believes that the predominance of the latter reaction under natural conditions is due to a combination of environmental circumstances (in this case the nature and behaviour of rats and mice) with the tendencies to movement inevitably produced by the cat's bodily structure (the cat being a ' small sized tiger ', especially adapted for making swift movements and for capturing small animals).

Several chapters in the present volume should be of interest to the psycho-analyst as presenting a behaviouristic approach to problems with which he is himself familiar. The behaviourist naturally tends to regard neurotic symptoms as due to a process of conditioning, and the problem from this point of view is to discover how the conditioning has, or may have, taken place. Menzies' very recent experiments show that vasomotor responses of a type similar to those of blushing can be con-

ditioned by a variety of stimuli and may then continue to be elicitable by these stimuli over a period of many days.

The cure of a neurotic symptom, on the other hand, must, on behaviouristic principles, be explained in terms of de-conditioning or re-conditioning, and in this connection, it would be an interesting exercise to attempt to re-write the chapter on ' Methods of Breaking Undesirable Habits ' in psycho-analytic terminology or expand it with the help of psycho-analytic concepts. Of the methods there enumerated, it would seem, for instance, that the processes of displacement and sublimation would come under the head of what is there called ' the incompatible response method ', the objective of which is ' to find and establish a new reaction (1) which is antagonistic to the habitual response, (2) which can be conditioned to stimuli that condition the habit also, and (3) which can be made sufficiently strong to inhibit the habit when the critical stimuli are present ' ; the process of catharsis is allied to ' the exhaustion method ', which involves the exhaustion of the undesirable response ' by intense, continuous repetition of it ' ; while the gradual increase of ego-control may produce results similar in some respects to those of the ' toleration method ', ' in which the individual is led to develop a slowly increasing toleration for the stimuli of the undesired reaction ', though of course with the important difference that the emphasis would be on the change in subjective rather than in objective factors. (Some forms of 'active therapy ' however have made a more direct use of the toleration method in its objective aspects.)

The chapter on ' A Comparison of Memory for Pleasant and Unpleasant Experiences ' deals with a field to which psycho-analysts were admittedly the first to draw attention, and the results of the experimental studies of Jersild and Koch there dealt with are in general harmony with psycho-analytic views, though in the discussion certain factors are pointed out which are seldom mentioned in psycho-analytic literature.

The chapter on ' Forgetting during Sleep and Waking ' also draws attention to certain dynamic factors in forgetting (those connected with ' retro-active inhibition ') which may well be of importance in psychopathology (especially in the somewhat neglected field of traumatic amnesia).

Finally, the studies of action currents in sleeping and waking open up a new approach to another neglected field, i.e. the objective manifestations of dreaming.

Everyone who is concerned with the problems of human behaviour, from whatever angle he approaches these problems, will find something to interest him in this fascinating volume.

J. C. F.

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A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology. Prepared by Willis D. Ellis, with an Introduction by K. Koffka. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1938. Pp. xiv. + 403. Price, 21*s.*)

The nature of this book is admirably summarized in the preface. It consists of ' a series of abstracts or summaries of thirty-four articles and one book published in Germany between 1915 and 1929 by the leading exponents of Gestalt psychology and their students '. ' The war, differences of tongue, sentiment and background, have all ', Professor Ellis thinks, ' made it difficult for English-speaking readers to welcome, *for what they were*, the experimental methods and results of certain German psychologists ', and, although, in the case of Gestalt, there now exists a considerable number of experimental reports in English, these are mostly of later date, and the present work aims at presenting in accessible and convenient form, a selection of the more important pioneer researches of this school. The original material, we are told, was about ten times as long, and considering the inevitable difficulty of condensation in this degree, Professor Ellis (who has enjoyed the guidance and collaboration of Professor Koffka) is to be congratulated on having produced a volume, which, though it confessedly makes some demands on the reader's attention, nevertheless appears to present the results in clearly understandable form, with no essential steps omitted, and which undoubtedly deserves a place in every library of psychology.

The page numbers of the original texts are indicated in the margin so that the student can easily fill the gaps, if at any point he finds the treatment too condensed or desires to consult the author's original presentation. As regards the choice of articles, the selection has on the whole been admirably made, and covers a wide field. Four selections deal with ' general problems ', thirteen with ' perception ' (inevitably the largest section, since it is in this field that Gestalt psychology has made its chief contributions), four with ' thought ', two with ' psychical forces ', six with ' pathological phenomena ' and three with ' replies ' to criticisms. Many readers will, however, regret that Professor Koffka is himself not more largely represented (he appears only as the author of one of the ' replies '), for his work is one of the three corner-stones of what has sometimes been called the K.K.W. (Koffka, Köhler, Wertheimer) school. It is perhaps also a pity that, for the sake of completeness, there is not also an abstract of Wertheimer's original work on the perception of movement (1912), which occupies a position in the history of the Gestalt school that corresponds roughly to that of the ' Studies in Hysteria ' in psycho-analysis.

Gestalt, like psycho-analysis, is still a subject that arouses much devoted enthusiasm on the one hand and much violent opposition on the other. The earlier attacks by Benussi, Müller and Rignano, to which ' replies ' are here forthcoming, have been followed by the further detailed

criticisms of Spearman, McDougall and others. Of these critics McDougall is the one who has brought out the points which are most likely to be of interest to psycho-analysts. Gestalt psychology, as we have already mentioned, has achieved its chief triumphs in the field of perception, where, besides pointing out the excesses of old-fashioned associationism, it drew attention to the importance of ' wholes ', ' shapes ', ' forms ' or ' configurations ' in the structure of our experience, and studied the influence of these wholes in a multitude of ingenious experiments. It is here especially that the reader will probably agree with Professor Ellis when he says that ' the *way* Gestalt psychologists think is something every thinking person should find exhilarating to observe '. Furthermore, they endeavoured to account for their findings in terms of energy and the tendency to maintain or return to an equilibrium. It was Wertheimer who formulated the fundamental Law of Prägnanz, according to which all psychological organizations tend to be as ' good ' as the prevailing conditions allow. There have also been formulated a number of subsidiary laws or ' factors ', dealing with ' proximity ', ' similarity ', ' uniform destiny ', ' objective set ', ' direction ', ' closure ', etc., some of which are well set out and illustrated in Wertheimer's second contribution to the present book.

This dynamic conception of experience is one which should make a strong appeal to psycho-analysts, for Freud's view of the mind is also essentially dynamic, and in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* he also attempted to describe mental life in terms of fundamental principles of energy.

The basic relationship between mental and physical energy remains obscure in the writings of both schools, but whereas psycho-analysis soon abandons physics and (like McDougall's ' hormic ' psychology) deals in psychological terms with wishes, instincts (including, if we accept it, the Death Instinct), desires and strivings, the Gestalt school endeavours to hold fast as long as possible to physical notions and seems only with a certain reluctance to abandon these, when necessary, in favour of such concepts as ' will ', ' needs ' or ' intentions '. (Hence the short section of the present book that deals more specifically with the orectic field is entitled ' Psychical Forces '.)

The physical notions seem to do their duty well enough so long as the Gestalt psychologist is dealing with perception, and, indeed, their employment here gives his whole treatment a certain fascinating quality. The reader will probably feel, however, that up to the present they have proved far less satisfying in dealing with orexis. The physics tends constantly to become vague and shadowy and to dissolve into psychology, so much so that one is often tempted to think that the introduction of physical concepts into this sphere is premature, resulting in a stilted and artificial treatment ; we are apt to feel how much more freely we could breathe in a frankly psychological atmosphere. Nevertheless, the attempt is a brave

one (and has, of course, since been carried by Lewin, in his *Dynamic Psychology*, a good deal further than is indicated in the present book); the discovery of really serviceable dynamic principles that would be of use alike in the field of orexis and in that of perception would be of incalculable value to psychology, and the Gestalt psychologists deserve our utmost sympathy in the difficult but important task that they have undertaken. Indeed, we cannot but hope that the Gestalt and the psycho-analytic approaches will eventually converge and provide us with certain common principles of psychological dynamics which, if not precisely identical, will at least approximate sufficiently to be mutually helpful and illuminating. Perhaps for some time to come it may be profitable to adopt an open-minded parallelism, keeping to that path of explanation which to us appears most promising, but at the same time maintaining a sharp watch for points of contact with the paths that other workers are pursuing. If we do this, we may ultimately find, for instance, that Wertheimer's Law of Prägnanz and Freud's Death Instinct, however different they at first appear, have really much in common (and that both have also much in common with the relevant concepts of many other writers, such as Raup's 'Complacency', Rignano's 'Stationary Physiological State', and—going further back—Herbert Spencer's 'Dependent Moving Equilibrium'). We shall, at any rate, in the meantime be more tolerant than many critics (such as McDougall) are inclined to be, of such statements as that which is here made by Köhler [1] to the effect that: '"Purposiveness" and "goal activity" of organic differentiation and growth appear to be casually determined happenings in communicating systems, the inner dynamics of which are impelled towards equilibrium. Causality in such systems is, in virtue of their coherence throughout, free from "arbitrary coincidence", yet (without any assumption of entelechies) at the same time constantly "directed" by the total pressure of the system.'

Schulte's 'Approach to a Gestalt Theory of Paranoic Phenomena' (Selection 31 of the present book) may be taken as an example of the more unsatisfactory aspects of the Gestalt contribution to the study of orexis. The central factor in this theory is what the author calls 'we-insufficiency'. There are certain situations, he tells us, which demand that we should feel ourselves as a part of a larger social group, that demand 'a "we" rather than a sum of independent egos'. If, for any reason (which may be external or internal) a person cannot achieve this sense of 'we-ness', he becomes pre-occupied with the 'chasm' between himself and the group, and endeavours to bridge the chasm. One way of doing so (others are indicated) is by converting the apparent outsideness or indifference of the group into an imagined hostility of the group, the behaviour

[1] P. 70.

of which is now directed against him (it is better to be persecuted than to be ignored). By this means a ' livable ' state is established in which the person has a genuine function (the bridging of the ' chasm ' is presumably analogous to, or at bottom the same process as, the ' closure ' that takes place in visually perceived figures, though this is not brought out in the Selection as here published). Though there is a certain descriptive truth in this account (which is illustrated by several good examples), it seems to lack all the detailed applicability of the psycho-analytic explanation in terms of the psychological motives first discovered by Freud in his study of the Schreber case. (A criticism of Freud's views on paranoia contained in the original article is omitted from this Selection). A psycho-analytic study would, we feel, have revealed the causes of many of the individual symptoms of Schulte's cases (e.g. the imagined accusations of arson and homosexuality, p. 367), which are left unexplained in his interpretation. Gestalt theory in its present form here reveals itself as a relatively clumsy instrument for dealing with the intricate phenomena of psycho-pathology.

On the other hand, Zeigarnik's paper ' On Finished and Unfinished Tasks ' (Selection 25) is a striking example of the value of the experimental work carried out by the Gestalt school. Not only does it reveal new facts of interest (that unfinished tasks are generally for a time recalled more easily than finished ones), but it illumines them with dynamic conceptions concerning the rôle of conation in remembering (conceptions which, although differently expressed, are perhaps at bottom not far removed from those that psycho-analysts have already formulated on the same subject). It even reveals the possibility of studying experimentally the phenomena of repression (the psycho-analytic concept is here frankly adopted). Thus it was found that when subjects were bad at a given task, they often thought that the task was withdrawn because the experimenter had detected their incapacity for it. This induced feelings of inferiority, and the task in question was generally forgotten. To give an example : ' Although most boys were poor at knitting, they nevertheless remembered this task (if interrupted) very well. Girls, on the other hand, who were inept at this task very often forgot to mention it in their report, even though it had been interrupted. We should not assume, however, that tasks which were (but ' should ' not have been) poorly performed, left no tension system when interrupted. Instead we must think of them as subject to the special forces of *repression* which caused their recall to be unusually difficult ' (p. 311).

Each of the numerous contemporary schools of psychology has made some significant contribution to our understanding of the mind (though opinions will necessarily vary as to the relative importance of their respective contributions). But before a full harvest can be reaped from the results of any school, these results will have to be allotted their due place

in psychology as a whole. Let us hope that the Law of Prägnanz applies to psychology itself, which too will therefore tend to become as ' good ' an organization as the prevailing circumstances permit. But a clear understanding of the main principles of each school is a necessary preliminary to this process ; and for achieving such an understanding, books such as that which Professor Ellis has here produced are likely to be instruments of the greatest value.

* J. C. F.

Friendship-Love in Adolescence. By N. M. Lovetz-Tereshchenko. (Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. Pp. 367. Price 16*s*.)

The author's purpose in collecting the material set forth in this book is to show that there are two kinds of love possible for human beings : one, which he calls friendship-love, which occurs about the time of the onset of puberty, in both sexes, and which may be directed to either sex or to both sexes at once ; the other, sexual love, which is only directed towards the opposite sex, is concerned with reproduction, accompanied by genital feeling and ' general voluptuousness '. In the author's view these two kinds of love are poles apart. Friendship-love is *not* sexual ; it is not in conflict with religion ; it brings with it a feeling of gratitude and goodness ; physically it is felt somewhere in the breast and not at all in the genitals. It is not accompanied by any desire for intercourse, has no reproductive purpose, and, if it seeks for bodily contact at all, such contact takes the form, for instance, of holding hands. Mostly this love is satisfied by gazing at the beloved. Friendship-love makes the lover better. In this it contrasts sharply with sexual love, as described by the author, which arouses feelings of shame, is surreptitious and accompanied by genital feelings which conflict with religion and take away self-respect.

In proof of these theories about the two distinct kinds of love—good friendship-love and bad sexual love—the author has collected a quantity of very interesting material, consisting of what he calls the ' Archives ' of a number of children ; that is to say, of a collection of documents, including intimate diaries, original literary productions such as stories and poems, letters and postcards, and notes, and he has worked out very carefully and exactly the ages at which these various documents were written, and arranged them in chronological order.

These archives make interesting reading, and give a very vivid picture of the writers' daily lives and of some aspects, at any rate, of their emotional development. Whether they support the author's contention about the non-sexual nature of friendship-love as conclusively as he believes is a matter for the reader to decide.

From the evidence in these children's archives it appears that about the age of fifteen in the boys and a little over thirteen in the case of the one girl whose archives are at all complete, an abrupt change makes its

appearance in their emotional outlook. Whereas formally they were what they described as ' wise '—that is, unnoticed emotionally—they begin to feel some curious stirring, which the author describes as *desiderium amico*, and very soon find themselves strongly attracted towards some other schoolfellow, who suddenly appears interesting in quite a new and romantic way. At first there is too much shyness to approach the loved schoolfellows and make their acquaintance. This phase is described as ' friendship at a distance '. A little later confidences are exchanged and the friends become inseparable for a time. In the case of boys, with whom the book mainly deals, the love choice falls first on fellow-schoolboys, then, a few months later, on schoolgirls, sometimes in the mass, just *as* schoolgirls, sometimes on one individual girl. Both boys and girls are loved in this way alternately or simultaneously. The lover is romantic, changeable in its object—jealous, reverend, sometimes sublimic. There is much fear of the grown-up's interference (even when their grown-ups have in fact no idea of interfering). It makes the children feel ' good ' and ' fine ', and there is an entry in one boy's diary stating that he gave himself ' his word of honour not to do one very (good) bad thing . . . because it became repugnant to me to do it when I remembered Betty '. The (good) bad thing which this boy gave up was looking at women bathing on the beach, which excited him sexually. From this (also making no reference to the interesting ambivalence of the entry in the diary) the author draws the conclusion that what the boy felt for Betty was good friendship-love, and that this love could not have been sexual because the boy himself contrasts it with his sexual experiences on the beach, and, now recognizing these as degrading, gives them up under the influence of the new purer non-sexual love. In the author's view it will be found that ' love plays a negative—repression retarding—rôle in those who approach one another on the way towards sexual intercourse '.

I suppose it is of little use to argue what is, after all, largely a question of words. The author has carefully defined sexuality in a way which excludes this other emotion which he calls friendship-love. According to definition, therefore, friendship-love is non-sexual. The author's view of the sexual act is such that, for him, it does seem to be a thing incompatible with love. He writes in his conclusion as follows : ' And we submit that the number of sexual acts performed while a state of love is actually being experienced by one or both of the mating persons is either very small or is equal to nought ', adding in a footnote : ' This second alternative (i.e. that the number is equal to nought) is, in fact, what the present writer believes.' It is hardly surprising that, holding sexuality in such low esteem, he should wish to differentiate the love of lovers from it.

Karin Stephen.

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Racial Attitudes in South Africa. Historical, Experimental and Psychological Studies. By I. D. MacCrone. (Published on behalf of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, by the Oxford University Press, London, 1937. Pp. 328. Price, 12*s*. 6*d*. net.)

This is an extremely interesting volume for any psychologist interested in social and racial problems. It makes a serious attempt to evaluate the present inter-racial situation in South Africa, and the feelings and attitudes of the white inhabitants towards the natives, in the light of psycho-analytic contributions to group psychology.

The book is divided into three parts, the first being historical, bringing out the various psycho-social situations which have arisen from the history of colonization and of frontier development. The second part is an experimental study in the measurement of social attitudes, the results being subjected to statistical analysis. This section of the book stands apart, not being brought into relation either with the historical background or the strictly psychological section. In the third part an account is given of Freudian group psychology, followed by a qualitative study of the psychological factors affecting attitudes towards the native and of relevant aspects of the unconscious in action. These chapters are well written, and Dr. MacCrone's specific contributions are most interesting. His account of psycho-analytic views is competent, although it hardly goes far enough. Nor are the descriptive facts brought into sufficiently intimate relation with the theoretical statement.

A more penetrating analysis of the psychological factors affecting individual and group attitudes to natives might have been achieved had the author understood the more recent contributions of child analysis. MacCrone takes psycho-analytic theory to hold that man is not social by nature, but entirely egoistic: 'To say that man is a social animal is a contradiction in terms, . . . since it joins together what in the light of psycho-analytic theory are seen to be opposed to one another, and the real source of man's inner conflicts.' But through more recent psycho-analytic work, we have come to understand that the social aspects of man's nature are much more deeply rooted than had before been realized. The conflict between love and hate of parents is endo-psychic and already apparent in the first year of life. Nor can man's inter-racial attitudes be fully understood without making use of what we now know of infantile *phantasies*, conscious and unconscious. The lack of reference to the work of Ernest Jones, Melanie Klein and Róheim reveals the limitations of the author's approach. Nevertheless, the book is a valuable contribution to a most important and difficult problem.

Susan Isaacs.

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History of Modern Morals. By Max Hodann. Translated by Stella Browne. (Heinemann, London, 1937. Pp. 325. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Max Hodann gives in this book a comprehensive survey of the work accomplished by pioneers for sex-enlightenment and sexual reforms. His own intimate experiences enable him to include in this survey many countries and the detailed work accomplished by outstanding men and women in them.

The nature of the main contents of the books can be gathered from the titles of the chapters: ' The Secret of Generation ', ' The Fight against Venereal Diseases ', ' The History of Birth Control ', ' The Fight for Legalised Abortion ', ' Sex Education '.

In these chapters the rise and the progress of movements for sexual reform, in face of the fear and prejudice of the ruling and the ruled classes alike, is recorded. The psycho-analyst will find the last two chapters disappointing. They are entitled ' The Analysis of the Sex Taboo ' and ' The Patriarchate in Dissolution '. The author turns from his objective account of the history of the movements mentioned and enters upon the field of interpretation of the subjective factors that are responsible for ' sex taboo '. He admits Freud as a pioneer in the work of breaking down the barriers that once prevented even discussion of sex problems, but he repudiates the concept of the Œdipus conflict as the unconscious root of sex taboo. Hodann's position can be gathered from his words.[1] ' The Œdipus complex is a stupendous *intellectual* construction with most significant implications for *early* historical achievements in social organization, religion and art: it is as inspiring a creation as the great Drama of Sophocles, from which Freud took its name.'

Since the Œdipus complex is considered by the author an intellectual conception one does not wonder that he repudiates the evidence of the emotional intensity associated with this complex as illustrated in Mrs Klein's analysis of a girl of two.[2] Even so, if Max Hodann can see. intellectually that the Œdipus ' construction ' has most significant implications for *early* historical achievements in social organization, religion and art, he must surely see also that it has the same significance in the early history of every one of us.

The author is apparently unaware of the developments in psychoanalytical science during recent years. It is a pity. He pleads himself for instance that sexual problems are inseparable from those of sociology and politics, but in the realm of psychology he segregates the sexual problem from other powerful instincts that are within the psyche. For example, he nowhere gives evidence that he has brought the aggressive

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[1] P. 273. Reviewer's italics.

[2] P. 272.

impulses into any kind of relationship with the sexual. To omit the problem of aggression when dealing with ' sex taboo ' is strange indeed, and neither of these instincts, aggressive and sexual, can be separated from another institution in the human mind, namely the super-ego, to which Hodann also makes no reference.

How little Max Hodann understands of the mental mechanisms revealed by psycho-analytic practice and embodied in the theory of the science in such words as ' repression ' and ' sublimation ' can be seen in such a passage as the following : ' Freud's theory of sublimation has simply superseded moral theology as a scientific "façade" for the social fabric of yesterday and to-day ; by the theory that all "higher values" are only achieved by repression of instinct '.

After this statement one is not surprised to find that the author places Freud in succession to St. Paul, St. Augustine and St. Tertullian rather than to Galileo and Darwin. He continues :—

' Sublimation in theory and *practice* acts as a permanent depressor of human energy and human capacity,' [3] and a little later declares, ' Individuals who have retained their genital capacity unimpaired are as a rule correspondingly potent and able in other directions, more active, more creative . . .'

The reviewer need quote no further. ' Sublimation ' in the Freudian ' theology ' is apparently something a person can practise and acquire by conscious determination or by exhortation of others ! Its fell intent is to repress sexuality. Hence the reason for the inclusion of Freud among the spiritual leaders who preached the gospel of mortification of the flesh. From this it is but a step to the discovery that for Hodann psycho-analysis supports tradition, reaction, and the maintenance of the ' classes ' to the enslavement and ignorance of the masses, an interesting change from another popular reaction over many years that psycho-analysis advocated every form of licence.

How difficult it is apparently for even Mr. Hodann to grasp that psycho-analysis is a scientific procedure and its theories scientific concepts.

One would think from reading this book that if only the prejudices and fears of the ruling classes could be banished all would be well with the world. Then sex-enlightenment, legalised abortion, the removal of sex taboos for the masses would result in a happier society.

He thinks wistfully of the Trobrianders. Even so it is well to remember that ' All men's Babylons are copies of his Babylonian heart '. Every psycho-analyst welcomes any reform that means justice, tolerance and health for the individual. He is the last person to belittle the rôle that environment plays in the perpetuation of physical and mental illness, but

[3] P. 317. Reviewer's italics.

no psycho-analyst would subscribe to the belief that these things *alone* will increase psychical well-being.

Mr. Hodann's remedy for the ills of our time lies in the dawn of Collectivism. He thinks we are steering for a new shore. He feels it a great responsibility ' to strive with all our powers so that the results of science may be placed at the service of the new world '. One hopes that among the results of science placed at the service of this new world will be Freud's Theory of Infantile Sexuality and the Œdipus Complex or the new world will be the old in another guise.

Ella Freeman Sharpe.

OBITUARY

DR. MERRELL MIDDLEMORE

Dr. Middlemore died suddenly on November 15, 1938, the day of her return from a convalescence in the country. She had long suffered from ill-health and this prevented her from playing the active part in psycho-analytical work that would have been commensurate with her talents. In a quiet way she was a valued contributor to the work of the British Society. The charm of her personality, however, and the high merit of her intelligence were fully revealed only to a small circle to whom she greatly endeared herself. She had of late devoted herself with great interest to making a specially direct study of the subtleties of breast feeding and had developed here a remarkable technique for dealing with mothers, nurses and infants in the way that would yield the least disturbing results. Some of her observations were reported in a paper read before the British Society on November 3, 1937. It is hoped that an amplified record of them will shortly appear in book form.

Ernest Jones.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONGRESS

The fifteenth Psycho-Analytical Congress was held in Paris, in the Salle Jéna, from Monday 1st to Friday August 5th 1938. On the previous Sunday evening Congress members and guests were entertained by the French Psycho-Analytical Society at a Reception held at the Restaurant Le Doyen, Avenue des Champs Elysées ; and on the following Tuesday afternoon a Reception was held at the Hotel Salomon de Rothschild, when Professor Jean Perrin, representing the Minister of Education, welcomed the Congress on behalf of the French Government. The Fifteenth Congress was marked not only by the quality of the scientific contributions but by the profuseness of hospitality displayed by our French colleagues. On Wednesday August 3rd an excursion was made to the Forest of Fontainebleau, and during the week receptions were given by, amongst others, Princess Marie of Greece and Dr. Raymond de Saussure, who, as local Congress Secretary, was also responsible for the excellent local arrangements. The Proceedings were as follows :—

Monday, August 1, 9 *a.m.*

Opening Address by Dr. Ernest Jones (President)

We meet to-day under the impression of another tremendous shock to Psycho-Analysis. I refer, of course, to the dispersal of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. It is a shock more than commensurate in importance with the blows our work has previously sustained in its short history of forty years : the defection of our first President, Jung, the death of two others, Abraham and Ferenczi, and the violent interference with the freedom of one of our most important branch Societies, the German one. The recent blow from without has fallen on a central, if not a vital, spot—on the mother of all psycho-analytical societies, at the very birth-place of psycho-analysis. That there should no longer be psycho-analysis practised in Vienna, of all places in the world, is a thought that catches the breath. It is a thought that will take us some time to assimilate.

The resilience of the human spirit, however, is such that, after the first stunning impact, it usually responds by drawing inspiration from all but the most crushing of disasters. Two considerations have thus deprived

the present misfortune of any catastrophic significance. One is the reflection that civilization is now too firmly and widely based for it to be any longer in the power of man, however animated by destructiveness and stupidity, permanently to arrest the march of scientific thought. And we can with confidence maintain to-day of psycho-analysis that the time has passed when it can be annihilated ; it will survive any opposition it may encounter. Set-backs, even severe ones, are local and temporary, affecting the alignment only ; the march itself towards knowledge is indomitable.

The other stimulating reflection is that psycho-analysts all over the world, despite any difference of outlook that may exist among them, have rallied together to cope with the difficult situation in a co-operative manner that once more demonstrates their common bonds. Independently and concurrently, in America, in England, in France and elsewhere, steps were initiated at once which have already led to tangible results. The shock in Austria was—at least to some of us—not so unexpected as the earlier one in Germany, so that it was possible to do a little thinking ahead. Being in the most responsible position I immediately proceeded to Vienna and conferred with the officials there about the best measures to undertake. An appeal for an International Fund was at once issued, and I found that our American colleagues had with admirable promptitude already taken similar steps. The British Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, whom I approached, unhesitatingly and in the best traditions of his country offered a permanent refuge to Professor Freud and his family and gave a promise of sympathetic assistance, which has since been borne out in action, for a number of his Viennese colleagues to settle in England. In the United States a special Refugee Committee, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Kubie, was formed. They did not confine themselves to help in financing and otherwise facilitating entry into their country, but with a true American practical sense promptly drew up a memorandum describing comprehensively the conditions of work and life that immigrants would find on their arrival. Much unofficial assistance was also given by individual analysts and private friends of which I cannot speak in detail. Suffice it to mention the upshot: of the 102 analysts and candidates in Vienna only some half a dozen still remain in that unfortunate city and we hope that they also will before long be in a position to leave.

Maintenant je vais parler d'un thème plus heureux, c'est à dire, le plaisir que nous ressentons d'être réunis pour la première fois dans le pays de France, si beau et si renommé. A notre dernier Congrès, à Marienbad, je pouvais trouver un rapport entre la naissance de la psychanalyse et l'association intéressante de Freud avec la ville Moravienne de Freiberg. Son association avec la France est encore mieux connue.

Il est inexact de faire dériver aucune de ses idées psychologiques, comme on l'a quelquefois fait, de son séjour, il y a aujourd'hui 44 ans, dans la clinique de Charcot. Mais il n'est que naturel de supposer qu'il fut encouragé, à son retour à Vienne, par le souvenir que le neurologue le plus célèbre en Europe différait d'une manière frappante de ses collègues en ce qu'il considérait sérieusement le phénomène de l'hystérie et qu'il le reconnaissait non pas comme un défaut du tempérament féminin mais comme une agitation cérébrale d'un ordre fortement complexe. Puis nous savons que plus tard, quand il se butait à un obstacle délicat dans son travail d'exploration, c'était vers la France qu'il retournait pour l'éclaircissement —cette fois-ci chez Bernheim de Nancy. Il est intéressant de remarquer que Freud est celui qui a mis fin à la lutte célèbre entre l'Ecole de la Salpétrière et l'Ecole de Nancy—lutte qui a agité pendant vingt ans au commencement de ce siècle le monde neurologique de la France. On peut peut-être décrire brièvement cette lutte en termes de l'importance relative des facteurs exogènes et endogènes dans la production de l'hystérie. Une des plus importantes contributions de Freud à la science fut la signification de la constitution sexuelle, non seulement dans l'hystérie mais ailleurs, comme étant un troisième facteur indépendant, dérivé d'une influence mutuelle des facteurs traumatiques et hérités.

Mais dans un sens plus large nous pouvons considérer la France comme étant le pays qui a donné le cadre nécessaire à la psychologie moderne. Ce sont les psychologues français qui ont découvert pour la première fois, par une intuition naturelle au pays, l'importance des observations cliniques et thérapeutiques pour la psychologie en général. Commençant par le magnétisme animal, avec le Marquis de Puységur et Deleuze (il y a plus de cent ans), nous pouvons suivre une ligne ininterrompue de travailleurs, en passant par les investigateurs précoces de l'hypnotisme et de la suggestion, c'est à dire Bertrand et Charpignon, aux observations soignées desquels on a ajouté très peu, par les noms célèbres de Liébault, Bernheim et Bérillon, par ceux qui ont étudié les dédoublements de la personnalité, tels qu'Azam, Mesnet, Bourru et Burot, Binet et Ribot, jusqu'aux travaux des psychologues cliniques, Depine, Charles Richet et autres, qui culminaient avec le travail brillant de Janet. Tout ce travail établissait sûrement le fait important que l'ésprit de l'homme n'agit pas toujours comme une unité telle que les philosophes l'imaginent, mais est susceptible de fonctionner automatiquement à cause des constituants individuels qui peuvent, dans certaines circonstances, devenir complètement indépendants de la personnalité principale.

Le terrain fut ainsi préparé pour la découverte capitale de l'inconscience normale, mais cette découverte a été faite ailleurs. Pour employer une comparaison avec l'agriculture, la terre française, qui avait été si incessament cultivée pendant cent ans, était à la fin du siècle dernier tout

à fait épuisée, les signes d'infertilité devenaient évidents, et une période suivit pendant laquelle elle dut rester en friche. Même quand Freud donna la stimulation fertilisante de la psychanalyse, le terrain épuisé fut longtemps à réagir. C'est seulement quelques années après la guerre, qu'on put discerner des signes sérieux de vie dans l'étude de la psychanalyse en France. Morichau-Beauchant et puis Hesnard ont fait un essai hardi, mais trop prématuré, pour stimuler l'intérêt. Madame Sokolnicka vint de Vienne à Paris, mais c'est assurément dans la personne de votre premier Président, le Dr. René Laforgue, que nous devons reconnaître le vrai pionnier de la psychanalyse en France. Son enérgie et son enthousiasme gagnèrent bientôt les adhérents et il y a environ douze ans depuis que la Société française fut fondée, avec la co-opération de Madame la Princesse Marie Bonaparte, les Docteurs Allendy, Borel, Loewenstein, Parcheminey et Pichon. Ici je dois faire mention de l'assistance inestimable qui fut accordée par la prévoyance remarquable et par la largeur de vision de Professeur Clause, à qui sa position éminente rendit possible de nous donner les facilités qui, autrement, n'auraient pas pu être obtenus. Aujourd'hui nous voyons la récolte de ce travail : une Société active et florissante qui joue son rôle dans une sphère internationale et qui nous accorde une bienvenue si gracieuse et si cordiale—une bienvenue pour laquelle la France est renommée.

1st Scientific Meeting. Chairman : Dr. Charles Odier, Paris.

(1) R. Loewenstein, Paris : ' Masochism and the Theory of Obsessions '.

(2) R. Allendy, Paris : ' Morbid Substitutions and Masochism '.

(3) S. M. Payne, London : ' Pregenital Factors in Fetish Formation '.

(4) D. Lagache, Strasbourg : ' Ideas of Homosexual Infidelity in Jealousy '.

(5) M. Katan, 's-Gravenhage : ' Some Mechanisms of Jealousy '.

(6) S. Lorand, New York : ' The Rôle of the Female Penis Fantasy in Male Character Formation '.

(7) E. Pichon, Paris : ' Divergent Evolution of Genitality and Sexuality in Western Civilization '.

2nd Scientific Meeting. 3 *p.m. Chairman :* Dr. S. T. R. de Monchy, Rotterdam.

(1) M. Rambert, Paris : ' Some Experiences in Child Analysis by Means of Guignol-play '.

(2) R. Bak, Budapest : ' Regression of Ego-orientation and Libido in Schizophrenia '.

(3) S. Morgenstern, Paris : ' The Psycho-Analytic Significance of Symbolism in Infantile Drawings '.

3rd Scientific Meeting. Tuesday, August 2. 9 *a.m. Chairman :* Dr. István Hollós, Budapest.

(1) Professor Sigmund Freud, London (*in absentia*) : ' The Progress in Spirituality '.

(2) K. Friedlander, London : ' The Longing to Die '.

(3) W. C. M. Scott, London : ' On the Intense Affects Encountered on Treating a Severe Manic-depressive Disorder '.

(4) M. Klein, London : ' Mourning and its Relation to Manic-depressive States '.

(5) S. Isaacs, London : ' A Special Manifestation of Anxiety Relating to Internalized Objects '.

(6) A. Kielholz, Königsfelden : ' On the Sources of Querulousness '.

(7) G. Bychowski, Warsaw : ' The Relations between the Ego and Super-Ego '.

4th Scientific Meeting. 3.30 *p.m.* *Chairman :* {Dr. Federn, Vienna ; Miss Anna Freud, London.}

Symposium : ' Ego Strength and Ego Weakness '.

Otto Fenichel, Los Angeles. René Laforgue, Paris.

Edward Glover, London. Hermann Nunberg, New York.

5th Scientific Meeting. Wednesday, August 4. 9 *a.m. Chairman :* Dr. Max Eitingon, Jerusalem.

(1) E. Bergler, Vienna : ' A New Point of View in the Therapy of Ereutophobia '.

(2) P. Federn, Vienna : ' The Choice between Hysteria and Obsessional Neurosis '.

(3) B. Lantos, London : ' On Working Incapacity '.

(4) P. Sarasin, Basle : ' Thinking and Acting '.

(5) P. Schiff, Paris : ' On the Possibilities of Psycho-analysing Criminals '.

(6) A. Bálint, Budapest : ' Naïve Egotism and Aggression '.

(7) M. Ribble, New York : ' Clinical Studies of Crying and Sucking Behaviour in the Infant '. (Motion picture.)

(8) G. Róheim, Budapest : ' Australian Totemism '. (Lantern slides.)

6th Scientific Meeting. Friday, August 5. 9 *a.m. Chairman :* Dr. Philipp Sarasin, Basle.

(1) E. Servadio, Rome : ' Psycho-analytic Considerations of Yoga '.

(2) E. Pichon, Paris : ' Person and Personality in the light of French Idiomatic Thought '.

(3) E. Sharpe, London : ' Psycho-physical Problems Revealed through Language '.

(4) Princess Marie Bonaparte, Paris : ' Man and Time '.

(5) R. Sterba, Vienna : ' On the Problem of Musical Activity '.

(6) O. Pfister, Zürich : ' The Formation and Resolution of Anxiety and Obsession in the History of Judaic-Christian Religion '.

(7) R. Schönberger, Budapest: ' A Dream of Descartes: Reflections on the Unconscious Determinants of the Sciences '.

7th Scientific Meeting. 3.30 *p.m. Chairman:* Dr. Ernest Jones, London.

Symposium: ' The Criteria of Interpretation '.

Susan Isaacs, London. Charles Odier, Paris.
Georg Gëro, Copenhagen. Robert Wälder, Vienna.

Business Meeting. August 4. 3.30 *p.m. Chairman:* Dr. Ernest Jones, London.

President's Report: Dr. Ernest Jones said: My report of the various Societies is more concise than usual because most of it is dwarfed in importance by two problems that will doubtless engage your chief attention, problems which have a certain relationship to each other, concerning America and Vienna respectively. The other Societies I will pass rapidly over, in alphabetical order.

At the last moment we have received a dossier of some thirty-seven pages from the President and Secretary of the American Psychoanalytic Association. There has hardly been time to digest it, and I am sure that the matter it contains will furnish material for discussion at the next Congress as well as at the present one. I must nevertheless try to present the gist of it to you now and will confine myself to the essentials.

Substantially the communications on the one hand inform us of various activities in the American Association and on the other hand make various suggestions to the International Association concerning the conduct of its organization. The latter are to the effect that the International Association should cease to exist as an administrative and executive body and should resolve itself entirely into a Congress for scientific purposes only. Even stronger are the terms in which the suggestion is made that the International Training Committee ' as an administrative organization endowed with executive power is not only very undesirable but also a paper institution '. The American Association has resolved that from henceforth it shall not be represented on the Executive Committee of the International Association, nor is any member of any American Training Committee to participate in the International Training Commission. We are further notified that the American Societies ' no longer recognize Memberships-at-Large in the International Association, or membership in a foreign Psychoanalytic Society, as applicable in the case of any psycho-analyst residing and practising in the United States '. They therefore ' urge that at the next Congress of the International Association it shall be resolved that the status of Membership-at-Large shall not apply to individuals residing and practising in the United States '. They inform us that a pressing need exists for an official organ of the American Association and that a Sub-

Committee has been formed for the purpose of dealing with this need. They support these decisions with two complaints about the International Association : first that the International Training Commission unwarrantably attempts to exercise its powers in the internal training problems of the United States, and secondly that the International Association encourages and supports those psycho-analysts in the United States who do not conform to the rules of the American Association.

The first part of the communication is a counter-part to the second. Side by side, that is to say, with the advice to reduce our administrative and executive functions comes the information that the centralizing body of the American Association, which originally was to function in a purely advisory capacity, has in practice assumed administrative and executive authority such as has never been imagined in the International Association. The Training Committee of the American Association, for example, have decreed a lengthy statement on the standards for the admission and training of physicians in psycho-analysis [thirteen pages long], which in rigour and binding force far exceed anything that any Psycho-Analytical Society or Association elsewhere had ever contemplated.

In effect these communications if acted on by this Congress would necessitate an alteration in the Statute concerning the constitution of the Central Executive, and the Statute on the constitution of the International Training Commission, together with a rescission of the resolutions of the last two Congresses concerning the continued membership of political refugees from the German Reich. If these conditions are fulfilled the American Association declares its wish to continue friendly co-operation in the form of an affiliation with the International Association.

It will at once be seen that these are very large problems which cannot be adequately resolved on a single occasion. The complaints from the Americans have caused much astonishment here and do not seem to us to be at all well founded. The American Association had, for the purposes indicated above, instituted a special Committee on the relations of the American Association to the International Association, and I would propose that we form a similar Committee to confer with the Executive of the American Association.

I have had no report from the Boston Society except the news that Dr. Hanns Sachs has resigned from the Training Committee there on a matter of principle.

In Chicago researches on asthma and hypertension are being continued and a programme of research on endocrinology has been initiated.

The New York Society has adopted a custom of holding ' interval ' meetings limited to active members only with the purpose of encouraging a more intimate and free discussion. There are seventy-three active members at present.

The Washington-Baltimore Society has been strengthened by the admission of Dr. Edith Weigert-Vowinckel. Dr. Loren B. T. Johnson has been elected an Honorary Member.

The British Society has as usual pursued an even tenor of steady progress. Miss Searl found herself obliged for theoretical reasons to resign from the Society, an event which was accompanied by regret at the loss of a valued member. The outstanding event has naturally been the arrival of our Austrian colleagues whom we have welcomed with complete cordiality. It is a matter of special gratification that Professor Freud and Miss Anna Freud are Members of our Society, the former being of course an Honorary Member.

The Danish-Norwegian Society has held regular monthly meetings. Dr. Hoel has resigned from the Society. There are five candidates in training with the Group.

I am happy to announce that the re-union of the two Dutch Groups, which our last Congress had strongly recommended, has been successfully achieved. There had been some official difficulties to be overcome, but the final consummation took place less than a month ago, on July 7. Our highly esteemed colleague, Dr. de Monchy, has been elected President, Dr. Blok, Secretary, Dr. van der Waals, Treasurer, and Drs. Katan and Tibout, Members of the Council. The official title of the Society is, as before, ' Nederlandsche Vereeniging vor Psychoanalyse ', and I am sure we shall wish this reconstituted Society a harmonious and successful future. It has been strengthened by the accession of the two Drs. Lampls.

The Finnish-Swedish Group has not been able to meet regularly, partly for geographical reasons. There has been in Sweden a wave of resistance against psycho-analysis, which we trust will not be of long duration. Progress has perhaps been more noticeable in Finland, where Dr. Kulovesi's new book has aroused general interest. Other books and articles on Psycho-Analysis have also appeared in Finnish.

The French Society have elected Professor Freud, Miss Anna Freud and myself to be Honorary Members. The standard of training and admission has been considerably raised of late in Paris. A noteworthy feature has been the extension of psycho-analysis in Paris into medical official circles. In several important hospitals and clinics there psycho-analysts are regularly employed for consultation and teaching work.

The German Society continues to live a somewhat delicate existence. The new German Institute for Psychological Research and Psycho-Therapy, of which the Psycho-Analytical Society is a separate department, was founded in May, 1936. The department has enjoyed considerable autonomy, many candidates have been trained and the total membership list increased. One of the members, Dr. Riemann, shared with Dr. Saul of Chicago the Clinical Prize Essay offered by the British Society. The

Stuttgart Psycho-Analytical Working Group, under Dr. Graber's leadership, has held regular monthly meetings.

The Hungarian Society, which has been working in close contact with the Austrian, has been very active in scientific work. Five candidates have been promoted to membership. Special interest has been taken in the extension of psycho-analysis to pedagogy. The outstanding event was the very successful Vierländertagung, which held very successful meetings in Budapest in May, 1937. The future of the Group has unfortunately darkened by the departure of their Viennese friends and with the approach of political uncertainties.

The Indian Society has sent two or three of its members to London for further study. The Society took full advantage of the important Indian Science Congress held at Calcutta last January, which I was at the last moment prevented from attending.

The Italian Society, which has not yet obtained official permission to belong to the International Association, has concentrated on intensive study work rather than on extension of its activities.

Of the Japanese Societies I have no recent news, but it is to be feared that their work must be somewhat hampered by the conditions prevailing in their country.

The Palestine Society has increased its membership to thirteen. Thirty-six analyses are being simultaneously carried out at the Institute. Dr. Eitingon is satisfied with the signs of rapidly increasing interest in psycho-analysis in Palestine.

The Swiss Society makes steady and satisfactory progress, both in scientific meetings and in training.

I have now to make a report about the unhappy fate that has befallen the Vienna Society. How unlikely did it seem when I participated in its first meetings more than thirty-two years ago that it should be my lot to have to recommend the practical dissolution of this, the mother of all psycho-analytical societies, on March 20 of this year. A photograph of the historic document incorporating this event appeared in the July number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL. The President of the Society, Professor Freud, accepted the recommendation that the good-will and duties of the Society be transferred to the German Psycho-Analytical Society, but of the final outcome of this procedure we are still in doubt. Widespread help was at once forthcoming for our dispossessed Viennese colleagues, all of whom, with the exception of four, are settling in English-speaking countries.

In concluding this report I may mention that the present membership of the International Association amounts to 560, of which, approximately, 30 per cent. are in America.

We have five deaths to record from our membership. In the February

of last year the Viennese Society lost one of its most distinguished members in the person of Lou Andreas-Salomé. This remarkable woman, of whom it will always be remembered that she obtained the close friendship of the greatest man of the nineteenth century and the greatest man of the twentieth, was already in the fifties when she became acquainted with psycho-analysis. Although she did not play a prominent part in our circles, she continued to practise analysis for a quarter of a century and made a number of valuable contributions to our literature.

The New York Society has lost two of its prominent members. Dr. Dorian Feigenbaum, whose vivid personality will long be remembered, played a leading part in the foundation of the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* and was one of the most active members in New York.

Dr. Frankwood E. Williams, whose value to psycho-analysis was more extensive than intensive, played a very important part in the mental hygiene movement in the United States and was able to arouse interest in psycho-analysis in ever-widening circles.

The Washington-Baltimore Society has lost its first President in the person of Dr. William A. White, one of the pioneers of psycho-analysis in the United States. I first met him in 1907 and he was one of those who helped me to found the American Psychoanalytic Association a couple of years later. Though never a practising psycho-analyst himself, he did much both by direct encouragement and by the propagation of its teachings in his numerous writings to extend interest in psycho-analysis in his country. His friends will miss in him a lovable and inspiring comrade.

Jean Frois-Wittmann, one of the most promising of the younger members of the French Society, died last October to the great regret of his colleagues.

I will now ask you to rise in respect to these colleagues we have lost through death.

Treasurer's Report. Dr. Sarasin stated that the receipts since the last Congress amounted to 6,699.27 Swiss francs; expenditure to 7,881.27 Swiss francs, leaving a debit balance of 1,182 Swiss francs, which has been more than covered by the credit balance of June 30, 1936. The existing credit balance stood at 2,027.50 Swiss francs.

Owing to the devaluation of the Swiss franc on September 26, 1938, the value of the annual subscription to the International Psycho-Analytical Association (2 dollars) was 10 Swiss francs instead of 8.

Since January 1, 1938, it had become uncertain whether three disbursements made by the Treasurer would ever be recovered. They were as follows: Hungarian Society, 351.32 Hungarian pengö, Vienna Verlag, 275.93 Austrian schillings, loan to the Vienna Verlag, 4,876.78 Swiss francs. Dr. Bálint gave a report on the financial situation and publishing activities of the Hungarian group.

Dr. Sarasin proposed an increase of the contribution to 10 Swiss francs instead of 8. Dr. Jones suggested giving the Treasurer power to vary the amount of the contribution, taking into consideration political and currency problems, the amount to be ratified by the Central Executive. After discussion by Drs. Odier, Lagache and Laforgue this was agreed to.

The meeting then considered Dr. Jones' report on the relations between the American Psychoanalytic Association and the International Psycho-Analytical Association, and his suggestion that a special committee be appointed to consider the matter and to enter into negotiations with the American Psychoanalytic Association. Dr. Bálint supported this proposal, which was carried. The following were elected as members of the sub-committee: Dr. Edward Bibring, Madame Marie Bonaparte, Miss Anna Freud, Dr. Edward Glover, Dr. Ernest Jones. With regard to the nomination of American members to the Central Executive in accordance with the International Statutes, it was decided to postpone any such nominations for the present.

The formation of the Topeka Psychoanalytic Group. After discussion it was decided to accept this group on the provisional assumption that they desired to be included as members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

Various problems arising out of the constitution of the International Training Commission and of Direct Membership were then considered. After a lengthy discussion (Drs. Staub, Bálint, Lorand, Nunberg, Mack-Brunswick, Laforgue, Finlayson, Eitingon, Miss Anna Freud, and Madame Marie Bonaparte), the motion of Drs. Staub and Bálint was agreed to, namely, that these matters should be left to the Committee to consider. It was also agreed that for the purposes of official membership the Vienna Society should be regarded as still existing.

Dr. Hollós expressed his gratitude to the Vienna Society for their active co-operation with the Hungarian Society, adding that it had been decided to continue the activities of the Hungarian group as formerly. Dr. Pfeifer supported Dr. Hollós' remarks.

Dr. Bornstein expressed the gratitude of the Prague Group to the Vienna Society.

Dr. Eitingon then presented a report of the International Training Commission, referring amongst other points to the assumption that this body exercised executive power over branch societies. In reply to a question by Dr. Lorand, Dr. Eitingon explained that this was not so.

Dr. Bibring reported on the state of the Verlag and the arrangements made for securing publication of journals, etc., in Holland. Dr. Pfeifer raised the question of subscriptions to the JOURNAL. Dr. Róheim suggested that the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS should be the sole official organ.

Dr. Jones replied that it was highly desirable to retain the old subscribers to the *Zeitschrift*.

Dr. Jones reported the transfer from Vienna to London of the Bibliographical Centre.

Dr. van Emden proposed that the next Congress should take place in Holland, but after some discussion it was agreed to accept Dr. Jones' invitation to hold it in England.

Dr. Laforgue re-opened the discussion of relations between the International Executive and the American Psychoanalytic Association, stating his view that the practical aspects of this problem should be sacrificed to some extent to the moral considerations. He proposed a resolution to the effect that the Congress regretted that just at this time the American Psychoanalytic Association should propose abstention from the activities of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. After discussion by Drs. Leuba, Sarasin, Staub, Finlayson, Löwenstein, Miss Anna Freud and Madame Marie Bonaparte the resolution was defeated by an overwhelming majority. Dr. Sarasin emphasized the necessity (in view of the difficult financial situation of the International Association) of rigid economy in administration.

The following members of the International Training Commission, namely, Drs. Eitingon and Bibring, and Miss Anna Freud, were re-elected unanimously.

The following members of the Council were re-elected: Drs. Jones, Sarasin, Glover and Eitingon, Madame Marie Bonaparte, Miss Anna Freud. Dr. Sarasin was re-elected Treasurer, and Dr. Glover was re-elected Secretary.

Dr. Jones then vacated the Chair, which was taken by Dr. Hollós.

Dr. Hollós proposed that Dr. Jones be re-elected President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. This was passed with acclamation.

The meeting then terminated.

Reports of Proceedings of Societies

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

1937

December 27 and 28. Dr. C. P. Oberndorf: 'Significance of the Preservation of Reality Situations in Depersonalization States'.

Dr. T. Benedek: 'Influences of the Environment and Adaptation to Reality in Early Infancy'.

Dr. H. Flanders Dunbar: 'Psychoanalysis and the General Hospital'.

Dr. F. Deutsch: 'Pain as a Psychosomatic Problem'.

Dr. L. Bartemeier: 'The Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of Chronic Exudative Dermatitis'

Dr. H. Levey : ' Poetry Production as an Emergency Defence of Anxiety '.

Round Table Discussion : ' Schizophrenia '.

Dr. L. Dooley : ' A Genetic Study of the Relation of Humour to Masochism '.

Dr. L. Tower : ' Premature Birth as a Factor in Development of a Paranoid Depressive Mechanism '.

Dr. T. M. French : ' Modifications of Instinctual Patterns in Reaction to Opportunity and Frustration '.

1938

June 3 *and* 4. Dr. B. D. Lewin : ' A Psychoanalytic Study of the Relationship of Knowing and Believing '.

Dr. F. Deutsch : ' The Associative Anamnesis '.

Dr. H. Flanders Dunbar : ' Character and Symptom Formation '.

Dr. B. Warburg : ' A Suicidal Attempt, a Pregnancy Fantasy and a Pregnancy in the Same Patient '.

Dr. S. Rado : ' Looking Medically at Instinctual Drives '.

Dr. O. Fenichel : ' The Misapprehended Oracle '.

Dr. C. B. Zachry : (by invitation) ' Contributions of Psychoanalysis to the Education of the Adolescent '.

Round Table Discussion : ' Scientific Problems of Training in Psychoanalysis '.

Dr. R. Knight : ' Projection, Introjection and Identification '.

Dr. E. Buxbaum : (by invitation) ' Gangster and Detective in Child Analysis '.

Dr. J. A. P. Millet : ' Art as a Medium for Encouraging Return to Reality '.

Drs. B. Mittelmann and H. J. Wolfe : (by invitation) ' Affects and Skin Temperature '.

Dr. C. P. Oberndorf : ' Time and Reality '.

Dr. M. Ribble : ' Latent Oxygen Hunger as a Factor in Infantile Anxiety '

Round Table Conference : ' Psychosomatic Problems and Research '.

L. S. Kubie.

THE BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1937

October 12. Dr. I. H. Coriat : ' Unconscious Motives of Interest in Chess '.

Dr. N. Anthonisen : On Freud's writings concerning ' Super-Ego and Ego Ideal '.

November 9. Dr. Ives Hendrick : On Anna Freud's book : ' *The Defence Mechanism of the Ego* '.

December 19. Dr. G. Zilboorg (New York) : ' Some Observations on the Transformation of Instincts '.

1938

February 26. Dr. S. Rado (New York) : ' Practical Aspects of our Therapeutic Technique '.

March 16. Dr. F. Deutsch : ' Asthma—A Psychosomatic Problem '.

April 30. Dr. E. Homburger : ' The Sioux Yesterday and Today : A Study in Social Pathology '.

J. M. Murray.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

October 5. Mr. Pryns Hopkins : ' Analytic Observations on the *scala perfectionis* of the Mystics '.

October 19. Discussion on Congress Symposium ' On the Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psycho-analysis '.

November 3. Dr. M. Middlemore : ' Observations on the Behaviour of New-born Infants at the Breast '.

November 17. Continued discussion on Congress Symposium ' On the Theory of Therapeutic Results of Psycho-analysis '.

December 1. Dr. A. Gross : ' On an Infantile Source of Chauvinism and Race Hatred '.

1938

January 26. Dr. O. Fenichel : ' Ego Disturbances and their Treatment '.

February 2. Mrs. S. Isaacs : ' An Acute Psychotic Anxiety occurring in a Boy of Four Years '.

February 16. Continued discussion on Congress Symposium ' On the Theory of Therapeutic Results of Psycho-analysis '.

March 2. Dr. W. R. D. Fairbairn : ' The Nature of Æsthetic Experience '.

April 6. Mrs. Susan Isaacs : ' The Nature of the Evidence concerning Mental Life in the Earliest Years '.

May 4. Mrs. E. Rosenfeld : ' Psycho-analytic Approach in a Case of Psychosis '.

May 18. Dr. M. Schmideberg : ' Technical Problems in a Suicidal Case '.

May 31. Mrs. Susan Isaacs : Resumé of ' The Nature of the Evidence concerning Mental Life in the Earliest Years ', and discussion.

June 29. Dr. I. Matte Blanco : ' A Case of Alcoholism '.

E. Glover.

THE CHICAGO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1937

October 9. Dr. T. M. French : ' Modifications of Instinctual Pattern in Reaction to Opportunity and Frustration '.

October 23. Dr. M. Grotjahn : ' Akinesia after Ventriculography : A Contribution to the Problem of Sleep '.

November 6. Dr. T. M. French : A continuation of ' Modifications of Instinctual Pattern in Reaction to Opportunity and Frustration '.

November 20. Dr. F. Alexander : ' Comments on the Emotional Factors in Essential Hypertension '.

December 4. Dr. J. Kasanin : ' Conceptual Thinking in Schizophrenia ' (with the collaboration of Dr. Hanfmann).

December 18. Dr. H. Stack Sullivan : ' Therapy and Pseudo-Therapy in a More or Less Psychoanalytic Situation '.

1938

January 22. Mrs. L. Finkelstein (guest) : ' Introduction to Graphology '.

February 5. Dr. G. J. Mohr : ' A Feeding Problem '.

Dr. L. Tower : ' Prematurity as a Factor in the Paranoid Depressive Mechanism '.

February 19. Dr. R. R. Grinker : ' A Comparison of Psychological " Repression " and Neurological " Inhibition " '.

March 19. Dr. L. Bollmeier : ' A Paranoid Mechanism in Male Overt Homosexuality '.

April 2. Dr. Herbert Feigl : ' Criteria of Scientific Method '.

May 23. Dr. H. B. Levey : ' A Critique of the Theory of Sublimation '.

June 4. Joint Scientific Meeting with the American Psychoanalytic Association. Round Table on Psychosomatic Problems.

G. Mohr.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIAN STUDY GROUP

1938

January 8. Dr. O. Fenichel : ' Strength and Weakness of the Ego '.

February 7. Dr. O. Fenichel : ' Report on a Visit to the Psycho-Analytical Societies of Western Europe '.

February 11. Frau Mayer-Olden : ' On Neurotic Sleep Disturbances '.

February 25. ' Abstracts of the Psycho-Analytical Literature on Agoraphobia '.

March 7. Frau Peller-Roubiczek (guest) : ' On the Origin of Speech '.

March 11. H. Heilborn : ' Contribution to the Problems of Archaic Object Relation '.

March 25. Short Communications : Dr. E. Windholz : ' Fever and Infantile Sexuality '. Dr. H. Loewenfeld : ' A Patient's Criminal Acts '.

Dr. O. Fenichel: ' On the Psycho-Analysis of Prostitution ', and ' Anecdotes from a Practice '.

April 1. Frau Mayer-Olden: ' On Adolescent " Gangs " '.

April 11. Reports on ' Psycho-Analysis and Criminology '.

O. Fenichel.

DANISH-NORWEGIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

September 28. Continuation of Discussion on ' Problems of Technique '.

October 29. Discussion of an Attack upon Psycho-Analysis in the Psychiatric Society.

November 23. G. Günther (guest): ' Case Reports '.

December 17. M. Raknes (guest): ' Case Reports '.

1938

January 14. M. Raknes (guest): ' Case Reports '.

February 14. Dr. P. Bernstein (guest): ' Case Reports '.

March 4. Dr. P. Bernstein; M. Raknes (guests): ' Case Reports '.

March 25. Dr. T. Braatøy; Dr. P. Bernstein (guest): ' Case Reports '.

May 13. M. Raknes (guest): ' Case Reports '.

June 3. Dr. T. Braatøy: ' The Development of Psycho-Analysis in Relation to Hysteria '.

June 17. Dr. O. Raknes: ' Discussion on Dr. W. Reich's Character Analysis by Vegeto-Therapy '.

O. Raknes.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

October. Dr. S. Weyl: ' Initial Difficulties in Analysis '.

November. Dr. M. Katan: Report on Freud's ' Analysis Terminable and Interminable '.

December. General Discussion on the Problem of Interruption of Analysis.

1938

January. Dr. Th. Reik: ' On Erotogenic Masochism '.

February. Dr. O. Fenichel (guest): ' On Lying '.

March. Dr. K. Landauer: ' On the Development of the Affects '.

April. Dr. R. Le Coultre: ' On Depersonalization in Meyrinck '.

May. Dr. B. C. Baas: ' On a Disturbance in Writing in a Child ', and ' On Exhibitionism in a Boy '.

June. Dr. A. Katan: ' On an Inhibition of Apprehension in a Girl, Interpreted by Her Mother '.

Miss A. Citrœn: ' On an Analysis in Writing '.

J. E. G. van Emden.

FINNISH-SWEDISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

September 20. Dr. A. Tamm : ' On Sublimation '.

October 4. Dr. G. Nycander : ' " Abstinence " and " Activity " during Psycho-Analytic Treatment '.

October 18. Dr. T. Sandström : ' Report on Dr. T. Braatøy's paper " Psycho-Analytic Technique and Therapy in the Light of Experimental Biology " '.

November 1. Discussion of Freud's ' Psycho-Analysis Terminable and Interminable '.

November 15. Continuation of Discussion on ' Analysis Terminable and Interminable '.

December 3. Dr. G. Gerö : ' On Problems of Oral Fixation '.

1938

January 24. Dr. P. H. Törngren : Report on Freud's ' Constructions in Analysis '.

February 7. Discussion : ' The Position of Lay Analysis in Scandinavia '. Dr. A. Tamm : ' A Childhood Memory : A Contribution to Freud's " Constructions in Analysis " '. Dr. G. Nycander : ' A Case of Alcoholism '.

February 21. Cand. med. N. Haak : On Anna Freud's ' The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence '.

March 7. Cand. med. N. Haak : ' Fragments of the Analysis of a Woman Patient with Distinct Oral Tendencies '.

Dr. A. Tamm : ' A Transference Situation '.

March 20. Dr. G. Gerö (guest) : ' A Case of Asthma '.

May 9. Dr. T. Sandström : ' Report on the Main Points of Alfred Adler's Theory of the Neuroses '.

May 30. Dr. E. Reinius (guest) : Report on R. Wälder's ' The Principle of Multiple Function : Observations on Over-Determination ', and ' On the Latent Metaphysical Elements of the Psychological Schools '.

A. Tamm.

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

October 26. M. Schlumberger read two original papers by the late M. Frois-Wittmann.

November 16. M. Schlumberger : ' A Case of Epilepsy '.

December 21. Dr. A. Garma : ' Rimbaud's Neurosis '.

February 21 *and* 22. Tenth Meeting of French-speaking Analysts. Dr. S. Nacht : ' Masochism. A Historical, Clinical and Psychogenetic Study '. Dr. R. Loewenstein : ' Masochism and Its Relations to the Theory of Obsession '.

1938

March 21. Mlle. Feibel : ' A Case of Obsessional Masturbation '.

April 25. Mlle. F. Marette : ' A Character Neurosis Based on Self-Punishment '.

June 20. Dr. M. Cenac : ' Treatment of Aggressiveness in a Little Girl by Play '.

J. Leuba.

GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

October 15. Frau Seiff : ' Report on the Copenhagen Psychotherapeutic Congress '.

October 29. Frau M. Seiff : Report on K. Horney's book *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*.

November 26. Frau Achelis-Lehbert : ' A Case of Conversion Hysteria '.

December 10. Dr. C. Müller-Braunschweig : ' Contribution to the Structure of Psychotherapeutic Psychology '.

1938

January 14. Herr F. Riemann : Report on Toni Wolff's ' Introduction to the Elements of the Complex Psychology '.

January 20. Dr. J. Cellarius : ' A Case of Hysteria with Schizoid Traits '.

February 4. Frau Dr. Buder-Schenck : Report on Corri's ' C. G. Jung's Psychology '.

February 18. Fräulein Käte Dräger : Report on C. G. Jung's ' The Psychology of Dementia præcox '.

April 30. Discussion : (*a*) ' The Attitude towards Patient's Difficulties in Dream Association '. (*b*) ' The Analyst's Attitude towards Uncompromising Transference Demands '.

May 6. Discussion : ' Problems of Technique (Passive and Active Technique) '.

May 20. Dr. W. Kemper ; Dr. H. Schultz-Hencke : ' The Importance of Transference in the Healing Process '.

May 28. Dr. C. Müller-Braunschweig : (*a*) ' The Rôle of Repetition Phenomena in Neurosis and in Psychotherapeutic Technique '. (*b*) ' The Problem of the Technique of " Working Through " '.

June 17. Continuation of the Discussion on the Papers of May 28.

June 23. Herr A. Aichhorn (Vienna) : (*a*) ' The Capacity for Reality Adaptation '. (*b*) ' The Question of Depth Psychology and Pedagogics '.

July 1. Dr. W. Kemper : Short Communications. (*a*) ' An Atypical Variant of Homosexual Object-Choice in Women '. (*b*) ' Dichronous Parapraxes '

July 15. Frau Dr. Arnold-Graf : ' Technical Difficulties in the Analysis of an Artist '.

September 24. Herr F. Rieman : ' On a Case of Homosexuality'

In November 1938 the German Psycho-Analytical Society, transformed into Arbeitsgruppe A of the Deutsche Institut für psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie, resigned its membership of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. C. Müller-Braunschweig.

STUTTGART PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY CIRCLE

1937

November 5. Dr. G. H. Graber: ' On Psycho-Analytic Procedure and Its Therapeutic Results '.

November 13 (at Berlin): Dr. G. H. Graber: ' Deliverance from Suffering '.

December 17. Dr. F. Schottländer: ' The Rôle of the Mother in Neurotic Symptom Formation '.

1938

January 15. Dr. G. Scheunert (Erfurt): ' Minor Problems of Psychotherapy '.

February 4. Dr. H. Gundert: ' A Digest of the Theory of the Neuroses '.

February 18. Discussion on Dr. Gundert's paper. G. H. Graber.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

October 8. Dr. Zs. Pfeifer: Report on Dr. L. Szondi's book *Analysis of Marriages*.

October 22. Continuation of Discussion on Dr. L. Szondi's book.

November 5. Dr. S. Feldmann: ' A Contribution to Freud's Theory of Wit '.

December 3. Symposium: ' On the Rôle of Mother Fixation in Homosexual Manifestations '.

December 17. Dr. F. Hann-Kende: Report on K. Horney's book *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*.

1938

January 14. Dr. A. Bálint: ' Mother Love and Children's Love '.

February 11. Frau Dr. Felszeghy: ' From the Analysis of a Six-Year-Old Girl '.

February 25. Dr. I. Hermann: ' The Self-Formative Activity of the Ego '.

March 11. Dr. L. Hajdu: ' On the Etiology of Schizophrenia '.

April 1. Dr. M. Bálint: ' Reality Testing in Schizophrenia '.

May 5. Dr. M. Brunner (guest): ' On a Borderline Case of Schizophrenia '.

May 12. Dr. R. Bak: ' Variations of Superficial Thinking in Schizophrenia '.

May 28. Ferenczi Memorial Meeting. Dr. L. Révész: ' The Importance of Early Traumata '.

June 3. ' Analysis of Descartes' Dream and the Development of Science '.

June 17. Dr. E. Petö : ' A Case of Negative Therapeutic Reaction '.

June 24. Dr. T. Rajka : ' Experimental Contributions to the Problem of Anxiety '.

July 1. Dr. R. Amar : ' A Case of Rapid Symptomatic Improvement '.

S. Pfeifer.

THE INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

March 4. Lieut.-Colonel Berkeley-Hill : ' Criticism of the Psycho-Analytical Conception of a Perversion '.

September 9. Dr. S. L. Sarkar : ' Report on a Case of Hallucination and Dream of a Religiously minded Sanyasi '.

Mr. H. P. Maiti : ' Concept of Normality '.

1938

January 4. Dr. G. Bose : ' The Paranoid Ego '.

March 3. Dr. G. Bose : ' The Action of Benzedrine on the Body and the Mind '.

May 14. Dr. G. Bose : ' The Mechanisms of Defiance '.

May 21. Mr. M. N. Banerji : ' Primal Scene and Tantrik Worship '.

M. N. Banerji.

PALESTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

December 25 (at Jerusalem) : Dr. Th. Reik : ' On Masochism '.

1938

January 22 (at Tel-Aviv). Dr. Rothschild (guest) : ' The Rôle of the Nervous and Endocrine System in the Development and Gratification of Instincts '.

February 19 (at Jerusalem). Dr. G. Barag : ' The Rôle of the Mother in the Religious Conceptions of the Jews '.

March 26 (at Tel-Aviv). Dr. E. Gumbel : ' Psycho-Analytic Case Reports '.

April 30 (at Jerusalem). Dr. E. Gumbel : ' Psycho-Analytic Case Reports '.

June 4 (at Tel-Aviv). Mrs. Obernik-Reiner : ' The Sexual Problems of the Palestinian Child '.

I. Schalit.

SENDAI PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

Professor K. Marui lectured on ' Psycho-Analysis for Students ' at the Medical Faculty of the Imperial Tohoku University at Sendai.

February 26. Dr. Ch. Hayasaka (at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting

of the Kinki Society of Neurology and Psychiatry at Osaka) : ' The Libidinal Type of Anxiety Hysterics '.

April 3. Professor K. Marui (at the Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Japanese Society of Neurology and Psychiatry at Kioto) : ' On Neuroses '. Dr. M. Yamamura : ' On an Obsessional Neurosis in a Child '.

M. Yamamura.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1937

October 6. Dr. R. Sterba : Report on Freud's ' Analysis Terminable and Interminable '.

October 23. Dr. A. Bálint (Budapest, guest) : ' Loving One's Mother and the Mother's Love '.

November 17. Dr. H. Hartmann : ' Reflections on the Problem of Adaptation '.

December 1. Dr. L. Jekels : ' The Death Instinct and Sleep '.

December 15. (1) Dr. H. Schikola (guest) : ' On Intelligence during the Latency Period '. (2) ' A Case of Collective Forgetting '.

1938

January 12. L. Peller-Roubiczek (Jerusalem, guest) : ' On the Origin of Speech '.

February 2. Dr. O. Fenichel (Prague-Los Angeles) : ' Misunderstanding the Oracle as a Motive '.

March 3. Dr. E. Hitschmann : (1) ' On Neurosis Formulæ '. (2) ' On Incontinentia Spermatica '.

R. Wälder.

THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1937

October. Dr. B. Weiniger : ' Psychotherapy of Post-Psychotic Patients '.

November. Dr. D. M. Bullard : ' Crises in Treatment Due to Analytic and Extra-Analytic Experience '.

December. Dr. W. Whitman : ' The Maternal Attitude in Psychoanalysis '.

1938

January. Round Table Discussion on ' Resistance ' opened by Dr. L. B. Hill.

February and March. Round Table Discussion on ' Interpretation ' opened by Dr. E. E. Hadley.

April. Dr. A. Greig : ' Analysis of a case of Chorea '.

May. Dr. G. Jacob : ' Notes on a Manic-Depressive '.

Dr. Dexter Bullard : ' Organization of Psychoanalytic Procedure in the Hospital '.

A. L. Stoughton.